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The unprecedented extent of globalisation, the growth of international 
business and global value chains, and businesses’ greater use of tax 
optimisation schemes have all spurred the proliferation of international tax 
disputes. The situation may be further exacerbated, at least in the short run, 
by the newly launched Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, which 
was initiated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) together with the Group of 20 (G20) as a response to 
aggressive tax planning by many multinational enterprises (MNEs). These 
are all placing significant pressure on the current system of international tax 
dispute resolution (ITDR).  
Traditionally, most tax disputes have been finalised through the Mutual 
Agreement Procedure (MAP). However, this mechanism has been 
increasingly criticised for its lack of efficiency, finality and transparency. Many 
believe the procedure is fundamentally broken. Correspondingly, the orthodox 
literature of ITDR has placed an overwhelming focus on legalistic methods of 
dispute resolution, such as tax arbitration or adjudication. In particular, 
students of ITDR tend to draw on lessons from trade and investment regimes, 
both of which are characterised by a legalistic dispute-settlement system.  
This research questions the validity of the comparative study based purely on 
legal terms, and seeks to build a self-sufficient, interdisciplinary framework for 
the topic of ITDR, drawing on the light of transaction cost (TC) theory. The 
framework facilitates a benefit-cost evaluation of the ITDR system. On the 
benefit side, the concern is to identify a dispute-settlement mode that can 
best economise the entire international tax regime. On the cost side, the 
question is which ITDR mode implies the lowest transaction costs. Based on 
this benefit-cost analysis, a MAP-based dispute-settlement system, which will 
be centred upon the MAP but supplemented by tax arbitration and mediation, 
is derived as the optimal mode of ITDR.  
 vi 
This research further explores ways to economise various ITDR mechanisms 
including the MAP, tax arbitration and mediation, still based on the TC 
framework. With respect to the MAP, the proposals on the structuring of the 
MAP process, the efficient model of tax participation, and the reassessment 
of “package deals” are intended as the most original contribution from this 
research to the existing literature of ITDR. As to tax arbitration, this research 
emphasises the synergy between the MAP and tax arbitration, highlighting 
the supplementary role of tax arbitration in the MAP-based system. In 
particular, the proposals on the documentary trial method and the wider use 
of final-offer arbitration are distinguished from the past studies. This author 
also explores solutions to address the underuse of tax mediation. In addition 
to the measures that are particular to each of these ITDR mechanisms, this 
thesis also proposes a holistic solutions to economise the entire ITDR system, 
i.e., to institutionalise the system.   




Stories of “tax battles” or even a “global tax war” increasingly appeared on 
social media. A number of leading MNEs, such as Google, Apple, Amazon 
and Starbucks, have come under fire from several tax authorities. The OECD 
statistics of the MAP cases also indicate the proliferation of tax disputes. This 
trend could be further exacerbated by the newly initiated BEPS Project. This 
is because, among others, the BEPS Project was originated by the OECD 
/G20 as a response to the aggressive tax-avoidance schemes by MNEs. 
Against this background, this thesis aims to strengthen the current ITDR 
system. 
This thesis was also inspired by an interesting observation: while trade and 
investment regimes have developed legalistic methods of dispute resolution, 
typically in the form of arbitration or panel procedures, most tax disputes are 
channelled through the MAP. Many believe that trade/investment dispute 
settlement system represents a promising direction for the evolution of the tax 
equivalent, since the MAP, which is essentially an inter-governmental 
negotiation procedure, falls short of finality and transparency and could be 
extremely time-consuming. As a result, the orthodox literature of ITDR is 
overwhelmingly focused on tax arbitration. However, as one commentator 
contends: even centuries ago, there were calls for an International Tax Court 
(ITC), but until now, most tax disputes have been resolved through the MAP. 
So the question is what makes tax disputes resolution so different. The 
orthodox reply is that taxation is the lifeblood of sovereignty. However, isn’t it 
the case that investment law and trade law also involve vital national 
interests?  
In seeking to identify the optimal mode of an ITDR system, this author chose 
not to rely on the sovereignty argument, but to conduct a benefit-cost analysis 
of the system, drawing on economic theory, especially TC theory. The 
analysis indicates that a MAP-based system is the optimal mode of ITDR. 
 viii 
From the benefit perspective, this system is congruent with the characteristics 
of the entire international tax regime. Specifically, this author argues that the 
international tax regime is remarkably benign as opposed to its trade and 
investment equivalents. Normally, legalistic dispute settlement is far more 
likely to occur when there is no ongoing relationship between the parties or 
where such a relationship has terminated.  
From a cost perspective, this thesis argues that the MAP-based system is the 
most cost-efficient ITDR mode. Specifically, the MAP is more flexible than 
either tax arbitration or mediation. Tax authorities are specialists not only in 
general tax administration but also in the specific allocation of cross-border 
tax bases. Therefore, it is efficient to have tax disputes resolved by tax 
authorities through the MAP in the first place. It is true that “unscrupulous” tax 
authorities may strategically obstruct the process. However, the nature of the 
international tax regime determines that the risk of opportunism with the ITDR 
process is substantially lower than with the dispute settlement process in 
trade and investment regimes.  
Despite the advantages of the MAP and the MAP-based ITDR system, this 
thesis does acknowledge the MAP’s deficiencies. Among others, tax 
authorities may care more about revenue collection than about the timely 
resolution of tax disputes and the elimination of double taxation. The 
negotiation between tax authorities may end up in deadlock. Therefore, the 
MAP mechanism needs to be strengthened from both within and without. 
From within the MAP mechanism, this thesis focuses on how to: (a) constrain 
the opportunism of the tax authorities in charge of MAP cases; and (b) break 
the bargaining impasse in MAP negotiations. From without, the MAP can be 
strengthened by third-party procedures including tax arbitration and mediation. 
This thesis also proposes a holistic solution to economise the entire ITDR 
system, i.e. to institutionalise the system. Various dispute-settlement 
institutions can engage in the resolution of tax disputes as well as the 
international coordination of ITDR policies.  
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1. Background problem and research question 
Where cross-border flows of trade and investment take place, there are risks 
that two or more countries claim tax jurisdictions over the same taxpayer with 
respect to the same income.1 The resulting tax disputes and double taxation 
may overburden cross-border economic activities. In a 2014 Ernst & Young 
survey covering over 830 tax and finance executives in 25 jurisdictions, 81% 
of the respondents voiced their uneasiness about tax risks and tax 
controversies over the next two years.2 The MAP statistics also speak for 
themselves. For instance, 2,509 new MAP cases were initiated in the OECD 
economies during 2015, an increase of 142.2% over the 1,036 cases in 
2006.3 The inventory of unresolved MAP cases at the end of 2015 amounted 
to 6,176, an increase of 162.59% over the number of cases at the end of 
2006.4 Furthermore, stories of “tax battles” or even a “global tax war” have 
increasingly appeared in headlines on social media. A number of leading 
MNEs, such as Google, Apple, Amazon, and Starbucks, have been 
challenged by the relevant states’ tax authorities about their tax planning 
arrangements.5  
                                                        
1 OECD, ‘Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures (MEMAP)’ 8 (Section 1.1.2). 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/manualoneffectivemutualagreementprocedures-index.htm> 
accessed 18 March 2018. 
2 ‘EY 2014 Tax Risk and Controversy Survey Highlights’ 
<http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/Tax-policy-and-controversy/EY-2014-tax-risk-controversy-sur
vey-01-summary> accessed 1 February 2018. 
3 ‘Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics (2006-2015)’ (OECD) 
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/dispute/map-statistics-2006-2015.htm> accessed 31 January 2018. 
4 ibid.   
5 John Gapper, ‘Alphabet and Apple Spell Global Tax War’ (Financial Times, 27 January 2016) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/7414a126-c41d-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45> accessed 31 January 2018; 
Juliette Garside, ‘War of Words Hots up between US and EU over Tax Avoidance’ (the Guardian, 25 
August 2016) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/25/war-of-words-eu-us-tax-avoidance-starbucks-appl
e-amazon> accessed 31 January 2018. 
 2 
The proliferation of tax disputes overlaps with an era when the international 
tax regime has undergone some sea changes from both within and without, 
including the financial and economic crisis, global attempts to prevent 
international tax avoidance and evasion, and particularly, the BEPS Project 
launched by the OECD/G20 in response to aggressive tax-optimisation 
schemes by MNEs.6 These events, separately and in combination, have 
unavoidably led to escalated tensions between national tax authorities and 
taxpayers. Meanwhile, the BEPS Project, which consists of 15 action plans, 
set forth the most fundamental rewrite of international tax rules in the last 
century.7 In particular, Action 14 provides a comprehensive reform of the 
ITDR system.8 Against this background, it is now the high time to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the current ITDR system and to explore the optimal ways 
to move the system forward. This is the core research question of this thesis.  
2. Interdisciplinary approach and the antilegalistic position 
Almost in coincidence with the proliferation of tax disputes over the past few 
decades, there has also been a steep increase in the number of articles, 
books, and institutional reports devoted to the study of ITDR.9 Some even 
believe that a new discipline called the International Tax Dispute Resolution 
Process (ITDRP) is emerging.10 What difference can this research make 
within this context? To address this question, it is beneficial to take stock of 
the three common features of the existing literature on ITDR, which will be 
further elaborated in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2. The first feature is a 
                                                        
6 Luca Cerioni, ‘Book Review: Advanced Issues in International and European Tax Law’ (2016) 44 
Intertax 284, 284. 
7 ‘OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for Discussion at G20 Finance Ministers 
Meeting - OECD’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-presents-outputs-of-oecd-g20-beps-project-for-discussion-at-g20-financ
e-ministers-meeting.htm> accessed 8 April 2018. 
8 See below, Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1.  
9 Daniele de Carolis, ‘A New Approach to International Taxation Dispute Resolution Process (ITDRP)’ 
(2017) 45 Intertax 391, 391. 
10 ibid. 
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comparative approach based on purely legal terms. Students of ITDR tend to 
take trade and investment dispute-settlement systems as role models for the 
rule design of the ITDR system. Since both trade and investment regimes 
have developed a legalistic system of dispute resolution, which is 
characterised by the use of binding arbitration or a panel procedure, this 
comparative approach has led to the second feature of the ITDR literature: an 
overwhelming interest in legalistic methods of dispute resolution. A vast 
majority of the studies in the domain begin with dissatisfaction or even 
disappointment with the traditional MAP mechanism, and end with a proposal 
on the method of arbitration or adjudication in resolving tax disputes. Many 
even go further to recommend the establishment of an ITC. Brown voices her 
doubts about this “legalistic fancy”: 
Almost before there were tax treaties to provide substantive rules for 
allocating tax revenues between sovereign nations, there were calls from 
business to establish an international organization to which taxpayers could 
appeal tax disputes with governments. Yet nearly a century later, there is no 
permanent international tribunal for resolving tax disputes and only a handful 
of international tax disputes have been considered by arbitration panels. 
Meanwhile, thousands of tax cases have been resolved through the mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP) established by tax treaties.11 
The third feature of the literature is the paucity of theoretical reflection. Most 
studies in this field focus on the rule design of various ITDR mechanisms 
while largely overlooking the theoretical foundation of the system. To some 
extent, this feature accounts for the other two: due to the lack of a 
self-sufficient theoretical ground, it becomes natural for students in this area 
to resort to the comparative studies, which in turn, reinforce the “legalistic 
                                                        
11 Patricia A Brown, ‘Enhancing the Mutual Agreement Procedure by Adopting Appropriate Arbitration 
Provisions’ in Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens (eds), International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD 
2015) 85. 
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fancy” in the literature on ITDR.  
If scholars are justified in promoting a new discipline of the ITDRP, it is 
beneficial to keep in mind that a solid theoretical foundation is indispensable 
for any discipline worthy of academic pursuit.12 For that reason, this author 
elects to build an interdisciplinary approach to the research of ITDR, drawing 
on TC theory. Based on this law-and-economic framework, an antilegalistic, 
rather than legalistic, approach to the ITDR system will be proposed. In 
particular, this thesis will demonstrate that a MAP-based system is the 
optimal approach to coping with the proliferation of tax disputes. It is this 
theoretical and interdisciplinary methodology, together with an antilegalistic 
position, that primarily distinguishes this research from the bulk of the existing 
ITDR literature.13 
3. Methodology 
There are five methodological strands in this thesis: theoretical analysis, 
doctrinal analysis, document analysis, comparative study, and quantitative 
analysis. 
(1) Theoretical analysis. As discussed above, a distinctive feature of this 
thesis is the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach that draws on TC 
theory. Based on this interdisciplinary framework, the research derives the 
optimal mode of the ITDR system and develops numerous measures to 
strengthen the system.  
                                                        
12 Qiang Cai and Pengfei Zhang, ‘A Theoretical Reflection on the OECD’s New Statistics Reporting 
Framework for the Mutual Agreement Procedure: Isolating, Measuring, and Monitoring’ (2018) 21 
Journal of International Economic Law 867, 884. 
13 By “legalistic mode”, this author refers to the third-party adjudication procedures that can apply 
predetermined rules objectively in disputed cases and deliver binding judgments thereafter. On the 
contrary, the “antilegalistic” mode mainly relies on the diplomatic resolution of disputes through 
intergovernmental consultation or negotiation. See Robert A Green, ‘Antilegalistic Approaches to 
Resolving Disputes between Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes’ 
(1998) 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 79, 82. 
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(2) Doctrinal analysis. The ITDR system is mostly manifested in 
dispute-settlement clauses and other relevant provisions under 
income-tax treaties (henceforth referred to as tax treaties). Therefore, a 
doctrinal analysis of these legal instruments will be necessary for the 
understanding of the system. In particular, the recent reform of the system 
embodied in BEPS Action 14 and Parts Ⅴ and Ⅵ of the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, often termed the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), 
will be assessed separately against the theoretical principles and 
propositions developed in this thesis. 14  The doctrinal analysis of 
countries’ treaty practice on ITDR will focus on the relevant provisions of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model 
Convention), as most tax treaties are based on the OECD Model 
Convention. 
(3) Document analysis. Documents released by the OECD, EU, or other 
relevant institutions constitute important sources of data that can be fed 
into this research. 15  In particular, the thesis provides an extensive 
analysis of 45 peer-review reports published by the OECD in relation to 
the peer-review process in BEPA Action 14.16 The reports contain a large 
volume of peer comments on the MAP practices of the assessed 
jurisdictions. Due to the general requirement of confidentiality in the tax 
domain, previous assessments of ITDR practices in the literature were 
largely based on unpublished sources such as anecdotes or personal 
experiences.    
(4) Comparative study. Chapter 4 compares the ITDR system with the 
                                                        
14 See below, Chapter 5, Section 4; Chapter 6, Section 7. 
15 For the method of document analysis, see Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2004) 380. 
16 See below, Chapter 3, Section 5.3. 
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dispute-settlement systems in trade and investment regimes. In line with 
the law-and-economic approach, this comparative study focuses on 
institutional aspects, rather than purely legal aspects, of those systems. 
(5) Quantitative analysis. While the above four methods are all qualitative 
in nature, both Section 5.2 in Chapter 3 and Section 4.5 in Chapter 5 
contain a quantitative analysis of the MAP statistics.     
4. Structure of the thesis 
Chapters 1 to 4 constitute the theoretical part of the thesis, while the 
remaining chapters focus on policy suggestions. Chapter 1 contains two parts. 
The first provides an overview of the ITDR system, mainly along historical 
lines. The second contains a review of the relevant literature. Chapter 2 
provides an introduction to TC theory, which forms the theoretical foundation 
of the entire thesis. Chapter 3 conducts a benefit-cost analysis of various 
ITDR mechanisms based on TC theory. Chapter 4 compares the ITDR 
system with the trade and investment dispute-settlement systems, with a view 
to testing the viability of the arguments and conclusions put forth in the 
preceding chapter. Chapters 5 and 6 respectively explore specific measures 
to improve the MAP and the third-party procedures of ITDR (tax arbitration 
and mediation). Chapter 7 inquiries into a holistic solution to strengthen the 
entire ITDR system: institutionalisation of the system. Chapter 8 concludes.  
5. Delimitation 
5.1. EU practice in ITDR 
The way to deal with EU practice in ITDR presents a tricky question in this 
thesis. On the one hand, the EU has played an overarching role in shaping 
the ITDR system as well as the international tax regime. Above all, the 
 7 
conclusion of the Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in 
Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (EU 
Arbitration Convention or Arbitration Convention) 17  marked a historic 
milestone in the development of ITDR. Some believe that the OECD’s 
inclusion of an arbitration clause into its Model Convention through its 2008 
update was substantially inspired by the Arbitration Convention.18 Recently, 
the EU approved the Council Directive on Tax Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms in the European Union (EU Arbitration Directive), 19  which 
stands to further strengthen the dispute-settlement system under the EU tax 
regime. Furthermore, several important ITDR cases all concern the EU 
Arbitration Convention.20 
On the other hand, considering the special governance structure of the EU, it 
is doubtful whether the resolution of cross-border tax disputes within the EU 
context can be classified as an international or even regional affair in the 
usual sense. Brexit notwithstanding, the integration of the EU is so deep that 
many describe this process as “creeping federalism”.21 The term “federalism” 
denotes a form of political integration whereby member states would be 
controlled by a supranational power centre.22 Typical examples of federalism 
include the US, Germany and Canada.23 In contrast, a significant part of this 
thesis concerns the topic of international cooperation on ITDR, following the 
law-and-economic approach. Economic theory is premised on individuals’ 
capability to make free choices.24 Accordingly, for the purpose of studying 
ITDR through an economic lens, the assumption of international anarchy 
where individual countries are free – at least in de jure sense – to choose 
                                                        
17 90/463/EEC. 
18 Michelle Markham, ‘Seeking New Directions in Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Do We Need a 
Revised Mutual Agreement Procedure?’ (2016) 70 Bulletin for International Taxation 82, 83. 
19 Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852. 
20 For instance, see below, Chapter 3, Section 5.4; Chapter 5, Section 2.1.4. 
21 Nigel G Foster, Foster on EU Law (Sixth edition., Oxford University Press 2017) 14.  
22 ibid 14–15. 
23 ibid 15. 
24 See below, Chapter 1, Section 2.7.1.  
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their fiscal policies, is necessary. Obviously, this anarchical assumption does 
not fit into the EU context. For this reason, the EU’s practice in cross-border 
tax-dispute resolution, particularly with respect to the EU Arbitration 
Convention and Arbitration Directive, will only be mentioned in passing in 
Chapter 1, with a view to laying out a general background for the thesis. The 
ITDR cases in the EU context will, however, be evaluated at some length, as 
those cases contain some general information about ITDR mechanisms 
regardless of the contexts in which those mechanisms operate.             
5.2 Bilateral or multilateral tax disputes 
As corporations increasingly expand their business into a multitude of 
countries, it is not unusual for tax disputes to become multilateral. In such 
cases, the high level of similarity in fact patterns and legal issues from country 
to country strongly suggests the feasibility of a multilateral solution to dispute 
resolution.25 Several countries have already reported experiences of dealing 
with trilateral MAP cases.26 Nevertheless, the vast majority of tax disputes is 
handled in a bilateral manner, and experiences of multilateral ITDR processes 
are still relatively rare.27 Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, the analysis 
in this thesis will be mostly premised on the predominance and resolute of 
bilateral tax disputes. 
5.3 Meaning of “institution” 
Throughout this thesis, the words “institution”, “institutional”, “institutionalised” 
and “institutionalisation” will be frequently used. In the Oxford Dictionary, the 
word “institution” has two meanings. The first is “an important organisation”, 
                                                        
25 Leonard B Terr and others, ‘Resolving International Tax Disputes: APAs, Mutual Agreement 
Procedures, and Arbitration’ (20120914) 41 Tax Management International Journal 435, 439. 
26 Peer Review Reports on Japan, 65 (para.170); Germany, 61 (para.143). 
27 Terr and others (n 25) 438–439. 
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such as a university or bank. The second is “an established law or custom”.28 
Both meanings are important to this thesis, depending on the particular 
context. In the particular discussion of institutional ITDR, or the 
institutionalisation of the ITDR process (Chapter 7), the first meaning governs. 
However, the thesis as a whole examines the institutional aspect of the ITDR 
system, and in this general sense, the second meaning is also relevant.  
 
Chapter 1. Outline of the ITDR System and Literature 
Review 
1. Outline of the ITDR system 
1.1 ITDR in early times 
Ever since before World War Ⅰ, when the modern international tax regime 
was emerging, international tax treaties have been characterised by a 
nonbinding, negotiation-based, intergovernmental dispute-settlement 
mechanism.29 For instance, the 1899 tax treaty between Austria-Hungary 
and Prussian, which was the earliest tax treaty recorded by the League of 
Nations, provided that in the event of double taxation imposed upon Austria 
and Prussian nationals, the Contracting States “will enter into an 
understanding and will take appropriate measures in accordance with this 
understanding”.30  
In 1926, the United Kingdom and Ireland signed a tax treaty containing the 
                                                        
28 Catherine Soanes and Sara Hawker (eds), Compact Oxford English Dictionary for Students (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 526.  
29 Zvi Daniel Altman, Dispute Resolution under Tax Treaties (IBFD 2005) 13. 
30 ibid; League of Nations, ‘Collection of International Agreements and International Legal Provisions 
for the Prevention of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion - League of Nations Documents 
(C.345.M.102.1928. Ⅱ)’ 249.  
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first binding and mandatory dispute-settlement mechanism.31 Article 7 of the 
treaty provided that any disputes between the parties would be determined by 
a tribunal, and the determination of such tribunal would be final.32 However, 
this legalistic method of dispute settlement was an absolute exception to the 
then treaty practice, which was characterised by an antilegalistic approach.33 
The 1926 United Kingdom-Ireland tax treaty itself was terminated in 1976 by 
a new tax treaty, which returns to the MAP as the only means of dispute 
resolution.34   
1.2 Attempts by the League of Nations 
From 1923 to the outbreak of World War Ⅱ, the League of Nations had 
established several expert committees to study the question of double 
taxation as well as tax evasion. 35  Numerous draft conventions on the 
prevention of double taxation – which became the origin of the modern 
double-taxation regime – had been disseminated for discussion. 36  The 
dispute-settlement methods under these draft treaties largely followed Article 
14 of the first draft released in 1927, which contained a non-binding expert 
procedure.37 A main departure from this non-binding approach was in Articles 
17-21 of the 1931 draft treaty, under which either party could bring the dispute 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) for binding adjudication 
should the consultation and expert procedures fail to resolve the case.38 
                                                        
31 Altman (n 29) 16–17; Agreement between the British Government and the Government of the Irish 
Free State in respect of Double Income Tax (electronic Irish Statute) 1926 Art.7.  
32 Agreement between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State in respect of 
Double Income Tax (electronic Irish Statute) Art.7; see also Altman (n 29) 16–17.  
33 Altman (n 29) 18. 
34 UK/Ireland Income and Capital Gains Tax Convention (1976) 1976 Arts 24, 28. 
35 Altman (n 29) 40–50; Diane Ring, ‘International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications’ (20070101) 
60 Tax Law Review 83, 121. 
36 Altman (n 29) 43–50; Ring (n 35) 117. 
37 League of Nations, ‘Report Presented to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations by The 
Committee Of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion - League of Nations Documents  
(C.216.M. 85.1927. II)’ 12; see also Altman (n 29) 44. 
38 League of Nations, ‘Draft Plurilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Certain 
Categories of Income - League of Nations Documents (C.415. M. 171. 1931. II. A)’ 12–13; Altman (n 29) 
48–49.  
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While this Article had received no objection in the discussion, the following 
drafts went back to the non-binding mode reflected in the 1927 draft.39 The 
committee did not specify the rationale for this antilegalistic return. 40 Altman 
hints that this shift may be associated with a general movement away from 
relying on specific rules to a greater reliance on general principles in drafting 
the text of the convention.41 As the committee stated in the introduction to the 
1933 draft: 
In view of the diversity of national laws and the extreme complexity and 
variety of the individual cases that arise, the Committee thought it advisable 
to prescribe only general principles…it was of the opinion that the general 
principle…will enable all special problems to be solved with the necessary 
flexibility.42 
However, Altman does not give much weight to this speculation. Instead, he 
connects the shift of the 1933 draft convention with a League of Nations 
Resolution on international economic dispute settlement (28 January 1932).43 
The Resolution expressed a negative attitude toward the use of legalistic 
methods in resolving international economic disputes. Specifically, as the 
resolution noted, the creation of a permanent organisation and the 
appointment of arbitrators can be quite slow and laborious and may cause 
much anxiety. 44  As a result, the resolution recommended more flexible 
dispute-resolution mechanisms such as advisory opinions, conciliation, or 
                                                        
39 See 1933 draft convention League of Nations, ‘Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of 
Business Income Between States for the Purpose of Taxation - League of Nations Documents 
(C.399.M.204.1933 II A)’ 5; see also Altman (n 29) 50. 
40 See 1933 draft convention League of Nations, ‘Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of 
Business Income Between States for the Purpose of Taxation - League of Nations Documents 
(C.399.M.204.1933 II A)’ (n 39) 5; see also Altman (n 29) 50. 
41 Altman (n 29) 50. 
42 League of Nations, ‘Draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of Business Income Between States 
for the Purpose of Taxation - League of Nations Documents (C.399.M.204.1933 II A)’ (n 39) 2; Altman 
(n 29) 50.  
43 League of Nations, ‘Procedure for the Friendly Settlement of Economic Disputes Between States - 
League of Nations Documents (C.57.M.32.1932. II. B)’ 4–5; see also Altman (n 29) 50–52.  
44 League of Nations, ‘Procedure for the Friendly Settlement of Economic Disputes Between States - 
League of Nations Documents (C.57.M.32.1932. II. B)’ (n 43) 4–5; see also Altman (n 29) 50–52.  
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arbitration.45 
It could be seen that the move from a legalistic method of dispute settlement 
to a more flexible mode seemed not so much a result of concerns over 
sovereignty, but more an outcome of considerations of efficiency. In particular, 
the procedural costs and the special character of international tax rules 
played an overarching role in determining the characteristics of the ITDR 
system.     
The League of Nations’ effort to develop a model convention on the 
prevention of double taxation for all countries was ultimately disrupted by the 
outbreak of World War Ⅱ.46 Nor had those released draft conventions been 
fully accepted by national governments. Most tax treaties in force between the 
two World Wars featured the MAP or some other negotiation-based methods 
of dispute settlement.47 Nonetheless, the League of Nations’ work laid out a 
substantial ground for the current ITDR system.48            
1.3 Dispute-resolution provisions of the OECD Model Convention 
and related documents  
1.3.1 Overview 
From 1956 to 1963, the OECD undertook the task of developing a model 
convention that could effectively resolve double-taxation problems between 
OECD member countries, and would provide uniform principles, definitions, 
rules, and interpretation methods to all member countries.49 These efforts 
culminated in the 1963 Draft Model and the Commentaries, both of which 
                                                        
45 League of Nations, ‘Procedure for the Friendly Settlement of Economic Disputes Between States - 
League of Nations Documents (C.57.M.32.1932. II. B)’ (n 43) 4–5; see also Altman (n 29) 50–52.  
46 Altman (n 29) 54–55. 
47 ibid 54. 
48 OECD Model Convention (2014) Introduction, 7 (para.4). 
49 ibid Introduction, 8 (paras 5, 6). 
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have since been revised and updated numerous times.50 While originally the 
Model Convention was mainly intended for the OECD members, it has now 
become a basic document of reference in treaty negotiations for both OECD 
and non-OECD countries.51 It has also been followed by the United Nations 
Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries (UN Model Convention), although the latter places a greater 
emphasis on developing countries’ interests in allocating tax rights.52  
1.3.2 Article 25 of the OECD Model 
Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention provides the MAP as the exclusive 
means of resolving trans-border tax disputes. It sets forth three types of MAP: 
the specific case, the interpretative, and the legislative.53 The specific-case 
MAP concerns the settlement of specific disputes in which taxpayers assert 
that they are not being taxed in accordance with the treaty. 54  The 
interpretative MAP aims to address difficulties concerning the interpretation 
and application of tax treaties. 55  The legislative MAP authorises the 
competent authorities to “consult together for the elimination of double 
taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention”.56  
The topic of ITDR mainly concerns the specific-case MAP,57 which can 
generally be divided into two stages.58 In the first stage, a taxpayer may 
submit a request for MAP assistance to the competent authority of the 
Contracting State of which it is a resident, if it considers that the action of one 
                                                        
50 ibid Introduction, 8 (para.6). 
51 ibid Introduction, 9-10 (paras 10, 14). 
52 UN Model Convention(2017) Introduction, iii (para. 3). For the introduction of source jurisdiction and 
residence jurisdiction, see below, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.  
53 Green (n 13) 96; OECD, ‘MEMAP’ (n 1) 9-10 (Sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2). 
54 OECD Model Convention (2014) Art. 25 (1),(2). 
55 ibid Art. 25 (3). 
56 ibid Art.25(3). 
57 OECD, ‘MEMAP’ (n 1) 9 (Section 1.2.1). 
58 OECD Model Convention (2014) Art. 25 (1)(2); see also Jasmin Kollmann and Laura Turcan, 
‘Overview of the Existing Mechanisms to Resolve Disputes and Their Challenges’ in Michael Lang and 
Jeffrey Owens (eds), International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD 2015) 21–22. 
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or both Contracting States has resulted in taxation not in accordance with the 
tax treaty provisions.59 If the competent authority that receives the request 
(henceforth referred to as the first competent authority) decides that the 
taxpayer’s objection is justified and that it could by itself resolve the dispute, 
this authority should then unilaterally grant double-taxation relief to the 
taxpayer.60 Until this stage, the proceedings take place exclusively between 
the taxpayer and the first competent authority. However, if the first competent 
authority is unable to arrive at a satisfactory solution on its own, usually 
because the resolution of the issue involves the other Contracting State, then 
it should initiate the second stage of the proceedings: to approach the 
competent authority of its treaty partner (the second competent authority) for 
a mutual negotiation.61 The two competent authorities shall then “endeavour” 
to resolve the case by mutual agreement.62 To this end, the competent 
authorities may refer the issue to a joint commission consisting of themselves 
or their representatives.63  
1.3.3 Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures (MEMAP) 
Besides the dispute settlement provision in the Model Convention, the OECD, 
mainly through its Committee on Fiscal Affairs and the Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administrative (CTPA), has also engaged in continuous research on the 
improvement of ITDR, leading to numerous reports and guidelines on the 
subject.64 In particular, the OECD published the MEMAP in 2007, a guide 
intended to increase the awareness of the MAP process and how it should 
function.65 Specifically, it provides tax administrations and taxpayers with 
                                                        
59 OECD Model Convention (2014) Art. 25(1). 
60 ibid Art. 25(2). 
61 ibid Art. 25 (2). 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid Art. 25 (4). 
64 For example, see the OECD’s 2004 Report on ‘Improving the Process for Resolving International 
Tax Disputes’, 2007 Report on ‘Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes’; see also Altman (n 29) 
61–66. 
65 OECD, ‘MEMAP’ (n 1) Preface. 
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basic information on the operation of the MAP and identifies best MAP 
practices, albeit with no binding effects.66 Some ten years later, numerous 
measures recommended in the MEMAP as best practices were incorporated 
in BEPS Action 14 as the minimum standard of MAP practice.67    
1.4 EU Arbitration Convention 
Recognising that double taxation constitutes an impediment to the internal 
market of Europe, the Council of the European Communities signed the 
Arbitration Convention in 1990.68 The Convention came into effect on 1 
January 1995 after all the then-Member States ratified the instrument.69 The 
dispute-resolution procedure under the Arbitration Convention begins with a 
typical specific-case MAP, which presents no significant difference from 
Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention. The two instruments diverge at the 
point where the MAP goes awry.70 Article 7(1) of the Arbitration Convention 
provides that if the competent authorities fail to reach an agreement within 
two years from the presentation of the case, they are then required to set up 
an Advisory Commission charged with delivering an opinion on the case.71 
The Advisory Commission typically consists of two representatives of each 
competent authority concerned and an even number of independent persons 
of standing to be appointed by mutual agreement.72 The opinion of the 
Advisory Commission is decided by a simple majority vote and should be 
delivered within no more than six months from the date on which the matter 
                                                        
66 ibid. 
67 See below, Chapter 5, Sections 4.2, 4.6. 
68 90/463/EEC; see also Andreas Bernath, ‘The Implications of the Arbitration Convention: A Step Back 
for the European Community or a Step Forward for Elimination of Transfer Pricing Related Double 
Taxation (Thesis)?’ [2006] Jönköping University 20–21. 
69 EU Commission, ‘Transfer Pricing and the Arbitration Convention’ (Taxation and Customs Union - 
European Commission, 13 September 2016) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/transfer-pricing-eu-context/transfer-prici
ng-arbitration-convention_en> accessed 1 May 2019; Bernath (n 68) 22. 
70 Bernath (n 68) 47–48. 
71 90/463/EEC, Art. 7(1). 
72 90/463/EEC, Art. 9(1), (4). 
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was referred to it.73 After the opinion has been delivered, the competent 
authorities have additional six months to take a decision to eliminate the 
double taxation.74 The competent authorities may by consent take a decision 
that deviates from the Advisory Commission’s opinion.75 However if they fail 
to agree on such a decision, they are obliged to comply with the Advisory 
Commission’s opinion.76 
1.5 2008 update to the OECD Model Convention   
In Article 25 of its 2008 update, the OECD Model Convention included an 
arbitration clause.77 Specifically, where the competent authorities are unable 
to resolve the dispute within the two-year time frame of the MAP, any 
unresolved issues will be submitted to arbitration upon the request of the 
taxpayer concerned.78 The arbitration decision shall be binding on both 
Contracting States unless the taxpayer does not accept it. 79  The 
Commentary on the Article notes that the arbitration procedure is instituted as 
an extension of the MAP rather than an alternative means of dispute 
resolution.80   
Article 25(5) does not set out any detailed rules for the operation of tax 
arbitration. Only the Commentary on the Article contains in its Annex a 
sample arbitration procedure (OECD Sample Procedure), which can be used 
by the competent authorities as a basis to agree on the mode of implementing 
the arbitration procedures. 81  The Sample Procedure takes conventional 
arbitration as the starting point, but allows the competent authorities to 
                                                        
73 90/463/EEC, Art. 11(1), (2). 
74 90/463/EEC, Art. 12(1). 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid. 
77 Chloe Burnett, ‘International Tax Arbitration’ (2007) 36 Australian Tax Review 173, 173. 
78 OECD Model Convention (2014) Art. 25(5). 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid Commentary on Art. 25, 388-389 (para. 64). 
81 ibid Sample Procedure, 398-413; See also Kollmann and Turcan (n 58) 35–36. 
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choose the “streamline arbitration process”, typically the final-offer arbitration, 
as an alternative mode of arbitration. 82  The comparison between the 
conventional and final-offer modes of arbitration will be discussed later in this 
thesis.83 The Sample Procedure also provides rules for the key stages of tax 
arbitration including the submission of an arbitration request, the settlement 
of the Terms of Reference, the appointment of arbitrators, procedural ad 
evidentiary rules, costs, and so on.84        
Following the 2008 update to the OECD Model Convention, the UN Model 
also added in its 2011 update an optional version of Article 25 (Alternative B), 
which provides arbitration for unresolved MAP issues. 85  The UN 
Commentary on Article 25 also contains in its Annex a sample arbitration 
procedure (UN Sample Procedure).86 The arbitral procedure under the UN 
Model differs from that of the OECD Model in five major aspects:87  
(1) The time period required for the trigger of arbitration is three years 
from the presentation of the case, rather than two years, as is in the 
OECD Model.88  
(2) The arbitration must be requested by the competent authority of one of 
the Contracting States rather than the taxpayer. This means that access to 
arbitration would be denied for cases where the competent authorities of 
both Contracting States consider such cases not suitable for arbitration.89 
(3) The competent authorities may depart from the arbitration decision if 
they agree to do so within six months after the decision is issued.90 This is 
akin to Article 12(1) of the EU Arbitration Convention.  
                                                        
82 OECD Model Convention (2014) Sample Procedure, 405 (para.4).  
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(4) The Commentary on Article 25(5) (Alternative B) provides voluntary 
arbitration as an alternative, the initiation of which is subject to ex post 
consent between the competent authorities.91 
(5) The UN Sample Procedure shows a preference for final-offer 
arbitration.92 
1.6 National practices in ITDR since World War Ⅱ 
The EU Arbitration Convention and the arbitration clause in the OECD and 
UN Model Conventions have substantially affected countries’ ITDR practice. 
In particular, since the 2008 update to the OECD Model Convention, a 
growing number of countries have included arbitration clauses in their 
treaties. 93  However, this legalistic move should not be overestimated. 
According to Pit’s study, as of March 2014, among nearly 3,000 tax treaties 
around the world, only 158 explicitly include some form of arbitration 
mechanism; and the majority of these 158 treaties have been concluded by 
the US, the Netherlands, Canada and Switzerland.94 Furthermore, there 
have been few reported arbitration cases under bilateral tax treaties or the EU 
Arbitration Convention. 95  It appears that tax arbitration is significantly 
underused, and most tax disputes to date have been finalised through the 
MAP.96 
For the purpose of this research, the US’s treaty practice in ITDR is worthy of 
special attention. In 1976, the US officially published its own Model Income 
                                                        
91 ibid Commentary on Art. 25(5) (Alternative B), 393-394 (para.14). 
92 ibid Sample Procedure, para 12. 
93 Hugh J Ault, ‘Dispute Resolution: The Mutual Agreement Procedure’ [2013] United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing Countries 20. 
94 HM Pit, ‘Arbitration under the OECD Model Convention: Follow-up under Double Tax Conventions: 
An Evaluation’ (2014) 42 Intertax 445, 448; ‘Tax Treaties: Update to OECD Model Tax Convention 
Released - OECD’ 
<https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/tax-treaties-2017-update-to-oecd-model-tax-convention-released.ht
m> accessed 9 October 2019. 
95 Terr and others (n 25) 485–486. 
96 Burnett (n 77) 174. 
 19 
Tax Convention (US Model Convention). 97  Article 25 of the US Model 
Convention provides the MAP as an exclusive means of dispute resolution.98 
In 1989, the US and Germany signed the world’s first tax treaty that contained 
an arbitration provision since World War Ⅱ . 99  Subsequently, the US 
concluded several more tax treaties with arbitration clauses.100 In its 2016 
revision, the US Model Convention included a mandatory and binding 
arbitration clause in Article 25.101 The US Model Convention and most US tax 
treaties with arbitration clauses adopt the final-offer approach as the default 
mode of arbitration.102          
1.7 Recent development of ITDR 
1.7.1 BEPS Project   
The international tax environment has changed considerably in recently years. 
Above all, the financial crisis and the aggressive tax planning by many MNEs 
have put BEPS high on the political agenda.103 In this context, since 2013, 
the OECD/G20 has launched the BEPS Project, which is hailed by many as 
the most significant rewrite of the international tax rules in a century.104 The 
project identifies 15 action plans including a variety of measures, such as new 
minimum standards, the revision of existing standards, and guidance drawing 
on best practices.105  The goal is to align international tax rules to the 
developments in the world economy, and to ensure that profits are taxed 
                                                        
97 Doron Narotzki, ‘Tax Treaty Models-Past, Present, and a Suggested Future’ (2017) 50 Akron Law 
Review 383, 387. 
98 US Model Convention (1976) Art.25. 
99 US-Germany tax treaty 1989 Art. 25(5); see also Altman (n 29) 19. 
100 For instance, US treaties with Canada (amending protocol signed on 17 May 1995), the 
Netherlands (1993), France (1994), etc.; see also Altman (n 29) 21. 
101 US Model Convention (2016) Art. 25 (6); Narotzki (n 97) 393; William Byrnes, ‘Analysis of the New 
US Model Tax Treaty’ (Kluwer International Tax Blog, 24 February 2016) 
<http://kluwertaxblog.com/2016/02/25/analysis-of-the-new-us-model-tax-treaty/> accessed 3 May 
2019. 
102 Brown (n 11) 108; Byrnes (n 101). 
103 OECD, ‘Background Brief: Inclusive Framework on BEPS’ (2017) 9. 
104 OECD, ‘OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: Information Brief’ (OECD 2015) 3. 
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where economic activities are carried out and value is created.106 Many of 
the measures developed through these action plans were later incorporated 
into the 2017 updates to the OECD and UN Model Conventions.107  
The major implications of the BEPS Project for the ITDR system are twofold. 
First, the project may have an impact on the trend of tax disputes. Second, 
several actions are directly relevant to ITDR.  
(1) Impact of the BEPS Project on tax disputes. Concerns have already 
been raised that the BEPS Project will lead to a staggering increase in tax 
disputes.108 As its name suggests, the BEPS Project was initiated as a 
countermeasure against aggressive tax-optimisation schemes by MNEs. 
National governments may even see the project as a means to get an 
increased slice of the “tax cake”.109 Moreover, since the Project has 
overhauled international tax rules, taxpayers and tax administrations will 
need time to adjust to the changes.110 During this transitional period, 
enormous uncertainties may arise for stakeholders. For instance, the 
taxpayers and the relevant tax administrations, or the tax authorities of 
different countries, may have divergent interpretations of the new rules 
proposed in the project. Potential inconsistencies within the project may 
also give rise to controversies.111 For instance, some have noted that the 
proposals to address the tax challenges regarding the digital economy 
may contradict those addressing transfer-pricing issues regarding 
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intangibles. 112  In numerous BEPS actions, multiple options that are 
equally acceptable have been presented for each issue in order to 
minimise political obstacles from member states.113     
(2) Action 14. The action aims to strengthen the ITDR system, in the 
awareness that measures to tackle BEPS might lead to unnecessary 
uncertainties for compliant taxpayers.114 The Action develops a minimum 
standard for MAP practice, plus a peer-review process to monitor 
countries’ compliance with the standard.115 The OECD also intended to 
promote a universal adoption of an arbitration mechanism in tax 
treaties.116 However, the Action 14 Final Report notes that only 20 OECD 
countries expressed an interest in doing so, and there is no consensus 
among all OECD and G20 countries on the initiative.117 As a result, the 
Final Report confirms that the Action is focused on the MAP, while tax 
arbitration will be developed later as part of the negotiation of the MLI 
undertaken in Action 15.118   
(3) Action 15 and Parts Ⅴ and Ⅵ of the MLI. Action 15 aims to develop 
an MLI to modify existing bilateral tax treaties in order to swiftly implement 
the measures developed in the course of the BEPS Project.119 The MLI 
was concluded and adopted by the OECD/G20 in November 2016.120 
Parts Ⅴ  and Ⅵ  of the MLI concern the MAP and tax arbitration, 
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respectively.121      
(4) Tie-breaker rule for companies in Action 6. Action 6 aims to identify 
and tackle treaty abuse, particularly treaty shopping, which is one of the 
major sources of BEPS problems.122 A particular measure proposed in 
the Action involves the revision to the tie-breaker rule for companies in tax 
treaties.123 Tax treaties are normally set up in such a manner that for any 
particular taxpayer, one Contracting State is deemed as the country of 
residence and the other the country where the foreign income arises.124 
Tax treaties do not define tax residence directly, leaving the issue to 
domestic laws.125 Since domestic laws usually define residence in a 
rather broad manner, it is highly possible that a taxpayer may be 
simultaneously identified as a resident in both Contracting States.126 In 
this connection, the tie-breaker rule is to decide which of the two states 
will be treated as the residence country for the purpose of applying the tax 
treaty at issue.127 Previously, the tie-breaker rule for companies stated 
that a company shall be deemed to be a resident only in the state in which 
its place of effective management is situated.128 This rule was radically 
changed by Action 6, which provides that the issue of dual residency will 
be determined through the MAP mechanism between the two competent 
authorities on a case-by-case basis.129 This is somewhat surprising, as 
dispute-settlement rules normally only come into play when the 
substantive rules are disputed.   
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1.7.2 EU Arbitration Directive 
In October 2017, as a critical step to implement the BEPS Project, the EU 
Council adopted the Arbitration Directive.130 This new legislation builds on 
existing systems in the EU, including tax treaties between EU Member States 
and the Arbitration Convention.131 In particular, the Directive supplements the 
Arbitration Convention in several key ways.132 First, the Directive forms a part 
of the Community law, and therefore has superior legal status to the 
Arbitration Convention.133  Second, the Directive applies to all taxpayers 
subject to taxes on income and capital, whereas the Arbitration Convention is 
limited to disputes over transfer pricing cases (including disputes involving the 
attribution of profits to permanent establishments (PEs)). 134  Third, the 
procedures under the Directive are more refined than those of the Arbitration 
Convention. On the one hand, more clearly defined and enforceable timelines 
makes the procedures more robust; on the other hand, the inclusion of 
final-offer arbitration and the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method 
increases the procedures’ flexibility.135   
1.7.3 A note on how to handle the new development in the thesis 
The need to deal with these new developments in ITDR presents a tricky 
question. Should BEPS Action 14 and Parts Ⅴ and Ⅵ of the MLI be treated 
as new laws, and hence singled out for separate evaluation, or regarded as 
having already been incorporated into the current ITDR system, and thus 
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woven into the general analysis of this thesis? This author prefers to 
approach them separately for two reasons. First, most tax treaties around the 
world have been based on the traditional rules and the process of 
implementing Action 14 and the MLI is still ongoing.136 Second, those new 
developments manifest the logic of TC theory, and thereby deserve special 
attention. Therefore, Action 14 (as well as Part Ⅴ  of the MLI) will be 
assessed in Chapter 5, while Part Ⅵ of the MLI will be evaluated in Chapter 
6. Detailed analysis of the EU Arbitration Directive is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  
1.8 Summary 
In general, the historic evolution of the ITDR system to date features the 
predominance and stagnancy of the MAP. While treaty practice since the 
1980s has shown an increased acceptance of tax arbitration, the mechanism 
has not been widely embraced by national governments, and where it is 
adopted, it is remarkably underused. The upshot is that by far, most tax 
disputes have been finalised through the MAP.137 Furthermore, the structure 
of tax arbitration itself features an “antilegalistic style”. Specifically, the 
initiation of the procedure is preconditioned upon the failure of the MAP. The 
procedure inherits the inter-governmental character of the MAP, allowing for a 
very limited taxpayer involvement.138 Under the UN Model Convention and 
the EU Arbitration Convention, the competent authorities are permitted, after 
the release of an arbitral decision, to agree on a solution that deviates from 
that arbitral decision. In addition, the UN Model Convention, the MLI, and the 
US treaty practice all take the final-offer approach as the default mode of tax 
arbitration. In short, tax arbitration is instituted as an integrated part of the 
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MAP. Its major purpose is to facilitate dialogues between competent 
authorities rather than to vindicate taxpayers’ claims or to ensure a consistent 
interpretation and application of tax treaties. 139  Lastly, the antilegalistic 
character of the ITDR system has been further reinforced by the recent 
reform of the tie-breaker rule, whereby dual-residency situations for corporate 
taxpayers are to be determined by the MAP on a case-by-case basis.  
Another outstanding feature of the ITDR history is that mediation, which is a 
typical method of international dispute settlement, has been entirely 
overlooked.140 When the parties to an international dispute are unable to 
achieve an agreement by negotiation, the intervention or facilitation by a 
mediator is a promising means to break the impasse. 141  The form of 
mediation spans a broad spectrum. At one end, a third party may simply 
provide the disputing parties with an additional channel of communication, 
and encourage them to resume negotiations. In this situation, the third party is 
said to be providing a “good office”.142 At the other end, the intermediary may 
undertake independent investigation, and present the parties with a set of 
formal proposals for dispute resolution. This form of intervention is called 
“conciliation” or expert procedure.143 Between the two lies the most common 
type of mediation, whereby the mediator actively participates in the 
negotiation between the parties and help them find a solution.144 Regardless 
of the above types, the hallmark of mediation is its non-binding character.145        
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Historic sketch of the literature 
According to Altman, the literature of ITDR can be traced back to a 1895 
study by a German scholar Ludwig von Bar, who proposed the establishment 
of an ITC.146 This preference for legalistic methods of dispute resolution also 
characterised other studies on ITDR before World War Ⅱ.147 
The post-war period saw a few articles and reports supporting the use of the 
MAP in resolving tax disputes.148 Presumably, this antilegalistic shift was 
associated with the publication of the first OECD Model Convention (1963), 
which confirmed the MAP as an exclusive means of resolving tax disputes. 
Nonetheless, scholarly efforts to explore more legalistic methods of ITDR, 
including tax arbitration and ITC, have never ceased.149 
In 1981, Lindencrona and Deventer examined the imperfections of the MAP, 
and suggested arbitration as a preferable approach to ITDR.150 Since then, 
interests in legalistic methods of ITDR have grown among tax professionals, 
researchers and policymakers.151 This growth was further reinforced by the 
conclusion of the EU Arbitration Convention and the 2008 update to the 
OECD Model Convention, both of which soon became topics of great 
interests for tax academics.152 
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During the past few decades, there has been a steep increase in the number 
of studies concerning ITDR. Some believe that this research growth has laid 
some foundation for the transformation of the topic into a new academic 
discipline: the ITDRP.153 As will be discussed below, this body of literature is 
highly concentrated on the topic of arbitration as opposed to the MAP or other 
non-binding dispute settlement mechanisms.  
From the above historic account, it could be seen that while ITDR practice is 
predominantly concerned with the MAP, academic consideration of the topic 
shows a persistent preference for a more legalistic mode of dispute 
settlement. This disparity constitutes a prominent feature of ITDR.        
2.2 Literature on the MAP 
2.2.1 Criticisms of the MAP 
The MAP has long been criticised.154 Indeed, given the legalistic tendency of 
the ITDR literature, studies in this field typically start with dissatisfaction with 
the MAP. Above all, the mechanism is often perceived to be time-consuming, 
with no guarantee of finality.155 It is possible that the competent authorities do 
not reach agreement on all points of the case or that they achieve no 
agreement at all.156  Many particularly attribute the MAP’s protraction or 
failure to the soft wording of tax treaties, which only call upon the competent 
authorities to “endeavour” to resolve MAP cases.157  
The MAP is also criticised for its lack of transparency. The procedure is 
carried out only by the two competent authorities, with the taxpayer 
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concerned excluded from the process. The competent authorities are 
perceived to be a gatekeeper, prosecutor and judge simultaneously. 158 
Related to the transparency issue is the concern about “package deals”, a 
situation where two competent authorities have several cases to be resolved 
at the same time and engage in horse-trading over these cases.159 For 
taxpayers facing the prospect of a package deal, “there is always a fear of 
being a sacrificial lamb”.160 Another related concern is that the use of the 
MAP in resolving the growing number of tax disputes may lead to inconsistent 
decisions, and thus compromise the value of legal certainty.161   
Many also voice their concerns about the procedure’s accessibility. Pursuant 
to Article 25 (2) of the OECD Model Convention, the first competent authority 
can unilaterally determine the eligibility of MAP requests. It is concerned that 
competent authorities may exercise such discretion in an arbitrary manner.162  
Those critics of the MAP do not necessarily deny the strength of the 
mechanism in its entirety. They acknowledge that the process may imply 
flexibility and goodwill.163 It could be an economical option for taxpayers, as 
the direct costs of the procedure are largely shouldered by the competent 
authorities involved in the case.164 Moreover, the competent authorities of 
many countries have long-established MAP experience.165  Nevertheless, 
these strengths of the MAP are generally downplayed in the orthodox 
literature. It is contended that flexibility and goodwill are not uniformly 
observable across MAP practice. Burnett even asserts that political enmities 
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independent of tax may creep into MAP negotiations.166 As to the competent 
authorities’ experiences or expertise in the MAP, it is simply “a standard 
argument in favour of the status quo in any debate about institutional 
change”.167    
2.2.2 Defense of the MAP 
Despite the overwhelming criticisms of the MAP, the mechanism has its 
proponents, which, though, are in the absolute minority. Several 
representative comments in defence of the MAP deserve special attention.  
2.2.2.1 1975 study by Madere  
Madere’s study examines the commonly expressed concerns about the MAP 
at that time, including the lack of guiding rules regarding the access to the 
MAP and the length and inefficiency of the procedure.168 The author then 
argues that, based on the US-Canada MAP experience, many of these 
concerns are only imaginary.169 Specifically, as to the issue of accessibility, 
the actual policy of the then US competent authority was to accept every case 
in which the taxpayer had exercised due diligence.170 The US-Canada MAP 
experience also showed that most MAP cases up to that time had been 
resolved successfully.171 These successes could be attributed to several 
factors, including the cooperative spirit in which negotiations were conducted, 
the sufficient authority granted to the competent authorities, and the tendency 
of the negotiators to work out consistent rules as guidelines for future 
negotiations.172 In Madere’s view, the real shortcoming of the MAP is its 
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bilateral nature and limited scope.173 
The deficiency of Madere’s study is obvious: it is solely based on the limited 
example of the US-Canada treaty practice.   
2.2.2.2 2008 study by Farah  
Farah’s article argues that the MAP has obtained positive results despite no 
duty to negotiate or settle.174 Interestingly, it attributes the success of the 
MAP to the consensual and voluntary character of the procedure. States 
favour MAP, argues Farah, this is why competent authorities generally take a 
positive attitude toward taxpayers’ MAP requests.175 Like Madere, Farah’s 
appraisal of the MAP is also based on the US-Canada experience. Farah’s 
study, which also discusses the shortcomings of tax arbitration, will be 
revisited below (Section 2.3.2.2). 
2.2.2.3 2015 study by Brown  
Brown was the first researcher to conduct an in-depth analysis of the OECD 
MAP statistics. The study shows an increasing use of the MAP, and reveals 
that the average completion time for MAP cases has remained at 
approximately two years, which is consistent with the time frame 
recommended in the MEMAP.176 The author further reviews the statistical 
reports for individual countries, confirming that a relatively large number of 
cases were resolved within about two years, and that numerous countries 
had very good record of MAP practices in certain years.177 Therefore, argues 
the author, the MAP can, and in many cases does, work well.178  This 
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challenges the common perception that the MAP is fundamentally broken.179 
That being said, Brown does admit that many MAPs have taken too much 
time to resolve or have simply languished. 180  Therefore, she does not 
oppose the adoption of tax arbitration, but insists that the arbitral procedure 
should be designed in a way that can supplement and enhance the MAP.181 
2.3 Literature on tax arbitration 
2.3.1 Arguments for tax arbitration  
In the orthodox literature, tax arbitration is contrasted with the MAP and 
portrayed as a preferred means of resolving tax disputes. The procedure is 
said to provide assurance of finality, since an arbitral panel is bound to deliver 
a final decision.182 The mandatory feature of the arbitration clause under the 
OECD Model Convention increases the autonomy of the arbitral procedure, 
since the submission of a case does not depend on a prior authorisation by 
the competent authorities.183 Many believe that the simple inclusion of an 
arbitration clause in a tax treaty may affect the MAP process in a positive way: 
competent authorities may be pressured to take the MAP more seriously and 
expedite the process so as to avoid the “hassle” of arbitration.184 Compared 
with the MAP, arbitral procedure also improves the status of the taxpayers 
concerned, which may present their positions to an arbitration board, or even 
attend arbitral hearings.185 Moreover, inasmuch as the tax arbitrators make 
an objective assessment of the fact and law at issue, the procedure ensures a 
more reasoned and principled approach to the interpretation and application 
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of tax treaties.186  
Commentators also go to great lengths to explore various aspects of the 
procedure, including, inter alia, the mandatory or optional nature of tax 
arbitration, 187  the composition and establishment of arbitral panels, 188 
taxpayer participation,189 the choice between final-offer and conventional 
arbitration modes, 190  the publication of arbitral awards, 191  the 
implementation and review of arbitral awards,192 the choice between ad hoc 
and institutional arbitration,193 and the relationship between tax arbitration 
and domestic laws.194 Many of these issues will be revisited in later chapters, 
along with an assessment of relevant literature.  
On the surface, two divergent tendencies can be identified in the literature on 
the rule design of tax arbitration. One tendency favours more revolutionary 
plans, such as stand-alone arbitration that is independent of the MAP, full 
taxpayer participation, full-fledged arbitral procedures featuring oral hearings, 
and the installation of an appellate mechanism.195 Some even propose to 
establish an ITC, 196  or International Tax Organisation (ITO). 197  Others 
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suggest having tax disputes being resolved under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)198, or the fora of international investment disputes.199 
The major rationale for these ambitious proposals is the protection of 
taxpayer rights and the guarantee of legal certainty. By contrast, the other 
tendency reflects a more conservative approach that generally accepts the 
built-in manner of tax arbitration. However, for many commentators in this 
camp, their conservatism largely reflects a pragmatic consideration in light of 
sovereignty concerns. In this regard, Burnett’s attitude is representative: 
“International tax arbitration even in a limited form is a good thing. Further, 
apart from being good or bad, the development of international tax arbitration 
may be inevitable, perhaps as a step on the way to another paradigm.”200 By 
“another paradigm”, Burnett means a more legalistic mode of ITDR, such as 
the ITC.201        
2.3.2 Critical reflections on tax arbitration 
In general, critical reflections on tax arbitration can be divided into two 
categories. The first criticizes the current mode of tax arbitration as being too 
conservative. These criticisms and the above-mentioned revolutionary 
approach are actually two sides of one coin. The second category raises 
concerns about the effectiveness of a legalistic approach in resolving tax 
disputes. The most commonly cited shortcoming of tax arbitration is related to 
sovereignty concerns.202 The adoption of such a procedure “would represent 
an unacceptable surrender of fiscal sovereignty”. 203  Another common 
concern is the procedural costs of the mechanism. Specifically, tax arbitration 
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involves arbitrators and probably legal counsel, who may incur substantial 
fees; there are also logistical expenses in administering the procedure.204 In 
addition to these common concerns, the following commentators raise 
different criticisms about a legalistic approach to ITDR.  
2.3.2.1 1999 study by Green 
Green’s study begins with what seems a puzzling observation: while tax 
treaties and trade agreements share the same goal of facilitating international 
trade and investment, and they use analogous rules to achieve that goal, they 
employ radically different methods of dispute settlement.205 Specifically, the 
trade regime, particularly the WTO system, employs a legalistic method of 
dispute resolution, whereas most tax treaties rely exclusively on negotiation 
for dispute settlement.206  The author refutes the rhetoric that tax-policy 
conflicts are matters of sovereignty prerogatives and hence not subject to 
legalistic dispute resolution. The argument is that trade-policy disputes also 
have sovereignty implications.207  How can sovereignty, contends Green, 
account for the radically different treatments of such conflicts under the two 
regimes?208  
Instead, the author approaches the question from a functional perspective of 
dispute-settlement systems, drawing on the insights from international 
relations (IR) theory. 209  This theory views intergovernmental 
dispute-settlement systems not as a means for dictating outcomes, but as 
devices for facilitating international cooperation.210 In short, explains Green, 
the international trade regime rests upon retaliatory strategies by states, and 
the function of a legalistic dispute-settlement system is to manage such 
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retaliatory strategies and keep them from breaking down.211 By contrast, 
retaliatory strategies are rarely used in international tax cooperation.212 The 
adoption of retaliatory strategies in trade regimes and their implications for 
the trade-dispute settlement system will be further discussed later in this 
thesis.213 
After examining the functional aspect, or benefit side, of dispute-settlement 
systems, Green goes on to evaluate the cost side of the equation. Such costs, 
writes Green, include not only the obvious costs of administering the systems, 
but more significantly, the damage to the stability of the cooperative 
regimes.214 Specifically, legalistic dispute-settlement procedures are more 
confrontational, and thus more likely to “poison the atmosphere”.215 They 
may elicit noncompliance and hence undermine the credibility of the 
systems.216 There might be legitimacy concerns, as international dispute 
settlement typically involves adjudicators from third countries who might have 
little understanding of the particular situation of the disputing countries.217 
Another concern is the inflexibility of the legalistic method. Some seemingly 
discriminatory tax measures, writes Green, may serve legitimate purposes, 
such as constraining tax avoidances. Yet legalistic dispute settlement may 
regard such anti-avoidance measures as discriminatory policies that should 
be banned.218  
To sum up Green’s argument, while legalistic dispute settlement methods 
imply costs for both trade and tax regimes, they provide fewer benefits to 
international tax regimes than to trade regimes. Therefore, Green concludes, 
the trade-dispute settlement system is not an ideal model for resolving tax 
                                                        
211 ibid 109–110. 
212 ibid 118–119. 
213 See below, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3; Chapter 4, Section 3.1.2.   
214 Green (n 13) 130. 
215 ibid. 
216 ibid 131. 
217 ibid 133–134. 
218 ibid 134. 
 36 
disputes.219 
To this author’s knowledge, Green’s article is the first study in the field of 
ITDR that adopts an interdisciplinary approach. 220  The cost-benefit 
framework in the article is also informative, providing much inspiration for this 
thesis. In particular, Green highlights the role of a dispute-settlement system 
in facilitating international cooperation as a whole, whereas the traditional 
literature on dispute resolution has a narrow focus on the procedural costs of 
the system itself.     
Despite Green’s insights, a substantial flaw of the study is that it mainly 
concerns policy-level conflicts.221 Green also admits that for transfer-pricing 
disputes and other fact-specific cases, legalistic methods may be helpful.222 
However, most double-taxation disputes are case-specific, arising from 
divergent interpretations of treaty provisions or legal facts. It is very doubtful 
that the retaliation theory can provide any sound basis for the analysis of such 
case-level conflicts.  
However, Green does raise an intriguing aspect: at policy level, the use of 
retaliatory strategy is extremely rare in international tax regimes. Indeed, as 
many others observe, not only retaliation, but even the initial breach of treaty 
obligation with respect to the prevention of double taxation is very unusual 
among states.223 To the contrary, tax conflicts at the policy level are more 
likely to concern the issue of under-taxation or tax competition: states use tax 
cuts, tax breaks, tax loopholes, or tax subsidies to compete for 
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investments.224 Later in this thesis this author will argue that this particular 
feature of the tax regime does have far-reaching effects on the dynamics of 
ITDR.225 
Another deficiency of Green’s study is that its cost analysis is not really about 
the costs of the system. For instance, the risk of “poisoning the atmosphere” 
actually concerns the effect of legalistic dispute resolution on the 
investor-government relationship. In the cost-benefit analysis conducted in 
this thesis, all the potential impacts of a dispute-settlement system upon the 
entire international cooperation, positive or negative, will be categorised as 
the benefit side of the system. The cost side of the equation will be confined 
to the expenses and burdens associated with the establishment and 
operation of the system itself.  
2.3.2.2 2008 study by Farah 
Farah questions the effectiveness of mandatory tax arbitration.226 The author 
reasons that, given the built-in manner of tax arbitration and the diplomatic 
nature of the MAP, a competent authority that does not want a certain tax 
dispute to be arbitrated may block the arbitration by denying the access to the 
MAP in the first place.227           
Farah’s another concern about tax arbitration is related to the issue of 
under-taxation or double non-taxation.228 The argument is that an arbitration 
panel will base its case decision primarily on the wording of relevant tax 
treaties. 229 Consequently, “in the same manner that taxpayers utilize the 
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ITTs [international tax treaties] to achieve double non-taxation they will be 
able to utilize the mandatory and binding arbitration to enforce double 
non-taxation”.230 
Based on these reasoning, Farah concludes that the current mechanism of 
mandatory tax arbitration will not be able to serve the two primary goals of tax 
treaties: preventing both double taxation and double non-taxation.231 
In Section 5.3 of Chapter 4, this author will demonstrate that Farah’s worry 
about the procedural obstruction by competent authorities in respect of MAP 
access is overstated. Farah’s second concern, the issue of double 
non-taxation, corresponds to Green’s notion that legalistic dispute resolution 
may lack flexibility in interpretation and application of anti-avoidance rules. 
The issue also concerns this author, and will be elaborated on in Section 
3.4.2.3 of Chapter 3.  
2.4 Literature on tax mediation 
Compared with the MAP and tax arbitration, the literature on international tax 
mediation is relatively meagre, albeit with a slight increase more recently.232 
In general, commentators value this mechanism highly. On the one hand, the 
procedure is helpful in facilitating MAP negotiations.233 On the other hand, its 
non-binding nature mitigates countries’ concerns about the loss of 
sovereignty, as in the case of tax arbitration.234 Some commentators have 
cited the experience of domestic tax mediation, concluding that the procedure 
in many countries not only expedites the dispute settlement, but also 
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enhances the mutual trust between taxpayers and tax administrations.235  
Some have noticed the fact that mediation has been overlooked in the 
international tax context. Nias writes that in a 2015 OECD meeting on the 
Action 14 draft recommendations, a senior OECD official suggested that 
mediation had no place in ITDR, as evidenced by the fact that it had attracted 
little, if any, use.236 Nias counters this, writing, “If you do not know what 
mediation is, do not know how it can benefit you and do not know where to 
turn to for the assistance, the opportunities (and benefits) are likely to pass 
you by.”237 Dalton, an editor of International Tax Review, provides some 
interesting perspectives based on his interviews with several leading experts 
on tax mediation, including Nias.238 First, countries may find it difficult to 
concede tax matters to a foreign mediator due to sovereignty concerns.239 
This point is, in this author’s view, a bit weak, considering the non-binding 
character of mediation. Second, it may be difficult for countries, particularly 
small ones, to reach out to the pools of international tax mediators.240 Third, it 
is suggested that the nature of the competent-authority relationship may 
restrict the efficacy of tax mediation. 241  Specifically, explains an expert 
interviewed by Dalton, competent authorities handling MAP cases are not 
necessarily operating from an individual case perspective, “but often from a 
much broader perspective about the whole relationship between country A 
and country B”.242  The competent authorities come together to achieve 
resolution “in the knowledge that what they give way on for one issue, they 
are likely to claw back on another issue”.243 From this broader perspective, 
having a mediator for one case may miss the overall balance of relevant 
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interests.244      
2.5 Holistic approaches 
Both legalistic and antilegalistic approaches have a binary feature, with the 
balance tilted either to arbitration (or adjudication) or to the MAP (and 
sometimes mediation). In contrast, a few other commentators try a more 
balanced and holistic approach to the study of ITDR. Below are several 
representative studies. 
2.5.1 2005 study by Altman 
In this heavily referenced monograph, Altman makes an extensive and 
in-depth evaluation of the ITDR system, drawing, like Green, on the IR theory 
as well as political science.245 Altman also conducts a cost-benefit analysis 
respectively for both the MAP and tax arbitration, concluding that both 
mechanisms have their pros and cons. 246  He therefore proposes a 
multi-pronged, somewhat complicated structure featuring a new ITO.247 To 
put it simply, the new structure will retain the MAP as the starting point of 
ITDR. 248  This is because the MAP provides taxpayers and tax 
administrations with benefits which are not easily replicated by legalistic 
methods, i.e., “a pleasant, informal, flexible, forward-looking process based 
on the good will of the parties”.249 If the MAP fails, the matter will proceed to 
the ITO, with factual issues arbitrated by a panel of experts and legal issues 
adjudicated by a permanent International Tax Tribunal (ITT) under the ITO.250 
No matter whether the dispute is settled through the MAP, arbitration or 
adjudication, the ITO will refer the final agreement or decision to the relevant 
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national courts for implementation.251 The domestic court can decline to 
enforce an ITO opinion, yet must explain the reasons for its 
noncompliance.252 Altman further proposes ways to improve the MAP and 
tax arbitration, involving issues of procedural timelines, taxpayer participation, 
confidentiality, appointment of arbitrators, etc.253  
The proposed ITO and its interaction with domestic courts were inspired by 
the institutional arrangement of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU).254 Under the CJEU system, national courts refer questions of EU law 
to the CJEU for authoritative interpretation, and it is ultimately for the national 
courts to apply the resulting interpretation to given cases.255 The intervention 
of the ITO, according to Altman, increases the level to which states comply 
with ITDR processes.256 Meanwhile, the fact that domestic courts possess 
the ultimate authority of implementing ITO opinions accommodates the 
states’ sovereignty interests. 257  The role of trans-national institutions in 
balancing the tension between international cooperation, on the one hand, 
and sovereignty concerns, on the other, is at the core of Liberal 
Institutionalism, a major school of IR theory. Altman went to great lengths to 
discuss the Liberal Institutionalism theory and its implications for ITDR.258  
This author doubts the necessity of having an international organisation 
referring ITDR agreements or decisions to domestic courts for enforcement. 
As will be argued later, implementation of MAP agreements or tax-arbitration 
decisions can be well-regulated under the current legal framework.259 This 
author does acknowledge that the ITO or other ITDR institutions can help 
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streamline and strengthen ITDR procedures. However, such operational 
benefits carry very limited weight in Altman’s vision of the ITO. This could be 
attributed to the fact that Liberal Institutionalism primarily concerns the “big 
picture” of ITDR, such as the issues of international cooperation and 
sovereignty concerns.  
Altman’s insistence on having a permanent body of judges in an ITT to decide 
legal questions reflects his emphasis on the rule-making function of the ITDR 
system. “Such a body is the most capable of generating the lex tributum so 
desperately needed for the efficient administration of tax treaties.”260 By “lex 
tributum”, Altman means an international law of taxes. This body of law, 
argues Altman, will provide the disputing parties with a common legal 
framework, help the expectations of the parties to converge even before any 
dispute materialises, and provide guidance for tax administrations in their 
deliberations on tax cases.261 In later chapters, this author will argue: (a) lex 
tributum plays a rather limited role in the current international tax regime; and 
(b) an antilegalistic mode of dispute settlement can also perform the 
rule-making function, albeit partially.262   
2.5.2 2012 study by Terr et al. 
Terr et al.’s study was largely spurred by the observation that there was a 
proliferation of tax disputes and the current system of ITDR was under 
significant strain.263 In particular, after examining the OECD MAP statistics, 
the authors warn that, absent a fundamental transformation of the status quo, 
the “fiscal Armageddon” will be approaching.264 Instead of favouring any 
particular ITDR mechanism, the authors stress the following parameters 
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against which the entire ITDR system can be assessed: 
(1) Publication of ITDR resolutions; 
(2) Adaptability of ITDR procedures to multilateral tax disputes; 
(3) Applicability of the procedures to non-treaty countries; 
(4) Sufficiency of taxpayer participation in the procedures; and 
(5) Adequacy of governmental resources invested in the system.265 
The authors then make a detailed evaluation of the major ITDR mechanisms, 
including the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA), the MAP, and tax arbitration, 
against these five parameters. The analysis reveals that all three 
mechanisms have deficiencies. The author therefore concludes that the 
current ITDR system needs fundamental changes in light of the above 
parameters.266  
The article does not provide any theoretical ground for the five parameters. It 
is therefore unclear why and how these five aspects play such an overarching 
role in the entire ITDR system, and whether they are conclusive. This author 
also doubts the viability of a uniform standard for different ITDR mechanisms. 
For instance, it is sensible to infer that both the publishing of ITDR resolutions 
and taxpayer participation may vary in their characteristics and significance 
from one ITDR mechanism to another.    
Terr et al.’s study also covers the APA, which refers to a binding written 
agreement between taxpayers and the relevant tax administrations.267 In a 
bilateral APA, both countries agree in advance that the pricing policy adopted 
by an MNE with respect to its intra-company transactions are in accordance 
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with the arm’s-length principle.268 The APA is essentially a dispute-prevention 
mechanism, and thus will not be elaborated on in this thesis except where its 
direct relation to ITDR is concerned. 
2.5.3 2016 proposal by Owens et al. 
Owen et al.’s article proposes a new dispute-settlement framework that is 
intended as an alternative to Article 25 of the UN Model.269 The research was 
part of a three-year project, “International Tax Disputes: Improving MAP and 
Mandatory Dispute Settlement”, which brings together contributions from 
leading academics, private-sector experts, practitioners, and policymakers.270 
Similar to Altman’s research, the framework proposed by Owens et al. also 
features a multi-pronged approach that considers the MAP as its first step.271 
If the case cannot be resolved within 20 months from the starting date of the 
MAP, the competent authorities should, unless they otherwise agree, submit 
the issues to an ADR panel, which will provide a non-binding means of 
dispute settlement, including mediation, conciliation, or expert evaluation, to 
the competent authorities.272 
If the ADR procedure failed to resolve the entire case within the allotted time, 
or if the competent authorities did not agree to use the ADR in the first place, 
the unresolved issues would be referred to arbitration.273 After the arbitral 
panel released its final decision, the two competent authorities would have six 
months to agree on a different solution before being bound by the decision.274 
Both the ADR and arbitration procedure would be administered by a 
self-standing ITDR body under the auspices of the UN or other competent 
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organisations. This body would maintain a list of independent experts from 
which the arbitrators could be drawn. 275  It would also provide training 
programs for developing countries.276   
The article is basically a policy proposal intended as a basis for further 
discussion on the establishment of a new ITDR framework.277 It does not 
provide any theoretical underpinning for the proposed framework. Given that 
the proposal is built on contributions from not just academics but also 
practitioners and policymakers, it is reasonable to infer that it largely 
represents a compromise approach that accommodates sovereignty 
concerns.  
2.5.4 2016 study by Carolis  
Carolis’s study was inspired by Altman, who draws on the theory of Liberal 
Institutionalism in arguing for the establishment of an ITO.278  However, 
Carolis further develops Altman’s approach in that he extends Liberal 
Institutionalism to the entire ITDR topic in proposing a new approach to the 
ITDRP.279   
Liberal Institutionalism, writes Carolis, aims to explain how international 
cooperation through certain regimes (such as trade, investment, or tax) is 
possible in an anarchic world.280 According to the theory, continues Carolis, 
international regimes allow states to maximise their self-interests more 
efficiently.281 Carolis enumerates the advantages of an international regime 
as follows: 
(1) Reducing negotiation costs through institutionalising cooperation and 
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thereby decreasing the costs of future agreements; 
(2) Detecting and exposing non-compliant members and increasing 
reputational costs for such free-riding states; and  
(3) Developing best practices related to the implementation of the 
regime.282 
Carolis demonstrates that this interdisciplinary approach has both analytical 
and comparative strengths.283 In terms of analytical strengths, the author 
argues that the approach illuminates several aspects of ITDR that are not 
immediately evident from a legal analysis alone.284 He uses as an example 
the role of OECD (as well as UN) Model Convention in the tax regime.285 
While traditional lawyers may doubt the viability of the Model Convention for 
its non-binding nature, from the perspective of Liberal Institutionalism, the 
Model Convention represents a reasonable balance between the high 
sovereignty and negotiation costs a traditional multilateral treaty would entail, 
on the one hand, and the need to ensure a coordinated approach to 
international tax rules on the other.286 By laying down a common basis for 
future tax agreements, the Model Convention reduces the costs of treaty 
negotiations.287  
With respect to the comparative strengths of his interdisciplinary approach, 
Carolis develops a common cost-benefit framework for comparative studies 
of ITDR. This attempt, declares the author, is partly motivated by the 
observation that most research on ITDR seeks to compare the ITDR system 
with the dispute-settlement systems of other domains, such as the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the WTO 
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and the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), on a purely legal 
basis. 288  The author contends the soundness of such legally oriented 
comparisons, as different dispute-settlement systems are, in a legal sense, 
extremely different, pertaining to different domains and using different 
terminologies.289 In contrast, the comparative framework based on Liberal 
Institutionalism features considerable generality, which would allow an 
evaluation of various solutions in other domains and their utilities to ITDR.290 
Specifically, the cost side of the framework includes sovereignty costs, 
negotiation costs, and reputation damages; while the benefit side mainly 
refers to the capacity of certain dispute settlement systems to satisfy the 
“interests and objectives underlying ITDRs”.291 Carolis further explains the 
interests and objectives underlying ITDRs: while the main objective is the 
elimination of double taxation, there are other underlying, and often conflicting, 
interests of tax authorities and taxpayers.292 Specifically, tax authorities may 
prefer to safeguard the national tax base and their control over tax policies 
and dispute-settlement processes, whereas taxpayers may favour eliminating 
double taxation and preserving the hard law systems securing predictability, 
certainty, and full protection of their rights.293    
Carolis further put forward five key dimensions of dispute-settlement systems, 
along which the above cost-benefit analysis and comparison can proceed.294 
These dimensions, which Carolis terms “international relations variables as 
comparability factors”, include private parties’ access to dispute-settlement 
procedures, the selection and composition of deciding bodies, the 
decision-making methods, the transparency/confidentiality of the procedures, 
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and the level of enforcement of the decisions.295  
The five comparability factors are informative in that they are neutral to the 
legal forms of various dispute-settlement systems, and hence acquire a 
universal applicability. However, the content of the cost-benefit framework is 
somewhat perplexing. First, while the cost side of the framework seems to be 
solely related to sovereign states, the benefit side involves the different and 
often conflicting interests of both tax authorities and taxpayers. This raises the 
question of how the framework can be applied in a coherent, consistent, and 
refutable manner. Comparatively, the cost-benefit framework in Altman’s 
study seems more orderly in that each of the ITDR mechanisms (the MAP 
and tax arbitration) is assessed twice, one from the perspective of tax 
authorities and the other from that of taxpayers, although Altman’s approach 
still leaves questions as to how to reconcile these different perspectives, and 
which perspective governs in case of contradiction. Second, it seems the 
sovereignty damage on the cost side and the tax authority’s preference on the 
benefit side are overlapping. Another – and subtler – problem concerns the 
sovereignty cost itself. The major purpose of IR theory is to explain how 
sovereign states are willing to relinquish part of their sovereignty by entering 
international regimes. Placing sovereignty cost into this explanatory 
framework again seems to be a tautology. Sovereignty cost also plays a 
critical role in Altman’s analytical framework. 
In contrast, Green carefully avoids these issues in his cost-benefit analysis of 
ITDR. First, Green excludes the sovereignty element in the first place. 
Second, his analysis focuses on the costs and benefits of the entire system 
rather than on the perspective of any particular participant in the system. This 
is congruent with the economic approach to cost-benefit analysis.296 That 
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being said, as examined above (Section 2.3.2.1), Green’s framework has its 
own problems. 
2.6 Comments on the literature 
Carolis claims that the existing literature of ITDR is laying a substantial 
foundation for a new discipline: the ITDRP.297 While this author also takes an 
optimistic view about the development of the ITDRP, the concern is that the 
foundation of the ITDRP is still very delicate. In particular, two major gaps in 
the past studies on the topic can be identified. 
2.6.1 Excessive focus on legalistic method 
Given that the current system of ITDR is predominated by the MAP, which 
does have deficiencies, the preference for a legalistic dispute-settlement 
method is justified for its own sake. Nonetheless, the literature of ITDR is 
characterised by an excessive preoccupation with this legalistic approach. 
Accordingly, there is a paucity of scholarship devoted to the MAP and other 
non-binding methods. 298  This situation has not changed even after the 
release of the MEMAP, which recommends a variety of measures to 
strengthen the MAP. Some doubt the effectiveness of the MEMAP, arguing 
that while it may go some way towards fixing the shortcomings of the MAP, 
many of those shortcomings are inherent in the MAP’s nature.299 Indeed, 
many tend to believe that the MAP is fundamentally broken and needs to be 
replaced.  
However, the reality is that the MAP has been playing, and will continue to 
play, a pivotal role in resolving tax disputes. This trend has been further 
reinforced by the OECD’s failure to promote a universal adoption of tax 
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arbitration among countries.300 Therefore, a caveat is that an excessive focus 
on a legalistic approach may miss the opportunity of cross-fertilisation 
between ITDR practice and scholarship.  
One might contend that the predominance of the MAP merely reflects states’ 
sovereignty concerns, which may gradually fade away along with the process 
of economic globalisation. However, sovereignty can hardly account for the 
recent amendment to the tie-break rule, which uses the MAP in the first 
instance to decide the substantive matters regarding dual residency of 
corporate taxpayers. Nor can sovereignty explain the dormancy of 
international tax mediation, which is ordinarily regarded as less threatening to 
sovereignty interests. Additionally, at least the early history of ITDR during the 
time of the League of Nations showed that sovereignty played a trivial role in 
the policy debate on the choice between binding and non-binding 
dispute-settlement methods. 301  Lastly, as will be discussed later, the 
sovereignty argument itself is subject to a variety of challenges.         
One might again argue that the mere adoption of arbitration clauses could 
enhance the speed and effectiveness of the MAP, hence MAP practice 
actually benefits from the scholarship of tax arbitration. Yet this proposition is 
largely premised on the assumption that the failure or protraction of the MAP 
solely results from bureaucracy or strategic behaviours on the part of 
competent authorities. Incapacity of countries or bona fide disagreements 
between competent authorities in MAP negotiations can hardly be addressed 
merely by the prospect of tax arbitration. Indeed, tax arbitration may pose 
severer capacity challenge to many developing countries.302   
In this connection, the antilegalistic arguments exemplified in the studies 
examined above are informative. Nevertheless, scholars favouring this 
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approach are in the minority, and more efforts need to be built along this line.      
2.6.2 Insufficiency of theoretical approaches 
In addition to its legalistic character, another prominent feature of the existing 
literature of ITDR is its “physical” approach: studies in this arena 
overwhelmingly focus on concrete rules of ITDR, whereas the theoretical 
foundation, or the “metaphysical” aspect of the system, has largely been 
neglected. Arguably, Carolis’s observation that students of ITDR tend to 
compare it with dispute-settlement systems in trade and investment regimes 
reflects the very fact that ITDR lacks its own self-sufficient theoretical 
foundation. Meanwhile, the paucity of theoretical reflection and the plethora of 
the comparative approach reinforce the legalistic tendency in the ITDR 
literature, since both trade and investment regimes feature legalistic 
dispute-resolution systems, in which negotiation or consultation plays only a 
very limited role.303   
If Carolis is correct in declaring that a new discipline, i.e. the ITDRP, is 
emerging, then a theoretical approach to the discipline is a must, as it is 
common sense that a discipline without a theoretical basis would be like a 
house built on sand.304 As Coase writes in criticising the writers of old 
institutional economics, “they were anti-theoretical, and without a theory to 
bind together their collection of facts, they had very little that they were able to 
pass on”.305 Also noteworthy is that theorists working on the topic of general 
conflict settlement,306 dispute resolution in other domains,307 and the topic of 
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international tax regime,308 have all achieved robust theoretical constructions 
in their respective fields.  
Given the significance and scarcity of the theoretical approach in ITDR, the 
attempts undertaken by Green, Altman, Carolis and a few others are 
illuminating. These efforts combine the study of ITDR with IR theory (mainly 
Liberal Institutionalism), and shed light on the “international” aspect of ITDR. 
Students in this area can therefore acquire a better understanding of the 
major drives for and obstacles to international cooperation on ITDR. 
Nonetheless, the subject of ITDR is multi-faceted, presenting not only an 
“international” aspect, but also “tax” and “dispute resolution” aspects. 
Consider those technical issues of dispute settlement, such as the choice 
between oral hearings and documentary methods, it is rather doubtful how IR 
theory can help. Indeed, Green’s inability to extend his arguments to 
case-level tax disputes reflects the very limitation of the IR-oriented approach. 
Another shortcoming of this approach is related to its cost-benefit framework. 
As was discussed above (Section 2.5.4), the treatment of the costs and 
benefits of the ITDR system by these authors is inconsistent and at times 
contradictory. Given the narrow scope of the IR-oriented approach, the 
question arises of whether it is possible to have a more general and 
comprehensive analytical framework for the study of ITDR. 
2.7 Comments on the sovereignty argument 
It could be seen that the past studies of ITDR have been considerably shaped 
by the sovereignty argument: taxation is the lifeblood of fiscal sovereignty; 
therefore, countries want to take control of the resolution of tax disputes. 
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Intuitively, sovereignty concerns feel real and concrete, particularly for 
developing countries. Cruz observes that fiscal sovereignty has been widely 
used in South American countries as grounds against arbitration in 
international tax matters.309 In a recent G20 meeting, Nirmala Sitaraman, 
India’s Minister of Finance, also resorted to the sovereignty argument in 
denouncing the OECD’s proposal – as part of BEPS Action 14 – of 
introducing mandatory and binding MAP arbitration in tax treaties.310 She 
alleged that tax arbitration “not only impinges on the sovereign rights of 
developing countries in taxation, but will also limit the ability of the developing 
countries to apply their domestic laws for taxing non-residents and foreign 
companies”.311  
2.7.1 Meaning of sovereignty 
The meaning of sovereignty is multi-faceted, partly because the concept has 
been raised in a variety of contexts, and different disciplines approach the 
concept from different perspectives.312 In its original sense, sovereignty is 
related to the principle of non-intervention, which was first formally 
established in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.313 In the fiscal context, this 
Westphalian sovereignty mainly refers to a country’s autonomy in deciding its 
own fiscal policies free from external intervention.314 However, in reality, 
absolute sovereignty is at best an “organized hypocrisy”.315 This is not just 
because history since the Westphalian era has been littered with incidences 
of intervention, but also because nations have long been willing to give up 
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part of their sovereignty when they see fit to do so.316 This is evidenced in the 
proliferation of various international regimes such as the UN, EU, WTO, and 
ICSID, many of which feature a substantial curtailment of national sovereignty. 
Indeed, many countries that resist tax arbitration have agreed to subject other 
types of economic disputes to various supranational fora.317 
Lee identifies two types of sovereignty: de jure and de facto. In short, de jure 
sovereignty is a matter of competence or right, whereas de facto sovereignty 
is a matter of actual ability.318 The implication of this classification is that even 
if states manage to secure their de jure sovereignty, their de facto sovereignty 
is inevitably eroded by the force of globalisation.319 This is particularly the 
case in the fiscal area, where increased capital mobility weakens an 
individual state’s ability to exercise its domestic fiscal policy independently.320 
It follows that a certain level of fiscal cooperation among states may enhance, 
rather than undermine, national sovereignty interests.321   
Therefore, the concept of sovereignty is rather amorphous. Both international 
cooperation and its breakdown can be explained by it. As a result, it is not 
unusual to see that in many issue areas, groups on all sides of a debate 
mobilise the concept for their own purposes to such an extent that some even 
regard sovereignty as an empty shell.322 Arguments based on such an empty 
shell can hardly generate any consistent and refutable conclusion. The 
situation can be illustrated by an analogy with economics or sociology, both of 
which concern interactions among individuals. Certainly individuals’ ability to 
choose between cooperation and defect is preconditioned on their capacity of 
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self-determination, which can perhaps be called individual sovereignty. As 
Friedman notes, a fundamental condition for market exchange is that 
individuals are effectively free to enter or not to enter into any particular 
transaction. 323  Nevertheless, individual sovereignty itself is helpless in 
predicting how a person will choose its strategy on a particular occasion.     
2.7.2 Instrumental perspective 
From a normative perspective, sovereignty has been increasingly viewed as 
an instrument with which to realise or advance more-fundamental values.324 
Sovereignty, scholars argue, is justified simply because according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, multitudes of sovereign states can serve the needs of 
global citizens better than can a supranational power.325 Related to this 
instrumental view is the notion of “popular sovereignty”, which indicates that 
the ultimate source of a sovereignty power does not lie with a nation’s 
government, but with its people. 326  Therefore, in the modern world, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for a country to justify its noncompliance with 
treaty obligations merely by citing sovereignty. In contrast, where 
collaborative actions among countries on certain issues – such as the 
countermeasures against global climate change – are believed to be 
welfare-enhancing for citizens around the world, the instrumental perspective 
of sovereignty would require states to concede part of their prerogatives so as 
to facilitate international cooperation on the issues.  
2.7.3 Summary   
The deficiencies of the sovereignty argument will be revisited repeatedly in 
the remaining chapters. Suffice it to conclude from the above critical review 
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that in an era of accelerated globalisation, the notion of sovereignty has 
become increasingly irrelevant. 327  In this connection, a natural question 
would arise as to what really accounts in explaining the success or failure of 
international cooperation in certain issue areas. To put it differently, what did 
Ms. Sitaraman (India’s Minister of Finance) really mean when she announced 
that tax arbitration impinges on national sovereignty? Simply to declare that 
taxation is of paramount importance is unhelpful, as many other types of 
international conflict also involve vital national interests. For example, 
international trade and investment conflicts usually involve issues like public 
order, health and morality, essential security interests, or even civil revolution, 
all of which can be more politically sensitive than tax disputes.328 As was 
discussed above (Section 1.2), Altman attributes the antilegalistic shift in the 
League of Nations that was reflected in the 1933 draft convention to efficiency 
considerations rather than sovereignty concerns. This hints that economic 
insights can be useful in the ITDR research. 
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Chapter 2. Introduction to TC Theory 
1. Cases for the marriage between ITDR and TC theory 
1.1 Overview 
In Chapter 1, this author highlighted the significance of a theoretical approach 
in the ITDR research. The next question is, then, to decide which theory to 
choose. This thesis adopts a law-and-economic approach. In particular, it 
looks into TC theory, which is the bedrock of the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE).   
1.2 Law-and-economic tradition 
Economic approaches to law are not new. Classic economists, such as Adam 
Smith, the founder of modern economics, and Karl Marx, all shed economic 
light on legal systems.329 For example, Smith’s Wealth of Nations spent three 
chapters on a discussion of the tax system of the Commonwealth, and 
another nine chapters on its system of political economy.330 Since then, 
however, the marriage between law and economics has largely disintegrated, 
partly because economists after Smith increasingly focused on the price 
mechanism in the marketplace.331 This disciplinary division persisted until the 
1960s, when a new law-and-economic movement emerged. 332  The 
movement comprised numerous separate but related efforts of extending 
formal economic theory to explain the nature and effects of legal 
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regulations.333 Currently, the law-and-economic tradition has evolved as a 
substantial and important body of thought within both economics and law.334 
In large part, the success of economics in penetrating non-market areas – this 
penetration is often termed as economic imperialism – can be attributed to the 
rigor, relevance, and generality of the theory.335 Economics is built upon three 
fundamental and interrelated concepts: maximisation, equilibrium and 
efficiency.336 Specifically, individuals (and firms) are assumed to engage in 
maximising rational behaviour under constraints.337 An implication of the 
assumption is that there are always trade-offs at the margin.338 Maximising 
behaviour tends to push these individuals toward a point of rest, known as 
equilibrium.339 Economic activities are said to attain efficiency if resources 
cannot be reallocated so as to make one individual better off without making 
someone else worse off. 340  Based on these three building blocks, a 
well-defined and universal behavioural model can be derived to produce 
refutable predictions not only in the market context, but also in non-marketing 
settings. For instance, legal rules or sanctions resemble the price or other 
constraints; therefore, rational individuals respond to these rules or sanctions 
much as they respond to the price.341 The prediction of the behavioural 
effects of certain rules or sanctions can further be tested by empirical 
evidence. Moreover, concepts like maximisation, margin, and equilibrium are 
particularly amenable to mathematical modelling, as they were originally 
borrowed from the disciplines of mathematics and physics.342 As a result, 
economics has developed an abstract but rigorous language that allows 
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economists to strip away complexity.343 Many claim that economics is the 
premier social science.344 In Chapter 1, this author has already argued that to 
some extent, the theoretical construction by Green, Altman, Carolis, and 
other researchers falls short of generality and consistency. In particular, 
IR-based theories focus narrowly on the international aspects of ITDR, and 
the cost-benefit framework needs to be clearly and consistently defined.345  
1.3 NIE and TC theory 
NIE started with Coase’s seminal introduction of transaction cost into the 
economic analysis in The Nature of the Firm (1937).346 It derived further 
strengths from a host of different but related contributions, including, inter alia, 
the property-rights theory led by Demsetz, Cheung, and others; the 
contractual theory by Cheung, Williamson, and others; the public-choice 
theory by Buchanan and Tullock; and transaction cost economics (TCE) by 
Williamson.347  
1.3.1 Main thrust of NIE 
NIE largely emerged as a critique of the mainstream economics, also known 
as neoclassic economics. Neoclassic economics emphasises the role of 
relative prices in economic decision-making, considering institutions to play 
virtually no role at all.348 The belief is that social welfare will be maximised by 
ensuring that production and allocation satisfy optimality conditions, 
regardless of the institutional environment. 349  Within this context, NIE 
delivers a revolutionary message: institutions matter for economic 
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performance.350 Here “institution” means “the rules of the game in a society”, 
including not only formal legal instruments, such as the law and other 
governmental rules, but also informal mechanisms, such as customs and 
conventions.351 NIE theorists maintain that (a) different sets of social rules 
and economic organisations affect behaviour and economic outcome; and (b) 
there is an economic logic underlying the variation of those social rules and 
economic organisations.352 
That being said, NIE does not seek to abandon the core elements of the 
neoclassic tradition, which includes, inter alia, the three fundamental 
concepts of neoclassic economics discussed above (Section 1.2); the 
theoretical approach characterised by the rational-choice model and marginal 
analysis; and a strong individualist orientation.353 Rather, new institutionalists 
extend neoclassic economics to cover a full range of institutions in diverse 
cultures and epochs.354 This distinguishes NIE from the old institutional 
economics that emerged during the early 20th century and persists today. 
While the old institutional economists also emphasise the institutional 
elements of the economic life, they reject any theoretical and abstract 
approach.355  
On the surface, NIE does make some changes to one of the three 
fundamentals of neoclassic economics: the assumption that individuals 
engage in rational maximisation. The first modification is that individuals only 
have bounded rationality.356 It is contended that decision-makers are not 
omniscient, but have real difficulties understanding complicated issues.357 
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Thus, human behaviour is “intendedly rational, but limitedly so”.358 A major 
implication of this modified assumption is related to the notion of contractual 
incompleteness: given the bounded rationality, all complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete.359 The second modification is that individuals are 
assumed to have a propensity not only toward maximisation but also toward 
perpetrating opportunistic behaviours. 360  Individuals are likely to be 
dishonest; they may disguise preferences, distort data, or deliberately 
confuse issues.361 Assumption of human opportunism also has a bearing on 
contractual incompleteness. After all, if contractual parties are wholly 
trustworthy, even incomplete contracts can be relied on.362 In contrast, given 
that human beings are “self-seeking with guile”, some safeguard mechanisms, 
or so-called governance structure, for the contract will be necessary to protect 
the contractual interests from opportunistic exploitation by the parties.363  
That being said, these two modifications should not be taken as a 
fundamental departure from the basic assumptions of neoclassic economics. 
As Posner points out, the assumption of bounded rationality is nothing more 
than the recognition of transaction costs – because acquisition of information 
is costly, it is rational for a person to have certain extent of ignorance about 
the transaction.364 Likewise, the concept of opportunism does not really add 
much to the assumption that individuals are inclined to maximise their own 
utility even by taking advantage of others.365 
1.3.2 Relevance of NIE  
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It is widely recognised that NIE provides the most important contribution to 
the law-and-economic approach.366  Before the advent of NIE, Law and 
Economics were confined to limited domains such as antitrust law, regulated 
industries, and taxation.367 The focus was on the effect of certain rules or 
institutions on market activities, rather than on the dynamics of the rules and 
institutions themselves. In particular, the topic of taxation was reduced to the 
category and scale of taxes, with the administrative or institutional aspects 
being largely overlooked.368 It was only with NIE that scholars of Law and 
Economics began to explore legal rules and institutions in a more concrete 
manner.369 This new approach informed by NIE has greater relevance to this 
thesis, because the research question of the thesis is not the effect of 
international taxation on market performance, but the assessment of 
alternative ITDR mechanisms and the quest for their optimal institutional 
design. Indeed, the Liberal Institutionalism on which Altman and Carolis relied 
was substantially inspired by NIE.370 In this sense, by employing NIE, this 
thesis does not entirely alienate itself from the earlier interdisciplinary 
attempts in the ITDR literature.   
Besides Liberal Institutionalism, a variety of other subjects has been 
reshaped by NIE, including those domains that are quite adjacent to ITDR. 
For instance, Rixen (2008, 2011), and Dietsch and Rixen (2014) explore the 
economic logic underlying the institutional trajectory of international tax 
governance.371 Cockfield (2013) conceptualises the international tax regime 
as a political and legal system striving to address transaction-cost challenges 
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– as will be explained below (Section 1.3.3), transaction cost is the core 
concept of NIE. 372  Gebken et al. (2006) evaluate the magnitude of 
transaction costs that the dispute-resolution system in the construction 
industry may entail, and propose the notion of dispute management.373 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the time is now ripe for the combination 
between NIE and ITDR.   
1.3.3 Bedrock of NIE: TC theory   
During the past few decades, NIE has developed several major branches, 
including, inter alia, TC theory, property-rights theory, public-choice theory, 
contractual theory, game theory, and historical and comparative institutional 
analysis. 374  Nevertheless, the main core of the discipline remains TC 
theory.375 As discussed below (Sections 2.3.3, 3), theories of property rights 
and contracts are enormously influenced by TC theory. Accordingly, the 
theoretical construction in this thesis will primarily be based on TC theory, 
although other theories (particularly property-rights theory, contractual theory 
and game theory) will also be touched on insofar as they specify or enrich TC 
theory in certain aspects.  
In general, TC theory can be further divided into two branches: classic TC 
theory, founded by Coase, and TCE, founded by Williamson. Both theories 
are relevant to the analysis in this thesis, and will be synthesised into one 
theoretical framework.  
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2. Classic TC theory 
2.1 Overview 
Under neoclassic economics, cost theories mainly concern the production 
process, and market transactions are generally assumed to be costless.376 In 
his ground-breaking work The Nature of the Firm (1937), Coase starts with a 
seemingly obvious reality: resource allocation in capitalist economies takes 
place not only through autonomous market exchanges, but also through 
entrepreneurial decisions or administrative orders within firms.377 Coase then 
raises a famous question: in light of the then-orthodox view that coordination 
will emerge through the price mechanism underlying the market exchange, 
why is the firm or any other type of organisation necessary?378 The reason is, 
continues Coase, that the use of the price mechanism implies transaction 
costs, and the firm helps to reduce such costs.379 According to Coase, the 
transaction costs of market exchanges include, inter alia, the cost of 
discovering the relative prices and of negotiating and concluding a separate 
contract for each transaction that takes place in a market.380 In contrast, 
through the use of the firm, there is no need for the owners of productive 
factors to contract with each other to realise gains from collaborative 
production.381 Instead, each factor owner concludes only one contract with 
the central entrepreneur, and the number of contracts that must be concluded 
between parties is greatly reduced.382  
2.1.1 Definition and deconstruction of transaction cost 
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A clear-cut definition of transaction cost does not exist, partly because these 
costs exist in different contexts, and scholars approach them from different 
perspectives. In its narrowest sense, transaction costs have been defined as 
the costs of using price mechanisms.383 More broadly, transaction costs are 
associated with property rights, defined as the costs of establishing, 
maintaining, transferring, and protecting property rights.384 In the broadest 
manner, transaction costs are the costs of running the economic system.385 
Furubotn and Richter categorise various types of transaction cost into three 
groups according to the contexts in which those costs are incurred: 
(1) Market transaction costs, defined as the costs of using the market. 
These arise primarily due to the need for information and bargaining 
processes that characterise the use of the market. They consist of: (a) the 
costs of preparing contracts (search and information costs); (b) the costs 
of concluding contracts (costs of bargaining and decision-making); and (c) 
the costs of monitoring and enforcing the contractual obligations.386 
(2) Managerial transaction costs, which are the costs of organising 
activities within a firm. These include: (a) the costs of setting up, 
maintaining, or changing an organisational design; and (b) the costs of 
running an organisation.387 
(3) Political transaction costs, which are associated with the costs of using 
political institutions. These are understood as: (a) the costs of setting up, 
maintaining, or changing a political system; and (b) the costs of running 
such a system.388 
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By identifying the managerial and political transaction costs, NIE theorists can 
extend their analysis from traditional market activities to the managerial and 
political fields, in which the topic of ITDR is typically situated. Be that as it may, 
the emphasis on contextual variation might risk obscuring the common nature 
of transaction costs. In this sense, Cheung’s definition is more general and 
fundamental. Transaction costs, writes Cheung, mainly include the costs “of 
contracting and negotiating…, of measuring and policing property rights, of 
engaging in politics for power, of monitoring performances, and of organizing 
activities”. 389  Cheung’s definition highlights three common sources of 
transaction costs: the agency problem, the bargaining problem, and the 
administrative problem. It has greater generality and broader applicability 
than other definitions of transaction costs. For example, while a typical market 
exchange consists of negotiating a contract (bargaining problem), organising 
execution of the contract (administrative burden), and monitoring the 
performance of the contract (agency problem), establishing and running a 
business or political institution also involves the process of bargaining, 
coordination and monitoring. These three components of transaction cost – 
agency cost, bargaining cost, and administrative cost – will be discussed in 
detail in subsequent sections.  
2.1.2 Significance of transaction cost   
While transaction costs are pervasive in the real world, it is widely agreed that 
lower transaction costs are generally desirable.390 High transaction costs can 
limit or prevent otherwise advantageous exchanges, and contrarily, reduction 
in these costs may facilitate more trade and greater specialisation, thereby 
bringing increased welfare, except for the case of illegal trade and 
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production.391 At the micro level, such as in an enterprise or project, the 
reduction of transaction costs ordinarily leads to higher profits. In this sense, 
the minimisation of transaction costs and wealth maximisation are often the 
two sides of a coin. Accordingly, in the tax context, the optimal system of 
ITDR must also be the most cost-efficient system. This further jutifies the TC 
approach to ITDR.  
2.1.3 Methods of measuring transaction costs 
Given the multifaceted feature of transaction costs and the complexity of 
institutional phenomena, it is no surprise that the measurement of transaction 
costs becomes a thorny question.392 In general, approaches to this empirical 
inquiry in the existing literature of NIE can be divided into two categories: 
cardinal and ordinal.393 The cardinal approach tries to measure the absolute 
value of transaction costs, usually with reference to market prices.394 For 
example, one scholar measures the market transaction costs by reference to 
the difference between production costs and the final price of the commodity, 
and concludes that in the year 1959, the average market transaction costs 
were 49% of the final consumer price.395 Another scholar concludes that in 
1993, the total market transaction costs were about 28% of the GDP.396 
In contrast, the ordinal method questions the feasibility of arriving at reliable 
quantitative estimates about the cardinal size of transaction costs, and seeks 
to work out an ordinal ranking of such costs for different institutions.397 This 
approach is congruent with the central task of NIE: to compare the relative 
efficiency of alternative institutional arrangements. 398  As a leading NIE 
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If we are able to say, ceteris paribus, that a particular type of transaction cost 
is higher in Situation A than in Situation B, and that different individuals 
consistently specify the same ranking whenever the two situations are 
observed, it would follow that transaction costs are measurable, at least at the 
margin.399 
Under this approach, transaction costs do not necessarily have to be 
expressed as monetary values, but can also be approximated by time, energy, 
efforts, or other proxies. 400  The key point is to make sure that the 
measurement is observable and consistent. In particular, the most commonly 
used proxy for transaction costs is the time spent on a particular transaction 
under examination.401 For example, a team of researchers undertook a 
survey on the transaction costs of establishing a business in Lima, Peru. 
Detailed notes and a time log were kept. The results showed that a person of 
modest means would have to spend 289 days in these procedures to set up a 
factory legally. 402  In contrast, another survey based in Tampa, Florida, 
showed that it took only two hours to obtain a permit to open a small business. 
Thus the time cost in Peru was over 1,000 times as high as in Florida.403 This 
thesis will adopt the ordinal approach in measuring transaction costs of 
alternative ITDR mechanisms.   
2.1.4 General determinants of transaction costs 
Various factors may affect the magnitude of transaction costs. Those factors 
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that have particular bearings on agency, bargaining or administrative costs 
will be elaborated on in subsequent sections. This subsection examines only 
the general determinants of transaction costs.       
(1) Institutions. It is institutions that largely determine how costly it is to 
transact.404 Eggertsson shows how the institutional environment – in the 
form of national policies – may influence the overall magnitude of 
transaction costs: 
When a state introduces and enforces the rule of law in a lawless area, it 
thereby lowers transaction costs and stimulates trade. When it prohibits 
trade in certain commodities – for example, heroin or antigovernment 
literature – it raises the cost of exchanging the restricted goods, perhaps 
to a point where trade is sharply reduced or abandoned altogether.405 
At the micro level, the impact of various institutional arrangements on 
transaction costs is more obvious. For example, different ownership 
structures of firms – e.g., whether they are private or public companies – 
may entail different transaction costs and lead to different economic 
outcomes.406           
(2) Technology. Technical changes exert far-reaching influences on the 
magnitude of transaction costs, although the direction of such influences 
is complicated. On the one hand, new technologies help to ease the 
business process, thereby reducing transaction costs of the business; on 
the other hand, they may also give rise to new business patterns that are 
more complex and hence more costly to handle.407 Eggertsson asserts 
that technical changes have a net effect of increasing transaction costs.408 
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Arguably, Eggertsson’s assertion largely concerns the macro level of a 
society. For specific transactions at the micro level, since the evolution of 
the general business pattern in a society is stable in the short run, 
technical innovation usually has the net effect of saving transaction costs. 
This is particularly reflected in the field of dispute settlement. On the one 
hand, technical changes, particularly the development of information 
technology (IT), have given rise to new types of conflict, and increased the 
frequency and complexity of traditional ones, for the whole society (the 
macro level). On the other hand, IT has created new tools that can 
facilitate dispute resolution processes (the micro level).409        
(3) Number of parties involved. It is conceivable that a larger number of 
parties involved in a transaction may bring more friction to the process. 
After all, transaction costs are by nature costs of human interaction, or 
“the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy”.410 The 
effect of party number on transaction costs will be examined in more detail 
in later sections.411   
(4) Transaction costs and economies of scale. Despite the difference 
between the transaction costs in NIE and the production costs in 
neoclassic economics, several economic rules about the production costs 
may also apply to transaction costs. 412  Among others, the rule of 
economies of scale (or scale economies) is of particular relevance for the 
purpose of this thesis. According to neoclassic economics, economies of 
scale refer to the phenomenon in which total average cost per output unit 
falls as the output rises. 413  Multiple factors may account for the 
economies of scale. For example, higher output can lead to better 
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specialisation in production activities and better use of machinery.414 For 
an established firm, overhead expenses for premises, equipment, 
management, etc., have nevertheless occurred even without any output, 
and increasing output from an initial low level allows those overhead costs 
to be spread over more product units.415 Likewise, for those transactions 
facilitated by certain institutional frameworks such as legal or monetary 
systems, transaction costs of establishing and running such frameworks 
can be diluted as the number of transactions using such frameworks 
increases.  
2.2 Agency costs 
The costs of “monitoring performance” specified in Cheung’s definition of 
transaction costs are largely associated with the agency costs. A 
principal-agency relation is established where one party (the principal) 
delegates the work to another (the agent).416 Such relations pervade the 
modern society. Examples include worker-boss, physician-patient, 
landlord-tenant, voter-politician, etc.417 The central problem of the agency 
relation is that the agent may pursue its own interest instead of being loyal to 
the principal.418 This agency problem is further compounded by the fact that it 
is usually difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing.419 Normally the agent knows better than the principal about 
the details of the task assigned to it, and about its own actions, abilities, and 
preferences.420 
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The literature on agency theory has identified several factors that would affect 
the magnitude of the agency problem.  
2.2.1 Extent of interest divergence 
The divergence between the interests of the principal and those of the agent 
is the primary root of the agency problem. Accordingly, the extent of interest 
divergence is positively related to the size of the agency cost.421 For instance, 
if a company is managed by the owner, the manager and the owner become 
the same person, and that person will operate the business in a diligent 
manner so as to maximise the return for the company.422 In contrast, as the 
owner-manager sells his or her equity shares to outside shareholders, agency 
costs will be generated by the divergence between his or her interests and 
those of the outside shareholders.423 Consequently, as his or her fraction of 
the equity falls, he or she would be increasingly encouraged to shirk in duty 
performing, and meanwhile to appropriate company resources, e.g., in the 
form of duty consumption.424    
2.2.2 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is positively related to the magnitude of the agency 
problem. The rationale is that since the information system informs the 
principal about the agent’s performance, the agent will realize that it cannot 
deceive its principal.425 Two types of information are the most relevant in the 
agency relation: the information about the agent’s behaviour, and the detail of 
the task assigned to the agent.426     
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2.2.3 Measurability of agents’ performance 
Measurability of the agent’s performance is negatively related to the 
magnitude of the agency problem. The argument is similar to that of the 
information system: if it is easy for the principal to measure the agent’s 
performance, there will be less scope for the agent to act in an aberrant 
manner. 427  A particular problem of measuring the agent’s performance 
concerns teamwork or joint production, in which the contributions of multiple 
agents are mixed. 428  Cheung instances the measuring problem of joint 
production by reference to the flashlight manufacturing in Hong Kong.429 
When the flashlights are electroplated, Chung writes, “one worker monitors 
the tank of chemicals, another rotates the article in the solution, and a third 
rinses them as they are handed to him on a hanger. The relative contribution 
of each worker is thus difficult to separate”.430 Therefore, says Cheung, they 
are paid in the form of an hourly wage, which entails more scope for the 
workers to “shirk”.431 In contrast, another lot of workers, who insert switches, 
are paid by piece, as their contributions are relatively easy to separate and 
measure.432 This example demonstrates that the efficacy of a monitoring 
system for a process of joint production depends on the extent to which the 
individual agent’s contribution to the joint outcome can be isolated and 
measured.  
The problem of measurability in relation to joint production provides another 
rationale for the existence of the firm that is slightly different from Coase’s firm 
theory. The reasoning begins with the common belief that the joint output of a 
team is usually greater than the sum of individual contributions made in 
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isolation.433 However, a problem with the teamwork is that individuals may 
“shirk” in the production, as it is difficult to measure the marginal product of 
each team member.434 In order to prevent excessive shirking, which may 
ultimately lead to the dissolution of the team, the members of the coalition 
employ a central agent and give it the right to hire, fire, and monitor the team 
members. 435  While it is true that the central agent itself may commit 
opportunistic conduct, the problem can be solved by giving it the claim over 
the firm’s residual income.436    
2.3 Bargaining costs 
The costs of “contracting and negotiating” in Cheung’s account include 
different types of transaction costs. In a technical sense, these costs include 
logistical expenses of organising the activities of contracting and negotiation, 
and the communication burden between the parties (such as those due to 
language differences). As will be discussed in the next section, these 
expenses can be classified as administrative costs. However, in many cases, 
even if such administrative costs are trivial, the negotiation may still break 
down for the reasons of distributive conflict. For example, Cooter et al. report 
that around 15-20% of divorces involving children ended up in court owing to 
the failure of the couples to achieve settlements on the partitioning of the 
property at stake.437  For these cases, negotiations should be relatively 
costless in a technical sense, as the processes are bilateral and between the 
two people who used to live under the same roof. Nevertheless, there can be 
great difficulties for the parties to agree on how to distribute the stake at issue. 
The difficulty for the parties to solve distributive conflict is termed bargaining 
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costs, which is the theme of this subsection. The dynamic of bargaining costs 
has been explored in multiple contexts within NIE and related disciplines such 
as game theory and law-and-economic theory. It is desirable to synthesise 
these different, and usually mutual-enlightened, perspectives.   
2.3.1 Game-theory approach   
2.3.1.1 Battle-of-sexes (BOS) game  
In the literature of game theory, the bargaining problem is typically modelled 
as the BOS game. Consider a young couple planning a date one evening. 
Whereas one spouse prefers to watch the football game, the other would 
rather go to the opera. However, both would prefer to go to the same place 
rather than to different ones, because after all, it is pointless to stay apart for a 
date. As the payoff matrix illustrates, the unmatched sets of choices, either 
opera-football (upper-right corner) or football-opera (lower-left corner), yield 
zero gain, meaning that the date is simply ruined. By contrast, the matched 
sets of choices, opera-opera (upper-left corner) and football-football 
(lower-right corner), yield a positive gain, denoted as (2, 3) and (3, 2), 
respectively.  
Table 1: The BOS game 
 Spouse B 
 
Spouse A  
 Opera Football 
Opera 2, 3 0, 0 
Football 0, 0 3, 2  
 
Table derived from Joel Watson, Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory (WWNorton 2002) 
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31–32.   
In this case, both players would prefer to cooperate with each other, and once 
they have achieved an agreement on a specific method of cooperation, they 
will have little incentive to defect. The problem is, however, that the game 
involves two equally efficient outcomes, and each outcome has a different 
distributive effect for the two players, with the opera-opera outcome favouring 
Spouse B and the football-football favouring Spouse A. If the distributive 
effect is large enough, the couple may trigger “the battle of the sexes” and 
ultimately ruin their date unless they find a way to compromise effectively.438  
2.3.1.2 Comparison between the BOS game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
game 
The BOS game is often compared with the PD game, which also has 
important implications for the theoretical construction in this thesis.439 The 
PD game considers that A and B are arrested and imprisoned for suspected 
felony, with no means of communicating with each other. The prosecutors 
lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but they 
have enough to convict both on a lesser charge. The prosecutors offer each 
prisoner a bargain: if A and B betray each other, both of them will serve two 
years in prison, which could be modelled as the payoff vector of (-2, -2). If A 
betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve three years 
in prison (and vice versa), respectively denoted as (0, -3) and (-3,0). If both A 
and B remain silent, both of them will only serve one year in prison (on the 
lesser charge), denoted as (-1, -1).440 
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Table 2: The PD game 
 Player B 
 
Player A 
 Silence Betray 
Silence -1, -1 -3, 0 
Betray 0, -3 -2, -2  
Table derived from Richard H. McAdams, ‘Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, 
Game Theory, and Law’, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 215 (2008). 
With the above payoffs, if B keeps silent, A is better off betraying (receiving 
the payoff of 0) than by silence (receiving -1). If B betrays, A is still better off 
betraying (-2) than silent (-3). Therefore, betrayal is A’s dominant strategy in 
this game, regardless of B’s choice. Because the positions of A and B are 
symmetric, B has the same dominant strategy: betrayal. It follows that the 
only equilibrium outcome, also known as the Nash Equilibrium, of the game is 
betray/betray, which is worse than the possible outcome of silent/ silent.441 In 
this game, by pursuing their own individual rewards, both parties ultimately 
receive the worst outcome overall. The teamwork or joint production, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3, represents a PD situation: each member in the 
team free-rides on its peers, and the outcome is poor performance of the 
team.442 
McAdams enunciates the difference between the BOS and PD games as 
follows: 
Though being the only one to defect in a PD is the best outcome, being the 
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only one to withhold agreement in a bargaining situation is not the best 
outcome, because it prevents the gain of the bargain. Instead, the problem is 
one of coordination because there is more than one way to conclude 
agreement and each party shares the desire to avoid an impasse that may 
result when each party presses for its preferred distribution.443 
Indeed, with mild distributive conflict, a BOS game becomes purely a 
coordination game that will hardly cause any impasse or enforcement 
problem. Such a coordination game is typified in negotiations on “rules of the 
road”, such as – in the context of transnational cooperation – the international 
rules established for air transport, marine navigation and the distribution of 
radio frequencies.444 It is fairly easy for countries to achieve agreements on 
these issues, and coercive enforcement of these agreements is usually not 
needed.445  
2.3.1.3 Solutions to the BOS game     
For the BOS game, given the multiple equilibriums in the game, players’ 
strategic choice cannot be solely determined by the payoffs of the game, but 
helped by factors outside the game.446 These other factors, also known as 
“focal points”, can direct the parties toward one of the equilibriums.447 One 
factor that is particularly relevant to the purpose of this thesis is third-party 
intervention.448 A third party can recommend that the individuals coordinate 
in a particular way, thereby creating self-fulfilling expectations among those 
individuals that the recommended behaviour will occur.449 One example is a 
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scenario where the traffic light fails at a busy intersection and a bystander 
steps in to direct the traffic.450 At the same time, two drivers approach from 
different directions; each prefers to proceed ahead of the other, but both 
regard a collision as the worst outcome that must be avoided.451 In this 
typical BOS situation, the bystander’s intervention would influence the drivers' 
behaviour even though the bystander is not a police officer.452 “If hand 
signals [of the bystanders] are in full view of both drivers, then the driver 
motioned to stop will now have stronger reason to expect that the other driver 
will proceed (and vice versa).”453 In a broader sense, legal expression is also 
a form of third-party intervention.454 If the government in a new society 
announces that drivers should drive on the right side of the road, the 
announcement is quite likely to create a focal point with which the people 
readily comply even if the government does not specify any repercussions of 
noncompliance.455  
In addition to third-party intervention, precedents also help to create a focal 
point for the BOS game. “Precedent” mainly refers to history or culture. What 
is focal depends on what the people in the situation believe about how their 
peers have solved or would solve the same or analogous situations.456 In an 
experiment, a team of game theorists asked people to name a place and time 
of day they would go to meet another person in New York City if they had 
planned a day to meet, yet had failed to pin down a particular place and 
time.457 A majority identified Grand Central Station and almost everyone 
selected noon.458 The outcome of this coordination game demonstrates the 
power of culture – people chose Grand Central Station because they 
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frequently arrived in New York City at that location, and noon is the middle of 
the day.459 
2.3.2 Law-and-economic approach  
In the Law and Economics literature, bargaining is usually discussed in 
conjunction with the topic of pre-trial settlement in a domestic context.460 The 
pre-trial settlement is typically described as a game played in the shadow of 
the law.461 The court encourages private settlement through negotiation but 
stands ready to step out of the shadow and resolve the dispute by coercion if 
the negotiation breaks down.462 This gives rise to a BOS situation: on the one 
hand, the parties have a mutual interest in settling the case so as to avoid 
costly litigation; on the other hand, the competition over the stake of the case 
between them dulls the prospect of a pre-trial settlement.463 
According to the Law and Economics literature, the failure to settle usually 
results from information asymmetry. 464  In particular, if both parties are 
optimistic about their prospect of wining a favourable award in the litigation, 
there will be no way that a settlement can be reached.465 For illustration, if 
both parties expect the court to award damages of $1,000 (to the plaintiff) and 
the trial costs are expected to be $200 for each party, the plaintiff will refuse to 
settle for less than $800, and the defendant will refuse to pay more than 
$1,200.466 As a result, any out-of-court settlement in which the defendant 
pays the plaintiff at least $800 but less than $1,200 makes both parties better 
off than going to trial. Accordingly, the size of the settlement range of this case 
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is $400 ($1,200 minus $800).467 If the plaintiff expects to be awarded $1,300 
and the defendant expects the award to be only $700, the plaintiff will refuse 
to accept any amount less than $1,100, and the defendant will refuse to pay 
more than $900.468 The upshot is that the settlement range disappears 
altogether.469 
The over-optimism from both parties usually results from the different sources 
of information on which they rely.470 One way to mitigate this information 
asymmetry and over-optimism, as some suggest, is for the parties to seek 
help from legal counsel.471 Lawyers are more experienced in dealing with 
similar situations, and can therefore be more realistic in predicting the 
outcome of a trial.472 
2.3.3 Property-rights approach 
The discussion of the bargaining problem in the property-rights literature is 
mostly associated with the topic of institutional evolution regarding 
property-rights regimes. The discussion typically starts with the question of 
why certain property-rights regimes that seem obviously inefficient still 
persist.473 The principle answer is that even though stakeholders may agree 
on the overall benefits from the reform of the inefficient property-rights 
arrangement, conflict arises over the distribution of such benefits.474 Each 
party seeks to push for their private net gains, with the resulting bargaining 
impasse likely to prevent the otherwise productive institutional change.475          
The situation can be illustrated by the example of oil-field unitisation. In the 
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USA, oil reservoirs are usually exploited by multiple operators, with each 
operator owning a section of the surface over a reservoir.476 Efficient oil 
extraction necessitates the maintenance of an appropriate level of reservoir 
pressure so that oil and gas can be pushed out of rocks.477 However, an oil 
reservoir is like a common pool: oil is migratory and can hardly be fully 
partitioned simply by delineating the surface over the oil reservoir. 478 
Specifically, each landowner can drill a well on their land and drain oil from 
their neighbours without economic liability.479 Since each owner will seek to 
maximise his or her own output, the result is a competitive drilling among 
these owners, leading to insufficient reservoir pressure. 480  One of the 
solutions to this common pool problem is the unitisation strategy: a single firm 
is designated by all other neighbouring oil firms as a united operator to extract 
the oil reservoir as a whole.481 Unitisation is economically desirable because 
the single operator has an incentive to protect the reservoir so as to maximise 
the aggregate value of the entire resource rather than overexploiting it as in 
the case of individual leases.482 However, before any such unitisation can be 
carried out, individual owners must first overcome distributive conflict to agree 
to a rule of sharing the output from the proposed unitisation.483 Theorists 
have identified several major factors that may reinforce the bargaining 
problem among the parties: 
(1) Vested interests of the parties. In considering whether or not to support 
a proposed change in a property-rights regime at any time, the bargaining 
parties will compare their expected income stream under the status quo 
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with that offered by the new arrangement.484 Parties predicting that their 
vested interests would be undermined by the new property-rights regime 
tend to perpetuate the status quo. 485  Accordingly, both the initial 
assignment of property rights, and the expected distribution will affect the 
individual efforts of contracting parties in promoting (or blocking) an 
institutional change.486  
(2) The number and heterogeneity of the parties. The greater the number 
of competing interest groups with a stake in the reform of a property-rights 
regime, the more claims need to be addressed to achieve a consensus on 
the reform. 487  The heterogeneity of the parties also contributes to 
bargaining difficulties, as the parties’ divergent interests mean that any 
simplified or uniform solution of an institutional change may benefit some 
parties while disrupting others.488 In the oil-unitisation case, the number of 
independently owned tracts of land on an oil field is large, and the 
economic incentives of large and small firms differ substantially.489 These 
all contribute to the difficulties of achieving consensus on the unitisation 
strategy.490     
(3) Information shortage or asymmetry. As discussed above, in deciding 
whether to support a proposed institutional change, individual parties will 
evaluate their initial position and the expected distribution. However, such 
assessment may encounter serious problems in the event of information 
shortages or asymmetries. 491  In the case of oil-field unitisation, 
information asymmetry and technical uncertainty make accurate 
economic valuation of individual leases difficult, thereby increasing 
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bargaining costs considerably.492 Occasionally, information shortage or 
asymmetry may even occur over the aggregate benefits of a proposed 
institutional change, so that not all parties agree on the legitimacy of the 
reform in the first place regardless of the share formula.493   
2.4 Administrative costs 
Administrative costs refer in Cheung’s definition to the costs of organising 
activities. Eggertsson distinguishes the administrative cost from the agency 
cost by stating that “even when agents are loyal and do not shirk, principals 
are still faced with the task of coordinating their activities, which is yet another 
cost of transaction”. 494  In addition to the costs of organising activities, 
administrative costs also include cognitive burdens, such as the costs of 
communication, case analysis, and the use of expertise. Indeed, 
administrative costs can be so broad that they almost contain any transaction 
costs that cannot be subsumed under agency or bargaining costs – they can 
be termed residual costs.    
Administration costs are prevalent in human society, particularly within 
bureaucratic systems. According to Furubotn and Richter, the greatest 
proportion of political transaction costs is incurred by the administration of 
justice, education, and other public affairs. 495  Unlike the agency and 
bargaining costs, administrative costs need to be approached in a contextual 
manner, as a general theory about this type of cost has yet to be developed in 
the field of economics.    
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2.5 Additional comments on the three components of transaction 
costs  
The above three components of transaction costs and the theories associated 
with them apply to a variety of contexts, including both micro-level 
transactions, such as a specific pre-trial settlement, and macro-level policies 
or regimes, such as the evolution of economic institutions. These components 
are largely interdependent. For instance, governmental bureaucracy, which is 
a typical agency problem, can be exacerbated by staff shortages or heavy 
workloads, which are an administrative problem. Moreover, reduction of one 
type of transaction costs may frequently increase the size of other types. For 
example, measures to address the agency problem, such as the 
establishment and maintenance of a monitoring system, may incur 
administrative costs. In the literature on agency theory, the costs of 
monitoring are also classified as part of agency costs. Thus, the total agency 
costs are the sum of the investments made in monitoring agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour, plus the residual loss due to the remaining shirking 
by the agents.496 For the sake of simplification, in this thesis, the agency 
costs include only the residual loss caused by agents’ shirking, whereas the 
costs of monitoring those agents will be classified as administrative costs.              
3. Transaction-cost economics (TCE) 
3.1 Overview 
TCE comes as a critique of classic TC theory. Williamson argues that despite 
the growing recognition that transaction costs are central to the study of 
economics, the concept needs specification.497 In particular, while classic TC 
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theory points out that the choice among various economic institutions 
depends on the variation in the transaction costs that attend each institution, it 
is unclear which factors are responsible for such cost variation.498 “There is a 
suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably 
specified transaction costs.”499 In this connection, TCE aims to operationalise 
transaction costs by specifying critical dimensions with respect to which 
transaction costs differ and alternative institutional arrangements are 
warranted to economise those costs.500 The central message delivered by 
TCE is that transaction costs can be economised by matching governance 
structures to the attributes of transactions in a discriminating way.501 
3.2 Economic institutions as modes of contractual governance 
TCE features a remarkable contractual orientation, maintaining that every 
exchange relation can be formulated as a contracting problem.502 Thus, 
various economic institutions such as markets and firms are regarded as 
different structures of contractual governance.503 According to Williamson, 
there are four main types of governance structure: market, trilateral, bilateral, 
and unified.504   
3.2.1 Market governance 
Market governance represents the simplest view of transactions: “sharp in by 
clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance”.505 Under the market 
governance, discrete, autonomous market exchanges are instantaneously 
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consummated under the aegis of fully specified contracts.506 Even where 
contractual performance is not instantaneous, future contingencies are fully 
anticipated in the present contract. 507  It follows that under market 
governance, relational considerations are principally absent. 508  Market 
governance is not merely a theoretical fiction, but very common for those 
on-spot transactions or transactions in thick markets in which substitute 
trading partners are easy to find.509 Market governance is supported within 
the legal framework of classic contract law.510 The major characteristics of 
classic contract law are that it: 
(1) Treats the identity of the contracting parties as irrelevant;  
(2) Emphasises clearly spelled-out contractual terms and provides 
rigorous court enforcement of these terms, although litigation is rarely 
triggered because the consequence of non-performance is predictable; 
and  
(3) Provides a well-defined body of law to deal with matters not specifically 
covered in a contract.511     
3.2.2 Trilateral governance 
Moving from market governance, contracts increasingly assume continuing 
and relational quality, and begin to enter the paradigm of trilateral governance. 
The legal counterpart of trilateral governance is “neoclassical contract law”.512 
This type of law has two prominent characteristics. First, the ex ante planning 
of the contract is inherently incomplete, and hence subject to various gaps.513 
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Second, the contracting parties use a range of ex post techniques to allow for 
flexibility. 514  In particular, third-party assistance such as arbitration or 
mediation is preferred over litigation as means of dispute settlement in case 
the contract maladapts.515     
3.2.3 Bilateral governance 
Bilateral governance features a more specialised and relational mechanism 
of adjusting contractual maladapations.516 While under trilateral governance 
(and neoclassic contract law), the original contract largely remains as the 
reference basis for effecting contractual adaptation, the significance of the 
original agreement decreases substantially under the bilateral governance.517 
What matters more for bilateral governance is that the parties develop a 
relationship and that the dispute settlement under this paradigm is of an 
“ongoing-administrative kind”.518 
Bilateral as well as trilateral governance can be illustrated by the following 
contractual provision, which is extracted from a 32-year coal-supply 
agreement between the Nevada Power Company and the Northwest Trading 
Company: 
In the event an inequitable condition occurs which adversely affects one Party, 
it shall then be the joint and equal responsibility of both Parties to act 
promptly and in good faith to determine the action required to cure or adjust 
for the inequity and effectively to implement such action. Upon written claim of 
inequity served by one Party upon the other, the Parties shall act jointly to 
reach an agreement concerning the claimed inequity within sixty days of the 
date of such written claim. ---. If the Parties cannot reach agreement within 
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sixty days the matter shall be submitted to arbitration.519 
The provision contains a mutual negotiation procedure (bilateral governance 
structure), which is further supplemented by an arbitration mechanism 
(trilateral governance structure) in case the negotiation goes awry. This 
provision is quite akin to Article 25 of the OECD Model (post-2008 version). 
3.2.4 Unified governance 
Under this governance structure, the otherwise independent contracting 
parties are now integrated into a single entity. 520  Administrative control 
dominates the relationship between the parties, and disputes between them 
will largely be resolved internally through administrative means.521 The most 
common form of unified governance is the firm. Within a firm, information is 
more easily acquired, less formal documentation is necessary, direct costs of 
using more formal mechanisms (such as lawyers, courts, and arbitration 
mechanisms) can be avoided, disputes can be resolved in a more timely 
fashion, and the potential for defection is reduced.522 
This description shows that as a contract moves from market governance to 
unified governance, the mechanism governing the contract becomes 
increasingly specialised, personalised, flexible, or, in Green’s word, 
antilegalistic. From a TCE perspective, there are rational economic reasons 
for organising some transactions one way and other transactions another.523 
The question is, however, which go where and for what reason? The answer 
is determined by the characteristics of the specific transactions at issue.524      
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3.3 Key attributes of transactions and the implications for 
governance structures 
TCE identifies three key attributes of a transaction that distinguish different 
types of transaction costs and the attendant governance structures: 
investment specificity, frequency of transactions, and uncertainty.525  The 
basic point is that transactions with specialised investments, high frequency, 
and high level of uncertainty are more suited to a specialised governance 
structure.526 
3.3.1 Asset specificity 
Among the three attributes of transactions, investment specificity, or asset 
specificity, is of paramount importance.527 Investment can be either general 
or specific.528 Transactions over general items pose few hazards, since 
buyers and suppliers in these circumstances can easily switch to alternative 
options in the market.529 Problems arise when transaction-specific expenses 
are incurred.530    
3.3.1.1 Transaction-specific investments 
Transaction-specific investments are the investments that, once committed, 
cannot be transferred to alternative uses without a loss in value. 531 Such 
specialised investments may take the following forms: 
(1) Specialised physical assets, such as a die for stamping out distinctive 
metal shapes;  
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(2) Site specificity, such as an investment in mining ore;  
(3) Specialised human assets that arise from firm-specific training or 
learning by doing; and  
(4) Brand-name capital. 532  
For transactions with specialised investments, or high degree of asset 
specificity, the assurance of a continuing relation between the contracting 
parties is needed to encourage such investments from both parties.533 This is 
because by definition, transaction-specific investments can best be 
reimbursed and appreciated by staying in their current use.534  For example, 
a buyer may induce a supplier to invest in specialised physical capital of a 
transaction-specific kind. Inasmuch as the value of this capital in other uses is 
much smaller than the use for which it has been originally intended, the 
supplier is effectively “locked into” the transaction.535 The process is often 
symmetrical in that the buyer may also find it difficult to reach alternative 
sources of supply and acquire the item for favourable terms because the item 
is not standardised.536 Therefore, when transaction-specific investments are 
at stake, parties usually have a strong incentive to craft a long-term and 
relational contract to protect these investments.     
3.3.1.2 Contractual incompleteness 
For long-term contracts, which provide the optimal legal framework for 
transactions with a high degree of asset specificity, contractual 
incompleteness is a fundamental reality. Because of bounded rationality, 
contracting parties can hardly anticipate and specify all the future 
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contingencies relevant to the contract.537 Furthermore, it will be rational for 
the parties to “wait and see what happens” rather than to try to cover a large 
number of individually unlikely eventualities.538 The same rule applies to the 
process of law-making, where a rational lawmaker does not try to regulate 
everything to the last detail.539  
Given the ex ante contractual incompleteness, it becomes desirable for the 
parties to ex post adapt the contract to the unfolded contingencies. However, 
such adaptation is vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by the contracting 
parties, which are assumed to be “self-seeking with guile”.540 Specifically, 
although parties have a long-term interest in effecting adaptations that will 
generate joint gains, each also has an interest in exploiting as much of the 
gains as they can on each adaptation.541 As a result, such opportunistic 
exploitation or costly haggling by the parties would either block the otherwise 
productive adaptations or dissipate the gains from those adaptations.542   
3.3.1.3 Specialised governance structures  
Contractual incompleteness together with human opportunism highlights the 
significance of contractual governance. For contracts with high level of asset 
specificity, the recommendation of TCE is that a specialised and flexible 
governance structure is superior to a rigid and legalistic one.543 The legal 
translation of this proposition is that for relational contracts, the optimal 
mechanism for resolving contractual disputes is negotiation, mediation, or 
other “private-ordering” methods, rather than litigation. The main rationales 
for this proposition are twofold: 
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First, as an incomplete contract evolves as events unfolded, the original 
wording of the contract becomes increasingly obsolete. It follows that a strict 
reliance on the original contractual text, as is the case in most litigation 
processes, may risk missing the point.544 By contrast, private settlements, 
such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration, permits greater latitudes for 
the parties or the mediator/arbitrator to realise the true spirit, rather than the 
original text, of the contract.545  
Second, even if adjudicatory review leads to a correct decision in a legal 
sense, it risks disrupting the ongoing relationship between the parties.546 As 
Justice Rehnquist comments, “the litigation of an individual’s claim of 
deprivation of a right would bring parties who must remain in a continuing 
relationship into the adversarial atmosphere of a courtroom”. 547  The 
examples offered by the Justice include courts’ reluctance to intervene in 
collective-bargaining disputes and family disputes.548 These controversies, 
writes Williamson, all involve transactions with highly specialised human 
capital.549 The assurance of an ongoing relationship is critical for these 
transactions because there are no adequate substitutes for these 
idiosyncratic relations.550   
Williamson further relies on the notion of specialised language in defending 
the fitness of specialised governance structures for relational contracts, 
although in this author’s view, the argument can be woven into the above two 
rationales. For those recurrent transactions, says Williamson, a specialised 
language between the parties develops as familiarity between them grows 
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and experiences accumulate. 551  Such specialised language, which is a 
special form of transaction-specific human capital, have two major effects on 
the choice of governance structures. First, while specialised investment in 
physical assets gives rise to some institutional trust between the contracting 
parties, specialised language between the parties may develop into a degree 
of personal trust. As a result, the relational character of the contract is 
reinforced by the development of specialised language, thereby further 
justifying a flexible governance structure. Second, the specialized language 
between the parties also downplays the cost-efficiency of a legalistic 
governance structure. This is because a judge who is exogenous to the 
transaction may have difficulties grasping the real spirit of that language.552 
“Different vocabularies for the interpretation of things divide men into groups 
which cannot understand each other’s way of seeing things and acting upon 
them”.553 
3.3.2 Frequency of transactions 
Compared with the market governance of contracts, which relies on 
pre-existing market mechanisms, specialised governance structures for 
relational contracts may come at substantial setup costs.554 However, if 
transactions of a recurring kind are involved, such costs will be easier to 
recover due to the economies of scale.555 Therefore, transactions of high 
frequency are more able to afford specialised governance structures.   
3.3.3 Uncertainty   
For transactions with specialised investments, increasing the degree of 
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uncertainty makes it more imperative for the parties to devise a specialised 
and flexible machinery to “work things out”, as contractual gaps will be larger 
in the light of uncertainty.556 
According to TCE, the attributes of frequency and uncertainty only become 
relevant when investment specificity comes into play.557 As discussed above, 
for transactions on standardised items, regardless of their frequency or level 
of uncertainty, the market governance would suffice.        
3.4 Governance matrix  
The following chart developed by Williamson is a governance matrix that 
summarises the connection between the attributes of transactions and the 
governance structures attending each transaction. The matrix assumes a 
given magnitude of uncertainty, and therefore only considers the remaining 
two attributes: investment specificity and frequency. 558  Frequency is 
categorised as occasional and recurrent, while investments are classified as 
nonspecific, mixed, and idiosyncratic (highly specific).559Then, depending on 
the frequency-specificity configurations, the four types of governance 
structure discussed above can be placed in the matrix. 
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Table 3: Matrix of efficient governance 
 
Oliver E Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (The Free Press 1985) 79. 
 
(1) Transactions with non-specific investments dictate market governance 
supported by classic contract law, regardless of whether those 
transactions are occasional (e.g. purchasing standard equipment) or 
recurrent (e.g. purchasing standard material).560 
(2) Occasional transactions with mixed investments, such as the purchase 
of customised equipment, warrant trilateral governance supported by 
neoclassic contract law.561 
(3) Frequent transactions with mixed investments, such as the purchase 
of customised material, warrant bilateral governance supported by 
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relational contract law.562 
(4) Transactions with idiosyncratic investments are primarily subject to 
unified governance (firm) unless the frequency of such transactions is very 
low (constructing a plant).563  
As was discussed above (Section 3.2.3), the dispute-settlement provision in 
the coal-supply agreement between the Nevada Power Company and the 
Northwest Trading Company reflects a combination of trilateral and bilateral 
governance structures. This is consonant with the characteristics of the 
contract: specialised investments and high frequency of purchasing.   
3.5 Critical reflection  
TCE has direct relevance to the topic of this thesis, as the theory places much 
reliance on the notions of contract law, contractual governance, and dispute 
resolution. Traditionally, economic studies of dispute settlement focus on the 
cost side of the process. “When a dispute is actually settled out of court, it is 
because a would-be plaintiff has perceived this alternative to be of a lower 
cost than settling in court.”564 In contrast, TCE mainly concerns the benefit 
side of the equation. It maintains that a proper dispute-resolution system 
economises transaction costs primarily in two ways: (a) it saves the expenses 
of ex ante writing a complex contract, and (b) it ex post safeguards the 
transaction in question against the hazards of opportunism.565 Here the 
emphasis is on the entire transaction or contractual relation, rather than on 
the dispute settlement itself. This is analogous to Green’s approach, which 
regards trade-dispute settlement as a device to facilitate trade regimes.566 
TCE’s emphasis on the benefit side of a dispute-settlement system is justified 
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for its own sake, since the theory mainly concerns the “big picture” (general 
pattern) of institutional transformation. However, for the purpose of assessing 
a particular, micro-level dispute-settlement system, both benefit and cost 
sides matter. It is true that the dimension of frequency proposed in TCE is 
more about the cost side of a dispute-settlement system. But mere frequency 
is insufficient to account for the entire cost analysis. By contrast, the 
framework developed in Section 2, which is based on classic TC theory, 
provides a more comprehensive and specified analytical framework to 
evaluate the cost side of a dispute-resolution system. This framework can 
also contain the dimension of frequency in TCE. In the benefit-cost analysis of 
the ITDR system to be conducted in the next chapter, the benefit analysis will 
be largely based on TCE, particularly with respect to the dimension of asset 
specificity, whereas the cost analysis will be based mostly on classic TC 
theory.   
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Chapter 3. Applying the Theory: Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
ITDR Mechanisms 
1. Introduction 
This chapter begins to apply TC theories to the topic of ITDR. In particular, a 
benefit-cost framework will be developed to evaluate ITDR mechanisms. In 
principle, the benefit analysis will be based on TCE, and the major question is 
about which type of ITDR system suits the current international tax regime 
best. For the cost analysis, classic TC theory governs, and the core task is to 
explore the most cost-efficient mode of ITDR. The benefit-cost analysis will 
be followed by a data analysis on countries’ ITDR practice.   
2. Behavioural patterns of major ITDR players    
Before starting the evaluation, it is necessary to first identify the major players 
of ITDR and their behavioural patterns. As Chapter 2 indicates, a consistent 
and refutable law-and-economic approach rests upon clearly defined 
behavioural assumptions. Three major types of players can be identified: 
taxpayers, states, and tax authorities. For taxpayers, most of whom are 
individuals or firms, the assumption of rational maximisation applies directly 
without the need of adaptation. An implication of this assumption is that 
taxpayers have a natural incentive to minimise their tax liabilities wherever 
possible.  
Contrary to individual taxpayers, both states and competent authorities are 
collective concepts. Conventional political theorists adopt an organic view of 
states and governments, and even when they sometimes consider the 
conduct of individual governmental officials, they tend to assume that these 
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officials act for the common good. 567  The law-and-economic approach 
refuses this organic and benign picture, contending instead that states and 
governments are governed by people – politicians, judges, bureaucrats, and 
others – and that these people act in their own interests.568 Specifically, it is 
sensible to posit that states are run by politicians, and governmental 
departments by public employees (bureaucrats). All these politicians and 
governmental employees have their own interests, albeit with different 
implications. For politicians, what matters most are powers and the attached 
prestige and influences.569 To achieve such power, they tend to maximise 
votes by catering to the preferences of their constituencies.570 While those 
preferences may vary from one group of voters to another, “in the end, 
elections usually come back to the economy – to jobs, wages, taxes, imports 
and exports, the price of goods and the cost of an education”.571 Even 
totalitarian regimes have a strong interest in strengthening their economic 
muscles. 572  Accordingly, states are assumed to maximise their national 
wealth.573 It should be borne in mind that wealth-maximisation does not 
necessarily equal revenue-maximisation, as states recognise that a predatory 
tax policy would ultimately stifle their economies. How the goal of 
wealth-maximisation influences states’ policy on international taxation will be 
elaborated below (Section 3.1.3).   
Likewise, public employees who run administrative bodies are assumed to 
maximise their personal interests such as regulatory power, reputation, and 
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perquisites.574 One implication of this assumption is that public staff tend to 
prioritise their departmental interests over public goods, because the personal 
interests of bureaucrats are closely related to the power and budget of the 
departments they serve.575 It is true that in a normative sense, administrative 
bodies are instituted in a democratic polity to implement and advance 
politicians’ agendas. In reality, however, each department has its own special 
focus and responsibility. For instance, the mission of the US Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) is to determine, assess, and collect internal revenue. 576 
Consequently, while wealth-maximising states tend to have more balanced 
tax policies, their tax administrations may have a greater emphasis on 
revenue maximisation. This behavioural assumption for tax administrations 
has a substantial impact on the ITDR process, as the competent-authority 
function is routinely performed by those administrations.577 It is true that 
frequently tax treaties designate “the Minister of Finance or his authorised 
representative” or “the Secretary of the Treasure or his delegate” as the 
Contracting States’ competent authority.578 Nevertheless, the subsequent 
delegation of the competent-authority function usually happens within a 
country’s tax administration.579 
3. Benefit analysis: TCE perspective  
3.1 Nature of the international tax regime: a relational contract  
3.1.1 International taxation as part of international investment contracts 
Tax constitutes the price that an investor pays to the invested state for being 
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allowed to operate in its territory.580 Economists often compare taxation with 
the sharecropping agreement between a landlord and a tenant.581 Under the 
sharecropping arrangement, the landowner (state) allows the tenant 
(taxpayer) to use the land (investments by the taxpayer in the state) in return 
for a share of the property rights over the crops (income) produced by the 
tenant.582 Such contracts need not be explicitly spelled out: once an investor 
obtains the permission to access a state’s market, there emerges an implied 
investment contract, within which the legal system, including the state’s tax 
rules (further including the tax treaties entered into by the state), will be 
automatically incorporated.  
By the same token, international taxation arises from transnational 
investments. For example, an investor in one country (home state) extends its 
operation to another country (host state); it makes investments in both 
countries. While the investor respectively contracts with each country, there 
could be interplay between the two contracts with respect to the tax part of the 
contracts. Specifically, most countries simultaneously maintain two basic 
types of tax jurisdiction: the residence jurisdiction and the source jurisdiction. 
Residence jurisdiction mandates that a country preserve the right of taxing its 
residents on their worldwide income and gains (residence tax). In contrast, 
source jurisdiction allows a country to tax the income and gains arising within 
its jurisdiction (source tax).583 Consider an investor resident in Country A that 
acquires income or wealth in Country B. Absent coordination between the two 
states, the residence jurisdiction of Country A and the source jurisdiction of 
Country B may overlap and juridical double taxation may occur.584 Even 
supposing the investor in Country A sets up a subsidiary in Country B, which, 
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by the law of B, is regarded as a resident of B, the tax claims of the two 
countries may still overlap. For instance, Country A may challenge the 
investor with respect to its pricing policies over intra-company transactions 
and make an upward adjustment of the taxable income regarding the 
subsidiary in A, whereas Country B refuses to make a corresponding 
downward-adjustment for the subsidiary in B. As a result, economic double 
taxation ensues.585   
3.1.2 Asset specificity of investment contracts   
A typical process of investment, whether national or international, can be 
divided into five steps. Specifically, the firm (a) decides to invest; (b) raises 
funds to finance its investment; (c) uses these funds to hire inputs needed to 
build factories, warehouses, and the like; (d) after the investment is 
completed, ends up with a larger stock of capital; and (e) uses the capital 
(along with other inputs) either to expand production or to reduce costs.586 At 
the outset, the firm’s decision on where to locate the planned investment is 
primarily subject to market forces. The investment has not been committed or 
devoted, and the investor is largely free to shop for the most attractive place 
to operate. It is at this point that states compete for investments by engaging 
in tax competition. In particular, states compete for foreign Directive 
Investment (FDI) for multiple reasons.587 FDI provides financial resources for 
host states.588 In a number of developing countries, FDI is the principal 
source of external capital. 589 FDI provides the host states with accesses to 
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new technologies as well as management techniques. 590  It offers 
opportunities for local firms by developing its supply chains in the host 
country.591  In general, it stimulates the host country’s economic growth 
through mobilising domestic resources.592 It is said that in China as well as 
Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Taipei, and other economies, FDI has 
been a locomotive for economic prosperity.593   
From the third step of the investment process, however, the firm begins to 
commit itself to a specific investment project by using the funds to hire inputs 
and build the project. The money sunk into the project cannot be used 
subsequently at another location without significant losses, because the 
machinery and installations are specifically designed for and tied to the 
particular project and location. Compared with their domestic equivalents, 
international investments feature a higher degree and greater scale of asset 
specificity – after all, it would be pointless for investors to enter a foreign 
market merely for trivial profits or routine business. “Often, the business plan 
of a [foreign] investor is to sink substantial resources into the project at the 
outset of the investment, with the expectation of recouping this amount plus 
an acceptable rate of return during the subsequent period of investment, 
sometimes running up to 30 years or more”.594 
The accrual of asset specificity in investment contracts is a two-way process, 
though not necessarily symmetric. In other words, not only do investors 
deploy location- and business-specific resources in the investment, the 
destination states incur firm-specific expenses as well. Specifically, local 
labours hired as part of an invested project will develop skills, experiences, 
and even emotional affinities that are specific to the project. In a broader 
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sense, the dynamics of local public services such as infrastructures, regional 
supply chains, and even the culture of the local communities will be reshaped 
by the investment, depending on its importance and scale. For illustration, 
Boeing’s decision to move its corporate headquarter out of Seattle caused 
dramatic shock to the region. Politicians and public figures in the region 
described the news as a “blow to our entire community”, which “leaves a void 
in our economic and cultural life”.595 Studies also confirm that the sudden 
departure of FDI, depending on their scale, may cause disruptions to the host 
states.596 Therefore, there is a mutual dependency between investors and 
the invested states.  
The notion of asset specificity or mutual dependency (between the investors 
and the invested states) is also at the core of international tax rules. Since the 
1928 draft convention by the League of Nations, which was the precedent to 
the OECD and UN Model Conventions, allocation of tax rights among 
countries has been based on two basic principles: the benefit principle and 
the single-tax principle.597 The benefit principle states that active (business) 
income should be taxed primarily by the source country, and passive 
(investment) income should be taxed primarily by the residence country.598 
The single-tax principle states that cross-border income should be taxed once 
at the rate determined by the benefit principle.599 The single-tax principle 
merely confirms the purpose of tax treaties: the prevention of double taxation 
and double non-taxation.600 It is the benefit principle that reflects the element 
of asset specificity. The acquisition of active income usually necessitates 
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material business operations by the earners of such income in the source 
country.601 Accordingly, there is a mutual dependency between the earners of 
active income and the source country. On the other hand, passive income is 
primarily earned by individuals, most of whom are residents in a particular 
country.602 As Avi-Yonah points out, residence usually overlaps with political 
allegiance.603 Thus, there is a mutual dependency between the earners of 
passive income and the residence country. It could be seen that the benefit 
principle enshrines the notion of economic allegiance, which is a more 
fundamental basis on which international tax regime rests. 604  Economic 
allegiance refers to the existence and extent of the economic relationships 
between a particular state and the income or person to be taxed.605 Arguably, 
this notion is another way of expressing mutual dependency or bilateral asset 
specificity between the investors and the invested states.  
The above analysis mainly focuses on the asset specificity embodied in 
investor-state relationships. Indeed, a substantial degree of mutual 
dependency, mainly in the form of specialised language, may also develop 
between tax authorities. This type of asset specificity will be elaborated in the 
cost analysis below (Section 4.4.2.2). In short, through routine interactions 
over the specific allocation of cross-border tax bases, tax administrations in 
different countries may develop a common (professional) language. As 
Williamson writes, such specialised language helps to foster some personal 
trust between the contractual parties.606     
3.1.3 Ongoing feature of international tax relationships 
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According to the TCE, for transactions with a high degree of asset specificity, 
long-term cooperation is crucial for both the investors and the invested states. 
To be sure, an individual investor may be more vulnerable than the invested 
state to the risks (commercial and political) associated with the invested 
project, thereby having a greater stake in securing an ongoing investor-state 
relationship. However, states’ stake in maintaining such relationships is also 
critical, not only because of the bilateral asset-specificity with respect to the 
existing investments, but also for the extra pressure of competing with each 
other for future investments. Obviously, a stable and congenial tax climate is 
vital for a country to attract FDI. 
The priority states give to maintaining stable and agreeable tax relationships 
over collecting short-term revenue is manifested in the historic evolution of 
the international tax regime. As discussed at the beginning of this section, the 
tax claims of different countries may overlap with respect to international 
investments. Originally, international investments were subject to double 
taxation, since all jurisdictions exerted their tax rights to the full.607 Double 
taxation distorts the cross-border flow of investments and hampers the growth 
of international economies.608 As a result, states commonly coordinate their 
competing tax rights by entering into bilateral tax treaties.609 Many states 
even unilaterally provide tax credit or exemption for their residents who 
acquire income from abroad.610 
That being said, international cooperation on the prevention of double 
taxation embodies distributive conflicts. Specifically, source countries 
normally favour higher source tax, whereas residence countries favour 
residence tax and prefer to limit source tax.611 Note that all countries are 
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simultaneously residence and source countries, yet to different degrees.612 
Thus their distributive interests hinge upon their relative investment positions: 
net capital importers have a stronger interest in source tax, whereas net 
capital exporters have a greater preference for residence tax.613 Therefore, 
international tax cooperation is a typical coordination game with distributive 
conflicts, or a BOS game.614 Fortunately, international institutions such as the 
League of Nations, the OECD, and the UN have continuously engaged in 
providing focal points for this game by developing model tax conventions.615 
In particular, the OECD Model Convention is the most successful in fostering 
a convergence of states’ expectations regarding the acceptable ways of 
allocating tax rights among them.616 Income tax treaties around the world are 
remarkably similar to each other, mostly being based on the OECD Model, 
although the Model is not binding in a strict legal sense.617 “One can pick up 
any modern tax treaty and immediately find one’s way around, often even 
down to the article number”.618 This fact testifies to the theory of the BOS 
game: once a focal point is provided and the distributive conflict solved, 
parties will have no incentive to defect.619 Some writers further suggest that 
in the game of international tax cooperation, the coordination aspect 
outweighs the conflict aspect, considering that many countries unilaterally 
provide tax credit or exemption for their residents doing business abroad.620 
As a result, scholars generally confirm that the double-taxation regime is 
remarkably successful and stable.621  
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The correlation between asset specificity in international investments, on the 
one hand, and the ongoing nature of international tax relationships, on the 
other, has already been indirectly touched on by Green, who points out that 
whereas retaliation is widely used in trade regimes, it is rarely employed in tax 
domains.622 Even the initial breach of tax-treaty obligations that may trigger 
treaty partners’ retaliation is extremely rare.623 An important reason for this 
fact, argues Green, is that unlike trade restrictions, which can target a 
narrowly defined industry of a foreign country, tax restrictions may have a 
broader effect on the domestic market of the country taking such disruptive 
measures.624 Not only foreign investors, but also domestic labour will be 
adversely affected. 625  This argument confirms the point that FDI is so 
embedded in the host state that any punitive measures by the host state 
targeting those investments will likely backfire on that state. In this sense, 
despite the headlines of tax war or tax battles, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, the real fiscal world has not entered such conflicts on a large 
scale. In contrast, the prospect of a global trade war does seem to loom 
large. 626  The institutional comparison between ITDR and trade dispute 
resolution will be further discussed in Chapter 4.627      
3.2 Contractual incompleteness  
According to TCE, relational investment contracts are bound to be imperfect, 
owing to positive transaction costs, or bounded rationality. 628  Such 
contractual incompleteness becomes particularly severe where the tax 
component of the investment contracts is concerned. Specifically, as 
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discussed above (Section 3.1.1), the tax components of most investment 
contracts are automatically taken from tax law and tax treaties applicable in 
Contracting States rather than being negotiated on an ad hoc basis. The 
wholesale application of tax law and treaties adds extra incompleteness to 
investment contracts in a number of ways.      
3.2.1 Vagueness of legal rules 
Often the language used in laws and treaties is ambiguous and unclear, as 
they are intended to be applied to a wider scope of people compared with 
private contracts.629 This is particularly the case in tax laws, which “applies to 
nearly all economic activities, all individuals and all business enterprises, 
each with different attributes”.630 Relative to domestic tax laws, international 
tax treaties can be more ambiguous. This is not just because of the general 
fact that treaties often reflect compromises to reconcile wide differences 
among the Contracting States,631 but also because of the unique process of 
negotiating tax treaties. As was explained above (Section 3.1.3), most 
countries use the OECD Model as the template for the negotiation of their tax 
treaties; thus most tax treaties are quite similar to one another. The similarity 
of tax treaties contributes to extra incompleteness of the international tax 
regime, as those treaties are less able to accommodate the particular 
circumstances or concerns of individual countries.632     
3.2.2 Supplementary nature of tax treaties 
Tax treaties mostly lack operative provisions of law; they do not create any 
new taxation independent of national tax systems, nor do they seek to unify 
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those systems.633 Instead, states have original jurisdictions to tax, and by 
concluding tax treaties they agree to restrict their tax laws in one way or 
another so as to avoid double taxation.634 In principle, the restriction of a 
state’s domestic tax law takes two forms: the waiver of the state’s tax claim in 
favour of its treaty partner (exemption method) and the grant of a credit 
against its tax for taxes paid in the other state (credit method).635 The task of 
deciding which state can exercise its tax claims and which state should 
provide tax exemption or credit hinges upon the distributive rules stipulated in 
tax treaties.636 For example, business profits are normally solely taxed in the 
residence state, whereas business profit from a PE are taxed by both of the 
Contracting States, with the residence state giving double tax relief for taxes 
levied by the source state. 637  Capital gains are normally taxed in the 
residence state, while the sales of shares connected to immovable property 
situated in the other state should be taxed in that other state, subject to 
certain threshold requirements.638 Once an international tax base has been 
disentangled and assigned to relevant states, those states apply their own 
laws to exercise tax rights. Therefore, tax treaties only regulate the interface 
of national tax systems, performing the role as the “rules of limitation of law” 
rather than the rules of substantive law. 639  Accordingly, the so-called 
international tax regime is not a global tax levied by a transnational power, but 
rather comprised of domestic tax laws as limited by tax treaties. However, 
since national tax systems (and other relevant national laws) vary from 
country to country, the supplementary nature of tax treaties renders the 
international tax regime intrinsically incomplete.  
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3.2.3 Separate-entity approach to the taxation of MNEs 
Related to the supplementary nature of tax treaties as described above, 
another feature of the international tax regime is the separate-entity approach 
to the taxation of MNEs. Under this approach, various affiliates of an MNE are 
treated as if they were independent of each other, and each country’s tax 
legislation is then applied to each part of the MNE.640 While the approach 
allows each state to retain its autonomy in enacting and implementing tax 
policies, an MNE is in reality a unified whole, and hence can manipulate the 
flow of resources and profits among its affiliates. As Rixen writes, 
“transnational tax bases are not givens that sit still and wait to be carved up 
between national tax authorities.” 641  This is quite analogous to the 
oil-extraction case discussed previously: while each country owns an “area of 
the surface” of an international tax base by reference to the legal form of an 
MNE and its affiliates, the migratory nature of the tax base gives rise to a 
common-pool problem.642 Therefore, the separate-entity approach leads to 
incomplete delineation of trans-border tax bases among states.  
3.2.4 Bilateral character of tax treaties 
In addition to their supplementary nature, most tax treaties also have a 
bilateral character: each is concluded between a pair of Contracting States.643 
Accordingly, the tax concessions granted in a tax treaty, such as reduced 
withholding-tax rates, are intended to benefit only the persons who are 
residents in either country that is a party to the treaty.644  The bilateral 
allocation of international tax bases is unavoidably imperfect given the fact 
that MNEs increasingly extend their reach to multiple countries. Consider a 
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property (e.g. mining ore) involving multiple parties; bilateral way of allocating 
this property may either cause the overlap of individual claims, or leave part 
of the resource in the public domain.     
3.3 Base appropriation and the resulting economic losses 
According to TCE, an incomplete contract gives rise to opportunistic 
appropriation by the contracting parties.645 Likewise, incomplete rules on the 
delineation of tax bases also give rise to competitive appropriation of the 
bases (base appropriation) among the taxpayers and the relevant tax 
authorities. Such base appropriation is largely asymmetric. In the first place, 
the taxpayers have an information advantage regarding their own business 
and tax arrangements as compared with the relevant tax administrations.646 
Owing to this information advantage, the taxpayers may engage in various 
tax-avoidance schemes.647 Such schemes usually take advantage of the 
separate-entity approach and the bilateral character of tax treaties. 
Specifically, the separate-entity approach allows an MNEs to manipulate the 
transfer pricing over its intra-company transactions so that income accrues in 
a low-tax jurisdiction and expenses in a high-tax one.648 In a similar vein, the 
bilateral character of tax treaties encourages MNEs to engage in “treaty 
shopping”. The most common method of “treaty shopping” involves an MNE’s 
establishment of a subsidiary, usually a “letterbox” company, as a 
pass-through entity to reap the benefits of a particular tax treaty to which the 
MNE would otherwise have no access.649 
Despite the taxpayers’ ex ante information advantage, states have ex post 
legal power to scrutinise taxpayers’ tax files and, in the event of tax evasion or 
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unacceptable tax avoidance, challenge the taxpayers’ position. It is true that 
as far as the tax administrations apply international tax rules correctly in 
revenue collection, they are reaping their fair share of tax bases. Nonetheless, 
since tax rules themselves are vague due to the contractual incompleteness, 
it becomes quite difficult for tax administrations to accurately discern the line 
between legitimate base allocation and problematic base appropriation. 
Frequently, tax administrations may push the line outward and overexploit the 
tax bases, thereby double taxing the taxpayers. In terms of frequency and 
magnitude, the most important source of double-taxation cases is associated 
with transfer-pricing adjustments.650 Asymmetry also exists between the two 
(or more) Contracting States in base appropriation. Usually, the source state 
gains a “first-bite” privilege over the tax base due to its proximity to the source 
of income.651  
As TCE suggests, contractual appropriation may cause the mutual gain from 
contractual adaptation to dissipate. In the context of international taxation, 
major economic losses resulting from base appropriation can be identified as 
described below. 
3.3.1 Losses associated with international tax avoidance 
International tax avoidance causes the problem of BEPS for the affected 
countries. It is reported that a number of the most influential MNEs have 
planned their businesses in such a way that they have ultimately paid very 
little tax.652 According to the OECD (2015), at 2014 levels, the net loss of 
global corporate tax revenues caused by BEPS amounted to US $100-240 
billion, or 4-10% of the total corporate tax revenues.653 Alvarez-Martinez et al. 
(2018) estimate that for the year 2012, there was a loss of €36 billion in 
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corporate tax revenue among EU countries due to BEPS activities.654 For the 
US, the total revenue loss is estimated at €100.8 billion, including € 96.8 
billion accruing to tax heavens.655 Japan is estimated to have lost €24 billion 
in corporate tax revenue, of which €23.3 billion went to tax havens.656 Henry 
(2012) reveals that some $ 21 trillion was cloaked by wealthy elites in 
secretive offshore jurisdictions to avoid taxes in their home countries.657 
Various other empirical studies also point to the proliferation and severity of 
BEPS.658 
Concerns have been raised about the adverse impact of BEPS. First, BEPS 
undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems and relevant legal 
rules.659 Specifically, it grants businesses that operate across borders an 
unfair competitive advantage over their domestic rivals, thereby undermining 
the spirit of fair play. 660  It also erodes the sense of corporate social 
responsibility, and thus places corporation’s reputation at risk.661 Second, it 
shifts fiscal burdens to those more inert tax bases such as domestic labours, 
as countries have to make up for the revenue losses caused by BEPS.662 
Third, tax-avoidance activities per se incur expenses. Complex tax-planning 
schemes usually involve “armies of bankers, lawyers and accountants who 
ensure that even though the letter of the law is respected, increasingly 
immoral ways are found of perverting the spirit of the law to ensure that tax is 
avoided”.663 In return, these tax-shelter promoters are highly paid by their 
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clients. It is reported that the annual revenue of the Big Four firms has 
continued to swell, and in particular, they generate around £1 billion in fees 
each year from commercial tax planning and artificial-avoidance schemes.664 
Lastly, BEPS forces tax administrations to deploy extra resources in 
developing and implementing anti-avoidance measures, such as tax audit 
and transfer-pricing documentation.665 For example, starting from 2005, the 
Canadian Minister of Finance has increased by CA $30 million per annum the 
resources devoted to tackling aggressive international tax plans.666 It should 
be noted that the anti-avoidance measures taken by tax authorities would in 
turn increase the compliance costs for taxpayers.667 
3.3.2 Losses associated with double taxation and tax disputes 
As the MEMAP notes, double taxation has a detrimental effect on the 
movements of capital, technology, and persons, and on the exchange of 
goods and services.668  In particular, it distorts investment decisions, as 
international investments become less profitable compared with domestic 
ones due to the high tax burden.669 Sometimes double taxation increases the 
real tax rate to such a high level that international investments are stifled.670 
In addition, the resolution of double-taxation disputes also implies costs, and 
a core theme of this research is to explore ways to economise these costs.  
3.4 Specialised dispute-settlement system  
Given the ex ante incompleteness of the international tax regime (as part of 
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investment contracts) and the resulting base appropriation, the significance of 
ex post dispute settlement becomes salient. Specifically, an appropriate ITDR 
system can economise the international tax regime by both saving states the 
costs of ex ante drafting perfect tax laws and treaties and attenuating the ex 
post base appropriation among the taxpayers and relevant states.671 
According to TCE, a relational contract requires a more flexible 
dispute-settlement system, as the otherwise legalistic mode may: (a) 
undermine the ongoing relationship between the contracting parties; and (b) 
lead to unpalatable decisions on the case due to the adjudicator’s failure to 
capture the spirit of the contractual relation. These arguments also apply to 
the choice of ITDR modes.  
3.4.1 Effect on international tax relationships 
In general, legalistic dispute-settlement procedures are more confrontational 
and adversarial than negotiation or consultation, thus more likely to spoil the 
relationship between the contractual parties. 672  Accordingly, it is widely 
accepted that litigation is far more likely to occur where there is no ongoing 
relationship between the parties or where such a relationship has definitively 
terminated.673  
In the context of ITDR, it is said that in French, the MAP is translated as a 
“friendly procedure”.674 This term is a reminder of the ongoing relationships 
between tax authorities, and between those authorities and taxpayers.675 
Indeed, the appreciation of congenial tax relationships is reflected in the 
entire process of tax administration. In 2002, the OECD established the 
Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), which has become a unique forum for the 
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cooperation between and among revenue bodies at a Commissioner-level, 
with participation from 53 OECD and non-OECD countries.676 In 2014, the 
FTA published the Multilateral Strategic Plan on Mutual Agreement 
Procedures, which notes that the success of the MAP “critically depends on 
strong, collegial relationships, grounded in mutual trust, between and among 
competent authorities around the world.”677 With respect to the relationship 
between taxpayers and tax administrations, the FTA has developed a 
cooperative-compliance framework, whereby revenue bodies are encouraged 
to establish relationships with businesses based on trust and cooperation.678 
A growing number of countries have implemented this 
cooperative-compliance approach.679 
3.4.2 Effect on treaty application  
As discussed previously, as early as the time of the League of Nations, treaty 
drafters began to recognise that tax treaties can only be applied with flexibility, 
considering “the diversity of national laws and the extreme complexity and 
variety of the individual cases that arise”.680 The proposition carries even 
more weight today. Specifically, the supplementary and bilateral nature of tax 
treaties and the separate-entity approach to the taxation of MNEs have 
perpetuated since the League of Nations. At the same time, international tax 
bases have been increasingly mobile due to the liberalisation of international 
economics and the development of ICT. All these factors make it more difficult 
for legalistic methods of dispute settlement to render viable decisions on tax 
                                                        
676 ‘About - Forum on Tax Administration’ 
<https://www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-administration/about/> accessed 9 September 2019. 
677 OECD FTA, ‘Multilateral Strategic Plan on Mutual Agreement Procedures: A Vision For Continuous 
Map Improvement’ para 15; ‘OECD Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) Statistics - Blogs - Tax News - 
ICAEW Blogs and Discussions’ 
<https://ion.icaew.com/taxfaculty/b/weblog/posts/oecdmutualagreementproceduremapstatistics> 
accessed 12 October 2019; Brown (n 11) 107. 
678 ‘Co-Operative Compliance: A Framework’ (OECD) 13 
<https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/co-operative-compliance-a-framework_9789264200852-en> 
accessed 9 September 2019; Kollmann and Turcan (n 58) 68–69. 
679 Kollmann and Turcan (n 58) 68. 
680 See above, Chapter1, Section 1.2. 
 119 
cases.  
3.4.2.1 Difficulties in treaty interpretation  
As discussed above (Section 3.2.2), tax treaties mainly function as limitations 
on domestic tax laws rather than as substantive tax rules. Consequently, 
those treaties often refer to or “piggyback” on domestic concepts.681 For 
example, pursuant to Article 7 of the OECD Model, if a non-resident 
enterprise carries out business in the host state through a PE situated in that 
host state, the host state has the primary right to tax the enterprise on its 
business profits that are attributable to the PE.682 The residence state may 
still tax the enterprise for its worldwide income, but has to grant tax credit for 
the tax levied by the host state.683 However, the term “business profits” in 
Article 7 is not defined by the treaty itself, and it is highly likely that the source 
and the residence states employ different methods of calculating business 
profits attributable to a PE.684 Many believe that this difference is a major 
source of double taxation or double non-taxation in the taxation of business 
profits with respect to PE.685  
To be sure, tax treaties do contain a handful of defined terms, many of which 
are related to distributive rules.686 Nevertheless, many of these terms are 
insufficiently defined, and thus need further clarification.687 The Boulez case 
offers an example: a German resident, Pierre Boulez, received a payment 
from a US company for his performance as a music conductor in the US.688 
There was a question as to whether the payment constituted a royalty, which 
was only taxable in Germany pursuant to the then US-Germany tax treaty, or 
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service income, which was only taxable in the US, according to the same 
treaty.689 Although the treaty in question defines “royalties” in Article VIII (3), 
the definition is incomplete and requires further clarification.690 The two 
competent authorities interpreted the term differently, and the taxpayer was 
ultimately double taxed.691    
In this connection, Article 3(2) of the OECD Model provides a gap-filling 
mechanism by prescribing that terms that are not defined by the treaty are 
given meaning under the law of the state that is applying the treaty.692 This 
method, sometimes also known as the lex fori approach, does carry some 
pragmatic wisdom in a domestic context, since a domestic court or authority 
standing to apply a tax treaty knows its own law best.693 Nonetheless, the 
method becomes largely irrelevant in the ITDR context, which should be 
neutral to either Contracting State. Furthermore, even in a domestic context, it 
is widely recognised that the lex fori method may lead to double taxation or 
double non-taxation, since Contracting States may apply the treaty differently 
given the variation of domestic laws.694 In both the Boulez case and the 
example of PE taxation, the outcome of double taxation results from the very 
fact that the source and the residence states each applies its own laws in 
interpreting the questioned treaty terms.  
In this vein, it seems quite necessary to develop an autonomous method of 
treaty interpretation in the context of legalistic ITDR. In particular, in the event 
that double taxation results from divergent treaty interpretations by the two 
Contracting States based on their own domestic laws, a tax 
arbitrator/adjudicator must decide which interpretation prevails. However, this 
task is quite difficult, if not impossible, because each state is justified in 
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choosing its own way of defining certain concepts in its domestic law based 
on its own social and economic circumstances or policies. Given the 
non-substantive nature of tax treaties, these domestic concepts constitute 
equal parts of a double-taxation regime upon the two Contracting States. As a 
result, any decision (from a legalistic approach to ITDR) claiming that the 
interpretation of a particular treaty term by one state is superior to that of the 
other may encounter legitimacy challenges from the losing state or the wider 
public.  
Several commentators recommend that one way of ensuring uniformity of 
treaty interpretation while avoiding controversy is to uniformly base treaty 
interpretation upon the law of either the source or the residence country.695 
Nonetheless, the choice between the two approaches is not an easy task. 
Consider the above-mentioned example of calculating business profits 
attributable to a PE. On the one hand, the source country has a “first-bite” 
privilege to tax the profits attributable to the PE, and hence is entitled to adopt 
the source-country approach to treaty interpretation.696 On the other hand, 
since the residence country must apply its own foreign tax credit rules in 
crediting the tax levied by the source country, the residence-country approach 
is also relevant in this case.697 Moreover, in many cases, the identification of 
source country or residence country rests upon ascertaining the residency 
status of the taxpayer concerned, which in itself could be extremely 
controversial. It is true that the term of residence is to some extent defined in 
tax treaties. For example, as discussed above, the traditional tie-breaker rule 
hinges the determination of corporate residency – in the case of dual 
residency – upon the notion of “place of effective management”.698 However, 
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the application of this notion is far from straightforward. In particular, two 
different approaches can be identified: the Anglo-American concept of 
“central management and control” and the Continental European “place of 
management”.699 Each of the two approaches may lead to more than one 
residence for a particular company.700 Dual residency status is an important 
source of double taxation, as, based on the residence jurisdiction, a country 
has the right to tax its residents over their worldwide income.701 Meanwhile, 
companies sometimes deliberately acquire dual residence as part of their 
tax-planning schemes.702 This concern about tax avoidance motivates the 
recent amendment to the traditional tie-breaker rule, which will be revisited 
below (Section 3.4.2.3).  
3.4.2.2 Difficulties in establishing arm’s-length prices 
As was discussed above (Section 3.3.1), the separate-entity approach to the 
partitioning of international tax bases among countries and the bilateral 
nature of tax treaties may give rise to aggressive tax planning. To tackle this 
problem and ensure that each state can collect a fair share of corporate tax, 
tax treaties and domestic tax laws introduce the arm’s-length principle. 
Specifically, the pricing of transactions between associated enterprises within 
an MNE group should be determined as if those enterprises were 
arm’s-length parties. 703  The most common method of establishing 
arm’s-length prices is to compare the questioned transfer price with the 
comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) of the transactions between 
independent parties.704 However, the main problem with the CUP method is 
the difficulty in establishing the comparability between the uncontrolled 
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transactions and the intra-company transactions at issue.705 More often than 
not, the internal prices within companies are invariably different from those 
charged between independent parties. 706  The identification of the CUP 
becomes more difficult when it comes to the transfer pricing of intangible 
assets, which are unique by nature.707  
The problem with the CUP is exemplified in the Glaxo case.708 Glaxo Canada 
was a subsidiary of a UK corporation, Glaxo Group Ltd. It purchased an 
active ingredient (ranitidine) to make and distribute Zantac in Canada. During 
the relevant period, Glaxo Canada purchased its active ingredient from 
Adechsa SA, a Swiss subsidiary of the Glaxo Group. This Swiss affiliation 
was a middleman, with the ingredient being manufactured by a Singapore 
subsidiary of the same group. The Glaxo Group had patented the 
manufacturing method of ranitidine, yet during the year under examination, 
the patent had expired and several generic versions of the material were 
available in the market. Glaxo Canada was paying around CA$ 1,500 per kilo 
to the Swiss company during the examined period, while the generic versions 
were traded at the price between CA$ 194 and $304 per kilo. The Canadian 
tax authority suspected that the transfer pricing adopted by Glaxo Canada 
(and the entire group) mainly served the purpose of shifting the group profits 
from Canada to Singapore, in which the Glaxo’s Singapore affiliation did not 
pay income tax for 10 years before being subject to an income tax rate of only 
10%. The tax authority then used the price of generic ranitidine as the CUP 
and sought to adjust the taxable income of Glaxo Canada upward. The Tax 
Court of Canada found for the tax authority, ruling that the reasonable transfer 
price of Glaxo Canada should be the highest price for the generic product, 
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subject to a small upward adjustment.709 The decision was overturned by the 
Federal Court of Appeal, which referred the case back for redetermination.710 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that business realities should be taken into 
consideration when deciding the reasonable price.711 The case was then 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which upheld the Court of 
Appeal’s decision to remit the case for retrial.712 On the eve of the second 
Tax Court trial on the matter, scheduled to commence on January 12, 2015, 
Glaxo achieved a settlement with the Canadian tax authority.713 
The taxpayer’s major defence, which is also supported by many 
commentators, was that the market condition of generic ranitidine was not 
really comparable to that of Glaxo Group, which had deployed significant 
outlay in researching and developing the ingredient.714 Among other things, 
the quality of the generic ranitidine could not be assured and was not 
comparable to that manufactured by Glaxo Singapore.715 Market reputation 
also plays a part. As one writer comments, “there is always this idea that the 
original product is ‘the true product’, whereas the copies can only be 
‘copies’”.716 The Glaxo case therefore posed a dilemma. On the one hand, 
the judgement of market comparability could not dispense with the 
consideration of major economic variables that have substantial impacts on 
the pricing; on the other hand, if all the major economic variables had been 
taken into account, the judge would have been left with no comparable to 
establish the arm’s-length price.717 
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In light of these difficulties in identifying CUPs, the OECD and numerous 
states have introduced alternative methods of establishing the arm’s-length 
price including, inter alia, resale price minus, cost plus, and transactional net 
margin. A common feature of these other methods is to shift the focus more or 
less from the comparable price to the comparable margin (gross profit) of the 
transaction under examination. 718  However, the establishment of the 
comparable margin still hinges upon the analysis of market comparability; 
thus the dilemma posed by the Glaxo case persists. Furthermore, the more 
one moves toward the approach of comparable margin as opposed to 
comparable price, the less accurate the arm’s-length price will become. This 
is because transactional margin is determined not only by the price of a 
transaction but also by a multitude of other factors, such as numerous cost 
items of the transaction.719 
It should be noted that the difficulties in establishing the arm’s-length price are 
not just because of the increasing sophistication of commercial transactions 
or the complexity of the business environment – after all, one of the functions 
of legalistic dispute resolution is to clarify the ambiguity around the legal 
issues and provide a basic level of certainty both for the litigants and the 
public in an uncertain world. Rather, the difficulty should be more ascribed to 
the fundamental fact that the arm’s-length price is in itself a legal fiction rather 
than a reality. Each MNE is actually an integrated whole, and, “ironically, 
MNEs exist because of the absence or imperfections of an arm’s length 
market.”720 It follows that any third-party determination of an arm’s-length 
price may be susceptible to being challenged for its arbitrariness. As one 
commentator writes, while there is no doubt that a judge can always render a 
judgment on an arm’s-length price, the judgment may raise important political 
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questions.721 Such political questions were manifested in the proceeding 
history of the Glaxo case: while the disputed transactions took place between 
1990 and 1993, the case was finally settled out of court in 2015, winding up 
decades of uncertainties for the taxpayer as well as the tax authority.722 The 
nuisances arising from the Glaxo case should not be taken as an anomaly. In 
the US, the jurisprudence on transfer-pricing cases has long been subject to 
criticisms. 723  It is observed that in establishing arm’s-length prices, the 
domestic courts largely rely on “approximations, compromises and rule of 
thumb” rather than providing principled guidance. 724  As a result, both 
taxpayers and governments increasingly bypass the courts in their attempts 
to resolve tax disputes.725   
3.4.2.3 Issue of double non-taxation 
According to TCE, as a relational contract evolves, its original text becomes 
increasingly obsolete，thereby giving rise to more loopholes. Consequently, 
there is a possibility that one or both parties may appropriate the contractual 
gains by relying on the literal letter of the contract.726 This proposition carries 
more weight in the tax world, in which taxpayers are always one step ahead 
of tax treaties, both because of the vagueness of the treaties and the 
ever-changing business environment.727 As a result, national governments 
may fear that a legalistic ITDR system, which is characterised by an 
adherence to hard rules, may provide a sword for taxpayers to “poach” the 
national fiscal base by employing aggressive tax-planning schemes.728 For 
example, a taxpayer may perpetrate treaty shopping and achieve double 
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non-taxation by taking advantage of the text of a particular tax treaty. The 
concern is, as argued by Farah, that in the same manner, that taxpayer will be 
able to use legalist ITDR methods to enforce the outcome of double 
non-taxation.729 
To be sure, concerns about BEPS under the legalistic ITDR method can be 
relieved by the fact that currently most domestic tax laws or tax treaties have 
in place anti-avoidance rules. By applying such rules, tax adjudicators may 
override the plain wording of tax laws and treaties. Nevertheless, 
anti-avoidance rules should not be taken as a panacea. Specifically, a 
majority of anti-abuse rules in tax treaties rely on objective tests to establish 
the existence of treaty abuse. For example, the most widely used anti-abuse 
method in tax treaties is the limitation-on-benefits rule, which provides that a 
resident of a Contracting State would be entitled to the treaty benefits only 
when it is a “qualified person” as defined by the treaty. In principle, a taxpayer 
can be identified as a qualified person only where there is some nexus 
between the taxpayer and the relevant Contracting State.730 Nonetheless, for 
any objective anti-avoidance rules, there is always a possibility that innovative 
taxpayers will invent new transaction forms to circumvent them.731 In this 
connection, BEPS Action 6 recommends a general anti-abuse rule based on 
a subjective test. The rule states that if one of the principal purposes of a 
transaction in question is to reap the tax benefits of the treaty concerned, the 
taxpayer undertaking the transaction will be denied that benefits. 732 
Numerous states have incorporated such general anti-avoidance rules in their 
domestic tax laws.733 The problem with this approach is that the task of 
proving the principle purpose of a transaction could be as thorny as, if not 
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more than, the establishment of an arm’s-length price.734 While a detailed 
examination of anti-avoidance rules is beyond the scope of this thesis, suffice 
it to point out that national courts’ attitudes vary toward the application of such 
rules.735 At least in several major developed countries, domestic courts are 
more cautious about disregarding the plain wording of tax treaties for 
anti-avoidance reasons. For example, Cockfield reports that Canada sees 
very few cases where tax administrations have succeeded in challenging the 
treaty shopping as a violation of Canada’s general anti-avoidance rules.736 In 
the case of MIL (Investments) v. The Queen, the court opines in obiter dicta 
that there is nothing inherently abusive about treaty shopping.737 Canada, the 
court reasons, “if concerned with the preferable tax rates of any of its treaty 
partners, instead of applying section 245 [Canadian anti-avoidance rules, this 
author added], should seek recourse by attempting to renegotiate selected 
tax treaties”.738 Avi-Yonah concludes that in the US, taxpayers have had an 
“enviable” record of victory in big transfer-pricing litigations, even though 
several of the tax arrangements obviously involved aggressive tax-avoidance 
schemes.739 In Germany, it is observed that tax courts take a rather generous 
attitude toward taxpayers’ use of letterbox companies.740 So long as there is 
a minimum infrastructure of personnel and assets installed in the companies, 
the taxpayers establishing such companies will not be found by the courts as 
having engaged in treaty abuse even though the companies have little active 
business function.741 
The concern about double non-taxation and its implications for the function of 
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ITDR are most vividly exemplified in the recent amendment to the tie-breaker 
rule under BEPS Action 6. Specifically, the notion of “place of effective 
management”, upon which the traditional tie-breaker rule rests, has become 
increasingly obsolete in light of the ever-changing business world. For 
example, the development of modern ICT makes it possible for company 
directors to be located all over the world, making and communicating their 
decisions through digital means.742 Moreover, modern businesses tend to be 
organised in a less hierarchical manner, and there are growing instances 
where multiple headquarters or centres co-exist for a single company.743 As a 
result, any predetermined tie-breaker rule will be vulnerable to abuse. A 
company may deliberately set itself up as a dual-resident taxpayer so as to 
reap tax benefits – such as offsetting the same tax loss against taxable profits 
twice in each of the Contracting States – to which it is otherwise not 
entitled.744  In this connection, BEPS Action 6 proposes the MAP as a 
substitution for the predetermined tie-breaker rule in solving the 
dual-residency issue, recognising that “there had been a number of tax 
avoidance cases involving dual resident companies” and that “better solution 
to the issue of dual residency of entities other than individuals was to deal 
with such situations on a case-by-case basis”.745 The new tie-breaker rule 
and the underlying rationale correspond to Williamson’s caveat about the use 
of legalistic dispute settlement in relational contracts: 
Where personal integrity is believed to be operative, individuals located at the 
interfaces may refuse to be a part of opportunistic efforts to take advantage of 
(rely on) the letter of the contract when the spirit of the exchange is 
emasculated.746   
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3.5 A digression on the formulary approach and its implications 
for ITDR 
The above analysis shows that most of the obstacles to the legalistic method 
of ITDR, particularly in relation to transfer-pricing cases, are associated with 
the separate-entity approach to taxation on the revenue of MNEs. This 
approach also accounts for base appropriation and the attendant welfare 
losses in the first place, as was explained above (Section 3.3). In this 
connection, scholars have extensively discussed an alternative means of 
apportioning international tax bases among countries: the formulary 
apportionment approach. Under this approach, an MNE’s profit is determined 
through a combined report and then attributed to each part of the enterprise 
based on a predetermined formula. 747  The formula should reflect the 
economic substance of each part of the MNE, typically by reference to a 
combination of factors such as property, sales, and payroll.748 In some major 
aspects, the formulary approach is reminiscent of the unitisation strategy in 
the oil industry discussed previously.749 By using the combined report of a 
MNE as the starting point of assessing tax liability, the formulary approach 
pools a transnational tax base together before apportioning it among 
jurisdictions. Because the tax base is pooled, there is far less scope for the 
MNE to relocate its paper profits among jurisdictions.750 Furthermore, since 
the formulary approach features a uniform standard of calculating and 
apportioning tax bases, a legalistic method of dispute settlement could be 
instrumental in clarifying this common standard, and could avoid the 
difficulties of establishing arm’s-length price. In a few countries such as Spain 
and Switzerland, and in some US states, the formulary method has already 
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been implemented at a domestic level.751  
Given the theoretical advantage of the formulary approach over 
separate-entity approach, it is natural to ask why countries do not agree on 
this approach as an alternative transfer-pricing regime. The clue to answering 
this question goes back to the starting point of TCE: because of transaction 
costs, or the bounded rationality of contractual parties, relational contracts are 
bound to be imperfect. Specifically, the global formulary approach entails 
multilateral efforts, which could be prohibitively costly compared with a 
bilateral approach to treaty negotiation. Such multilateral efforts, as the 
OECD recognises in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, require substantial 
international coordination and consensus on the predetermined formula to be 
used, the composition of the MNE group in question, the use of a common 
accounting system, and so on, and reaching such agreement would be time 
consuming and extremely difficult.752 In particular, the negotiation of the 
formula will encounter considerable bargaining problems, since each country 
would have a strong incentive to devise the formula weights in its own favour 
to maximise its revenue.753 Furthermore, similar to the design of tie-breaker 
rule discussed above, any predetermined formula could be arbitrary and 
would likely encourage abusive planning by taxpayers, albeit to a lesser 
extent than the legal-entity approach.754 A variety of other concerns about the 
formulary approach have also been discussed in the Guidelines.755    
Despite many countries’ rejection of the formulary approach as the basis of 
their transfer-pricing regimes, the OECD acknowledges that the method has 
already been used selectively at the case level, “such as might be used in a 
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mutual agreement procedure, advance pricing agreement, or other bilateral 
or multilateral determination”.756 Here the apportionment formulae are not 
predetermined, but negotiated on a case-by-case basis by the competent 
authorities of the treaty partners together with, in the case of APA, the MNEs 
concerned.757 In this way, the competent authorities avoid the hazards of 
establishing arm’s-length prices while at the same time keeping the potential 
risks associated with the formulary approach under control. Such 
experimentation can hardly be possible under a legalistic ITDR system, in 
which deviation from hard rules would be strictly scrutinised. Therefore, the 
case of the formulary approach actually further buttresses TCE’s proposition 
that a flexible dispute-settlement system economises the transaction costs of 
ex ante drafting a complete contract and ex post attenuating contractual 
appropriation.758  
4. Cost analysis: classic TC theory perspective 
4.1 Overview 
The cost-side evaluation of the ITDR system will be built upon Cheung’s 
account of transaction costs and the three categories of such costs: agency 
costs, bargaining costs, and administrative costs. A particular issue of this 
evaluation is about whose perspective one should take. As discussed 
previously, a number of writers on the cost-benefit analysis of the ITDR 
system attempt an eclectic approach, in which the payoffs facing each of the 
ITDR players are analysed respectively.759 This thesis primarily concerns the 
social (global) welfare effect of the system. This is because: (a) the eclectic 
approach may lead to conflicting conclusions, with one party’s benefit being 
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the other’s cost; and (b) the global perspective is in line with the 
law-and-economic approach under which social welfare ordinarily outweighs 
private payoffs. For instance, economists typically regard free-trade regimes 
as cost-efficient and welfare-enhancing for the global economic development, 
although certain countries or interest groups may benefit from protectionist 
policies.760 The global perspective is also congruous with the normative 
perspective of sovereignty, which is viewed as an instrument to advance the 
welfare of global citizens.761  
4.2 Agency costs   
One the one hand, the major goal of the ITDR system is to eliminate double 
taxation for taxpayers.762 The latest version of the OECD Model Convention 
even urges that competent authorities are “obliged” to seek to resolve tax 
disputes in a fair and objective manner.763 On the other hand, the ITDR 
process, either the MAP or tax arbitration, is dominated by the two competent 
authorities and – when the implementation of ITDR resolutions is concerned – 
relevant tax administrations, while the taxpayers are largely excluded from 
the process. It follows that an agency relationship emerges in the ITDR 
process, with the competent authorities being the agent and the relevant 
taxpayers principal.764 Because a tax administration, to which the competent 
authority is typically affiliated, is assumed to pursue its own priorities, such as 
revenue maximisation or better working conditions, the interests of the 
principal and the agent can diverge.765 Consequently, there is a risk of 
agency problem arising from the relationship. 766  For instance, either 
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competent authority in an ITDR process may fail to exercise due diligence.767 
More seriously, they may engage in aggressive tactics, such as strategically 
delaying or blocking an ITDR process.768  The agency problem, real or 
perceived, can be particularly acute for competent authorities that initiate the 
audit and adjustment and hence stand in a defending position (henceforth 
referred to as defending competent authority).  
In third-party procedures of ITDR, particularly tax arbitration, the relationship 
between the third-party neutral on the one hand and the parties (competent 
authorities as well as the taxpayer concerned) on the other hand may give 
rise to another type of agency concern: once the third party neutral is selected, 
he may become the master of his own and thus behave in a way that 
undermines the public confidence in the procedure.769 
4.2.1 Agency costs of the MAP 
Since the entire process of the MAP is primarily in the hands of competent 
authorities, the agency problem may occur at any stage of the process, 
including the initiation of the procedure, the implementation of MAP 
agreements and the stages in between.  
(1) Initiation of the procedure. While Article 25 (1) of the OECD Model 
provides the taxpayer with the right to seek MAP assistances, Article 25 (2) 
leaves it to the first competent authority to decide whether the case is 
justifiable for further pursuance.770 Through this filter mechanism, cases 
that apparently lack merit will be prevented from the process at an early 
stage, and thus transaction costs related to the subsequent stages of the 
procedure can be saved. However, competent authorities may abuse their 
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discretion in deciding the admissibility of MAP requests with a view to 
blocking the processes from the outset.  
(2) Implementation of MAP agreements. The implementation of MAP 
agreements is typically left to the relevant tax administrations. These 
administrations, particularly the “losing parties”, may delay or even decline 
the implementation process. 
(3) Intermediate stages. One or both competent authorities may fail to 
exercise their endeavour in MAP negotiations, or even engage in strategic 
behaviours to hinder the process. For instance, a competent authority, 
usually the defending party, may simply disagree about any proposal on a 
particular case from the other side or remain inactive during the 
negotiation.  
Arguably, of the entire MAP process, the intermediate stages imply the 
highest level of agency costs. Specifically, the MAP negotiation is akin to a 
process of teamwork or joint production in that the successful settlement of a 
dispute relies on the mutual endeavour of the two parties. As discussed 
previously, the process of joint production is subject to a measuring problem: 
each competent authority’s contribution to the outcome of the MAP is 
intermingled and thus hard to gauge.771 For any lengthy MAP case, it is 
difficult to tell which party should be blamed for the delay; competent 
authorities may even pass the buck back and forth.772 According to agency 
theory, the lower measurability of a mutual negotiation leads to a lower 
accountability of the competent authorities, which may “shirk” in the 
process.773 This agency perspective reveals the deficiency of the orthodox 
view that the delay of the MAP results from the soft wording of tax treaties, 
which only require competent authorities to “endeavour” to resolve tax 
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disputes.774 In this author’s view, the word “endeavour” is not intrinsically soft. 
The Commentary on Article 25 unequivocally states that “the undertaking to 
resolve by mutual agreement cases of taxation not in accordance with the 
Convention is an integral part of the obligations assumed by a Contracting 
State in entering into a tax treaty and must be performed in good faith”.775 
The real problem of the MAP is its joint-production character and the resulting 
measurability problem, which in turn, leads to low accountability from the 
competent authorities. As the Commentary acknowledges, “as far as reaching 
mutual agreement through the procedure is concerned, the competent 
authorities are under a duty merely to use their best endeavours and not to 
achieve a result”.776   
Comparatively, the other two stages of the MAP – access to the procedure 
and the implementation of MAP agreements – imply a lower level of agency 
problem. The judgement of the admissibility of a MAP request only involves 
the input of the first competent authority, thus is more observable and 
measurable. The measurability of the implementation stage is even higher, 
since the rights and obligations of the tax authorities to a particular dispute 
have already been clearly defined by the MAP agreement to be implemented.  
4.2.2 Agency costs of tax arbitration 
Two types of agency costs need to be considered in the context of tax 
arbitration. The first type concerns the tax authority – taxpayer relationship; 
the second involves the arbitrator – party relationship.  
The first type of agency costs will be substantially constrained under tax 
arbitration, where an arbitral panel will largely take over the procedure and be 
bound to issue a binding arbitral decision within a given time frame. Many 
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believe that mere inclusion of an arbitration provision in tax treaties may spur 
competent authorities to put more efforts in accelerating the resolution of 
MAP cases.777 Depending on the extent of procedural robustness, there may 
still be some room for recalcitrant competent authorities to engage in 
statesmanship in arbitral proceedings.778 The issue of procedural abuse in 
arbitral procedures has been extensively discussed in the literature of 
commercial arbitration, and will be revisited later.779 Suffice it to point out that 
compared with the MAP, the room for statesmanship in tax arbitration should 
be moderate, since the procedure is monitored by an arbitral panel. For 
example, parties to a tax dispute will realise that the overuse of strategic 
actions during the arbitral proceedings may undermine their own credibility 
before the panel.780  
It should be noted that the arbitrators’ intervention in an ITDR process begins 
from the point when the arbitral panel has been successfully established. 
Before this point, even an arbitral proceeding is still largely a bilateral process 
governed by party autonomy. Consequently, the pre-panel proceedings, 
particularly the process of appointing arbitrators, are more vulnerable to party 
abuse than post-panel proceedings. For instance, either competent authority 
may delay the appointment of an arbitrator, or keep challenging the proposed 
appointments by the other side.781 Nonetheless, most arbitral rules provide 
for an appointing authority that will intervene if the parties fail to agree on an 
appointment in a timely manner.782 Therefore, the agency costs associated 
with panel establishment are generally controllable.   
As to the agency problem associated with the arbitrator – party relationship, 
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there is voluminous literature in commercial arbitration that deals with the 
topic of arbitrator behaviour.783 The most common complaint in this literature 
is that arbitrators fail to manage the proceedings efficiently.784 “Anecdotal 
tales abound of an arbitrator waiting over a year to schedule the preliminary 
conference, or waiting for more than three years after the conclusion of the 
arbitration to render an award.”785 More seriously, an arbitrator may behave 
in a way that raises doubts about their impartiality or integrity. For instance, 
according to the US Federal Arbitration Act, one of the grounds for vacating 
an arbitral award is that “there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrator”.786 Nevertheless, the risk of arbitrator-misconduct should not be 
overstated. This is because, although the panel takes over an arbitral 
proceeding, the parties still participate in and have substantial influence on 
the process, thereby effectively monitoring the panel. Furthermore, it is not 
unusual in commercial arbitration that the parties successfully challenge an 
arbitrator for conflict of interest or improper conduct. 787  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that in principle, tax arbitration implies lower agency 
costs than the MAP.  
4.2.3 Agency costs of tax mediation 
By definition, mediation is of a non-binding nature. A mediator has no 
decision-making authority, and the procedure is characterised by party 
autonomy, as is with the MAP.788 In this sense, tax mediation imposes much 
weaker monitoring pressure on the competent authorities than does tax 
                                                        
783 Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 151–152; Orley C Ashenfelter and David E Bloom, Models of Arbitrator 
Behavior: Theory and Evidence (National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass, USA 1983); 
David E Bloom, Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass, USA 1986); Henry S Farber and Max Bazerman, The 
General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass, USA 1984). 
784 Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 151–152. 
785 ibid 152. 
786 US Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC. §10 (a). 
787 Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 147. 
788 Susan Nauss Exon, ‘The Effects That Mediator Styles Impose on Neutrality and Impartiality 
Requirements of Mediation’ (2007) 42 USFL Rev. 577, 578,582. 
 139 
arbitration. It is said that in a domestic context some parties may use 
mediation as a tactic to stall the litigation process.789 In the end, successful 
mediation depends upon the parties’ willingness to enter the process in good 
faith.790    
That said, the involvement of a mediator increases the transparency of the 
dispute-settlement process relative to the MAP. Arguably, parties may feel the 
pressure of being “watched” and morally judged by the mediator, who usually 
has a good understanding of the tactics that would be used in negotiations.791 
In this way, the opportunistic tendency of the competent authorities will be 
more constrained in mediation than in the MAP.  
Like arbitration, a mediation process also implies agency costs associated 
with the relationship between the third-party neutral and the parties. On the 
one hand, the impartiality and integrity of a mediator plays a critical role in 
engaging parties in full disclosure and open communication, both of which are 
vital to the success of mediation. 792  On the other hand, the 
mediator-misconduct could be more difficult to detect given the informality 
and flexibility of the procedure. For example, whereas an arbitrator’s ex parte 
communication with one of the parties may constitute a ground for the other 
party to challenge the arbitrator’s impartiality, such separate communication is 
a common technique in mediation.793 Nonetheless, given the principle of 
party autonomy in the mediation process, the potential damage caused by the 
mediator’s opportunism should not be overestimated.      
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4.3 Bargaining costs 
Bargaining costs of the ITDR process refer to competent authorities’ 
difficulties in achieving consensus on substantive as well as procedural 
issues arising from the process.794 The ITDR process is a typical BOS game, 
“with one state’s fiscal gain being the other’s fiscal loss”.795 It is true that the 
failure of negotiations between competent authorities frequently results from 
genuine disagreements on the interpretation of certain treaty provisions. 
Nonetheless, if the disagreements were to make little difference to the 
distribution (or redistribution) of a tax base, it is doubtful that those authorities 
would so cling to their positions. 
It is worth noting that the division between bargaining costs and agency costs 
is not watertight in the ITDR context, given the triangular structure of ITDR 
relationships. As Figure 1 illustrates, in a typical ITDR relationship, the 
interaction between the two competent authorities constitutes a bargaining 
relationship. Meanwhile, each authority forms its own principal-agency 
relationship with the taxpayer concerned.796 Thus, it is sometimes quite 
difficult to classify competent authorities’ strategic actions in the ITDR process 
as either an agency problem or a bargaining problem. From the competent 
authorities’ perspective, such conduct is a typical bargaining tactic. Yet from 
the viewpoint of the taxpayers, wilful delay or obstruction of a 
dispute-resolution procedure by the competent authorities amounts to 
opportunistic conduct. In addition, the two problems are often interdependent. 
On the one hand, the pursuit of departmental interests by the competent 
authorities contributes to the distributive conflicts of a dispute-settlement 
process. On the other hand, the bargaining problem may intensify the 
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competent authorities’ tendency to “play hardball” in the process. 
 








That being said, the bargaining problem in the ITDR process is a standing-alone 
existence vis-à-vis the agency problem. Specifically, even assuming that two competent 
authorities conduct an ITDR process in good faith, they may still get entrenched in their 
own positions.797 This corresponds with the core message of the BOS game: while both 
parties have a strong incentive to establish and maintain cooperation on a particular 
issue, they encounter difficulties in solving the distributive conflict over the issue.798 
Occasionally, the bargaining problem can be observed independently. For example, in a 
MAP case stalemated under two competent authorities that have a good track record of 
MAP performance, it is more likely that the failure to reach an agreement stems from the 
bargaining problem. 
4.3.1 Bargaining costs of the MAP 
As its name indicates, the bargaining problem is intrinsically associated with 
the negotiation process, where the principle of party autonomy governs. 
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Therefore, it is safe to conclude that among alternative ITDR mechanisms, 
the MAP implies the highest level of bargaining costs. Considerable delay 
may be caused by disagreements between competent authorities on the 
interpretation of certain treaty provisions or the establishment of an 
arm’s-length price, even though the parties enter the negotiation in good faith. 
After all, the purpose of double-taxation relief enshrined in tax treaties does 
not, and should not, oblige a state to give up its fair share of a trans-border 
tax base in order to resolve the dispute, unless states willingly offer to 
concede their interests in the negotiation. 
For many MAPs that encounter bargaining problems, the relevant tax treaties, 
the OECD (and UN) Model Convention and the Commentaries, as well as 
common international practices in similar tax issues, may help coordinate the 
viewpoints of competent authorities. As bargaining theory indicates, legal 
expressions and precedents provide focal points for BOS games. 799 
Nonetheless, such focal points are not always readily identifiable across the 
board. Specifically, the fundamental incompleteness of the international tax 
regime indicates that model tax conventions and commentaries are frequently 
less helpful for certain cases in question. Common international practices 
may also become irrelevant insofar as particular tax disputes with unique 
facts are concerned. In many other instances, information asymmetry and 
bounded rationality prevent parties from taking a realistic view about their own 
positions.800     
4.3.2 Bargaining costs of tax arbitration  
Similar to the reasoning on the agency costs of tax arbitration (Section 4.2.2), 
binding arbitration provides an effective means of breaking impasses of MAP 
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cases and moving the processes forward.801 Accordingly, it could also be 
said that tax arbitration provides a compulsory focal point for the bargaining 
parties.  
Section 4.2.2 also discussed the issue of procedural abuse in tax arbitration. 
Frequently, a procedural impasse in arbitration may result from bona fide 
disagreements between the parties rather than from strategic abuse. 802 
Since a panel oversees the functioning of an arbitral procedure, the 
bargaining problem over procedural matters will also be mild and controllable, 
as is with the case of procedural abuse. Moreover, compared with substantive 
issues, negotiation over procedural matters generally implies less distributive 
conflict. As discussed previously, parties are more likely to achieve 
consensus over issues with less-extensive distributive conflict, such as the 
rules of the road.803 Therefore, parties who are acting in good faith will 
usually be able to solve their disagreements on procedural matters quickly 
and smoothly. The issue of bargaining over procedural matters will be 
revisited in Section 3 of Chapter 6.  
4.3.3 Bargaining costs of tax mediation 
The primary role of mediation is to facilitate parties’ attempt to solve their 
bargaining impasses.804 A mediator can: (a) help the parties to present their 
own cases more effectively to the other side; and (b) examine the merit of 
each side anew.805 In this way, the problem of over-optimism discussed 
previously can be effectively mitigated.806 In the case of evaluative mediation, 
the mediator will, in addition to facilitating the parties’ negotiation, further offer 
an opinion on the likely outcome of the case, and hence provide a focal point 
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to the bargaining problem.807 In the context of ITDR, the merit of using 
mediation has been confirmed by the MEMAP: 
A mediator’s role may offer an opportunity for the competent authorities to 
view a specific case, or the MAP process itself, from a much different 
perspective. This perspective, perhaps acquired through the mediator’s 
restatement of the positions or of the critical issues, may illuminate elements 
of a case or of the MAP process that are not perceptible when viewed from 
the standpoint of an administration defending an adjustment or one that is 
being asked to provide relief.808 
Despite the above benefits of mediation, given its non-binding nature, there is 
no guarantee that the parties will achieve any agreement. In this sense, 
mediation is less robust than arbitration in breaking impasses arising from 
MAP negotiations.   
4.4 Administrative costs 
As discussed previously, administrative costs can only be approached in a 
contextual manner, as studies of the topic have yet to produce any general 
economic rules.809 Nevertheless, in the context of dispute settlement, a 
general principle can be drawn from the literature in this domain: the 
administrative costs of a particular dispute-settlement mechanism are 
positively correlated to the formality of this mechanism. This principle 
manifested itself in the ADR movement that emerged in the US and then 
spread to the world in the 1980s.810 The movement was largely fuelled by 
dissatisfaction with the formal litigation procedure at the time, which had 
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increasingly been criticised for its delay, rigidity, and high procedural costs.811 
In this connection, proponents of ADR argue that informal dispute-resolution 
mechanisms are more efficient than formal ones, saving both time and 
money.812 The following analysis starts with the most formal mechanism of 
ITDR: tax arbitration.      
4.4.1 Administrative costs of tax arbitration 
Studies on the procedural costs of commercial arbitration abound. 813  A 
common perception is that commercial arbitration processes, particularly 
those in an international context, are becoming increasingly expensive and 
time-consuming as they grow more formal.814 As a practitioner describes, 
“there is now broader discovery, larger damages requests, longer briefing 
schedules, much bigger briefs, far greater reliance on experts and their 
testimony, and more procedural challenges to the arbitration”.815  
More often than not, writers on commercial arbitration tend to focus on the 
monetary expenses of arbitral procedures. 816  Under this approach, 
arbitration costs are divided into two main categories. 817 The first is the 
tribunal costs, which include the arbitrators’ remuneration, the registration fee 
of the arbitral institute (if applicable), and the charges for any other assistance 
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required by the arbitral tribunal.818 The second category consists of party 
costs, which include the fees for legal counsel, party-appointed experts, 
witnesses, translators, etc.; the transportation and accommodation expenses 
related to hearings; and other party-inflicting costs.819 In the context of tax 
arbitration, insofar as the taxpayers concerned also participate in the 
procedures, the expenses resulted from such participation can also be 
classified as party-related costs.  
Nonetheless, the administrative costs of arbitration are broader than mere 
monetary expenses. In particular, where ad hoc arbitration is concerned, 
considerable time and effort are needed to search for and appoint arbitrators, 
organise arbitral hearings and/or other arbitral meetings, and so on. These 
inputs, though hard to price, certainly constitute the substantial bulk of the 
administrative costs. In addition, the parties’ “in-house” inputs, such as the 
time and effort devoted by the parties’ own staff in researching and preparing 
the cases, attending the procedures, and communicating with the panels 
and/or the other side, also contribute to administrative costs. The 
communication cost not just concerns language translation, which can be 
covered in translator fees, but also cultural and professional divergence, 
which is a typical non-monetary cost. Again, taxpayer participation in the 
procedure will also incur non-monetary expenses.  
4.4.2 Administrative costs of the MAP 
4.4.2.1 Procedural flexibility  
In the orthodox literature of ITDR, most of positive comments about the MAP, 
if any, are focused on the administrative costs of the mechanism. Specifically, 
the monetary expenses, including the tribunal costs and party costs of arbitral 
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proceedings, will largely be avoided under the MAP. The non-monetary costs 
such as those associated with the establishment of arbitral panels will also be 
saved in the MAP. It is true that MAPs are no free lunch. The process 
demands efforts from competent authority staff on case research and 
communication. The face-to-face meetings between competent authorities, 
where applicable, also incur substantial costs, both monetary and 
non-monetary. As the MEMAP notes:  
The competent authority function needs sufficient human (skilled personnel), 
financial (in particular to pay for translations and travel/accommodation 
expenses for face-to-face meetings with other competent authorities) and 
other resources (access to company databases, industry data and foreign tax 
laws) to be able to meet its obligations under the Convention.820 
Nonetheless, these costs also occur, usually with greater scale, with tax 
arbitration, which entails more formalised meetings (e.g. pre-trial meetings 
and hearings) and greater efforts on case analysis.  
These advantages of the MAP can be largely attributed to the procedural 
flexibility of the mechanism. For example, a MAP case with simple facts and 
low monetary value at stake may only require a few telephone calls or emails 
between the competent authorities to settle the dispute. Moreover, the MAP 
also allows for the method of package negotiation, whereby a pair of 
competent authorities resolves numerous cases at the same time. This 
method and its advantages will be revisited later.821 
4.4.2.2 Human-asset specificity   
In addition to the MAP’s procedural flexibility, the notion of asset specificity 
also plays a critical role in explaining its low level of administrative costs. The 
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central argument is that competent authorities have over time gained 
extensive knowledge of and experiences with tax matters, including MAP 
practices, and that such specialised human assets constitute valuable 
“procedural capital” for functioning of the mechanism.822 Accordingly, there is 
a quasi-rent for tax disputes to be resolved by competent authorities in the 
first place, rather than by an outsider such as an arbitrator. Burnett contends 
that the reference to established experiences of competent authorities is 
rather a mundane rhetoric in favour of the status quo in any debate about 
institutional change.823  In this author’s view, Burnett underestimates the 
significance of human-asset specificity in the ITDR process. Such 
significance is connected to two related facts about ITDR. First, tax disputes 
are highly specialised and complicated. Even Albert Einstein once 
complained that “the hardest thing in the world to understand is the Income 
Tax”.824 Over the years, international tax matters have become increasingly 
complicated with inputs from skilful lawyers and economists.825 As a result, 
persons engaging in ITDR processes or other international tax matters are 
more likely to gain specialised knowledge on these matters through special 
training and adaptive learning. 
Second, tax administrations, with which competent authorities are affiliated, 
acquire specialised human assets in relation to ITDR not only through their 
experiences of dispute settlement, but also their daily implementation of tax 
policies even before any tax dispute materialises. Furthermore, tax 
administrations not only engage in general implementation of tax law or 
policies, but also take part in specific allocation of trans-border tax bases. For 
example, if an enterprise of one country carries out its business in another 
                                                        
822 Burnett (n 77) 176. 
823 ibid. 
824 ‘The Hardest Thing in the World to Understand Is Income Taxes – Quote Investigator’ 
<https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/03/07/einstein-income-taxes/> accessed 26 January 2019. 
825 Sikka and Willmott (n 663) 417. 
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country through a PE situated in that host country, while the tax administration 
of the host country would assess the tax liability of the non-resident enterprise 
that is attributable to the PE, such assessment would also be carried out in 
the residence country so as to figure out the amount of tax credit granted to 
the enterprise. Therefore, tax administrations acquire specialised knowledge 
on tax matters at both the policy and case levels. In particular, through routine 
interactions at the case level, these administrations also develop a common 
(professional) language, which helps reduce the communication cost 
between the parties. It is true that according to agency theory, the 
competent-authority function should be independent from the audit 
department of the same tax administration.826 Nevertheless, considering that 
internal staff-shift is common within tax administrations, the stock of 
specialised human assets of a tax administration is shared across all its 
sections.  
4.4.2.3 Insights from domestic administrative laws 
The elements of procedural flexibility and human-asset specificity and their 
implications for dispute settlement are also reflected in domestic laws, 
particularly with respect to a well-established doctrine in administrative law: 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.827 The exhaustion doctrine states 
that no one is entitled to judicial relief for an alleged injury until the prescribed 
administrative remedy has been exhausted. 828  In a broader sense, the 
doctrine reflects judicial deference to administration determination.829 While 
such deference can be justified on multiple grounds, economic considerations 
play a critical part.830 First, administrative resolution is more economical than 
                                                        
826 See below, Chapter 5, Section.2.1.1. 
827 Marcia R Gelpe, ‘Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases’ 
(1984) 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1; Ralph F Fuchs, ‘Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agency Action’ (1975) 51 Ind. LJ 817. 
828 McKart v US (1969) 395 US 185, 193; see also Gelpe (n 827) 3.  
829 Gelpe (n 827) 22.  
830 ibid 10–11. 
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judicial resolution in that administrative proceedings are less formal, and thus 
less expensive. 831  Second, administrators with greater technical 
backgrounds can reach factually accurate decisions more quickly.832 “The 
agency’s experts can gather, digest, and evaluate information more quickly 
and, therefore, more economically than a court.” 833  Accordingly, when 
technical expertise not possessed by the courts enters into agency 
determinations, “this expertness should be drawn upon prior to judicial 
review”.834 
Arguably, the MAP is essentially a special form of administrative appeal 
procedure – albeit with an international character. In contrast, tax arbitration 
or other legalistic methods of ITDR are more analogous to litigation in a 
domestic context. Therefore, considering the technicality of tax issues and the 
expertise of tax administrations, the exhaustion doctrine also carries weight in 
the debate about ITDR models, and similar deference should be accorded to 
the MAP as well.   
4.4.3 Administrative costs of tax mediation 
It is commonly recognised that mediation is a cost-efficient means of dispute 
settlement, whether in a domestic or international context.835 This is mainly 
because mediation is more flexible and less adversarial than arbitration and 
litigation. 836  Nonetheless, mediation still implies a higher level of 
administrative costs than does the MAP. The extra costs can mainly be 
attributed to the involvement of the third-party neutral, as well as the logistical 
burden of organising face-to-face meetings, which are essential for the 
success of a mediation process. In particular, as Dalton’s survey indicates, 
                                                        
831 McKart, 395 US (1969) (n 828) 195; Gelpe (n 827) 12. 
832 Gelpe (n 827) 12. 
833 ibid 17. 
834 Fuchs (n 827) 866. 
835 Blake (n 791) 225.  
836 ibid 224.  
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one of the reasons underlying the dormancy of tax mediation is the difficulty 
for competent authorities to access the pool of international tax mediators, 
who are expected not only to be professional in tax matters, but also skilful in 
communication and persuasion.837      
4.5 Overall assessment 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above evaluation of the transaction 
costs of ITDR. First, the MAP is superior to the other two ITDR mechanisms 
in saving administrative costs. Accordingly, where competent authorities 
handle tax disputes in good faith and are always ready to compromise in the 
process, the MAP will be the most cost-efficient means of dispute settlement. 
Second, tax arbitration has the advantage of being a way to manage agency 
and bargaining problems. In particular, the procedure usually guarantees 
finality for dispute settlement. Therefore, for those ITDR processes fraught 
with bureaucracy, bargaining impasses, or political enmity, tax arbitration 
represents the most robust solution. Third, tax mediation occupies a middle 
ground between the MAP and tax arbitration with respect to the three types of 
transaction costs. However, this middle ground could be construed as a 
disadvantage, as it is more expensive than the MAP in terms of administrative 
costs, while less effective than tax arbitration in curbing agency and 
bargaining problems. This partly explains the dormancy of tax mediation in 
ITDR practice. 
Given the proposition that the MAP excels in economising administrative 
costs of the ITDR process while tax arbitration is more effective in addressing 
issues of bureaucracy, statesmanship, impasses, and political volatility, the 
question remains: is the ITDR process functioning (or malfunctioning) in 
Locke’s world, which “is a condition of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and 
                                                        
837 See above, Chapter 1, Section 2.4. 
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preservation”,838 or in a Hobbesian world, where “every man is enemy to 
every man”?839 Intuitively, Hobbes’s version of the fiscal world seems more 
congruent with the assumption of rational maximisation or human 
opportunism. Nonetheless, as discussed above (Section 2), a 
wealth-maximising country usually avoids revenue-maximising policies on the 
postulation that a predatory fiscal policy could ultimately stifle economic 
development. In particular, it has already been established above (Section 
3.1.3) that the international tax regime is essentially a coordination game with 
limited distributive conflict. Therefore, although the process of ITDR may be 
affected by agency and bargaining problems, these problems are not 
insurmountable given the political goodwill among countries regarding the 
prevention of double taxation. In particular, the agency problem in the ITDR 
process will largely be an issue of bureaucratic exigencies or capacity 
limitation rather than political statesmanship. Indeed, it should be no surprise 
to see that states may frequently side with taxpayers in monitoring tax 
authorities’ performance on ITDR practice.840 To summarise, as far as the 
international tax regime and its dispute-settlement system are concerned, 
Locke’s view of the world is the most prevalent and influential. Accordingly, 
the MAP is more cost-efficient overall than tax arbitration and mediation.    
4.6 Resolution of multilateral tax disputes  
While the above section established the superiority of the MAP among ITDR 
mechanisms, the conclusion could be slightly different where the resolution of 
multilateral tax disputes is concerned. As explained previously, the number of 
parties involved in a dispute-settlement process is positively correlated to the 
magnitude of all three types of transaction costs the process may entail.841 
                                                        
838 John W Yolton, A Locke Dictionary (Blackwell 1993) 278–279.  
839 Aloysius Martinich, A Hobbes Dictionary (Blackwell Pub 2005) 292.  
840 See below, Chapter 5, Section 2.1.2. 
841 See above, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4. 
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Specifically, as the number of parties increases, MAP negotiations would be 
more akin to a process of joint production, which implies higher agency costs. 
It also becomes more difficult for the parties to find a commonly accepted 
solution to solve their distributive conflict, thereby reinforcing the risk of a 
bargaining impasse. The administrative costs of a multilateral MAP would 
also increase because it is more difficult to coordinate and manage the 
conduct of multiple parties in the process. In this connection, the value of the 
third-party neutral in coordinating and monitoring the conduct of the parties, 
and providing focal points to the distributive conflicts among them, becomes 
more prominent. To some extent, that third-party neutral is reminiscent of a 
firm in organising productive activities among a multitude of resource owners. 
Therefore, as tax disputes become multilateral, the case for the use of tax 
arbitration as well as mediation becomes stronger. That being said, the 
resolution of multilateral tax disputes does not necessarily dictate the 
complete replacement of the MAP with arbitration (and/or mediation). Given 
the political goodwill surrounding the ITDR process, the MAP can still be a 
generally effective means to resolve multilateral tax disputes. The prospect of 
successful multilateral MAPs can be further improved with some institutional 
facilitation, as will be discussed later.842         
5. Evaluation of the current ITDR practice: data analysis 
5.1 Overview 
The data to be analysed in this section includes the OECD MAP statistics, 
peer-review reports under BEPS Action 14, and a case study. While this data 
mainly pertains to the cost dynamics of ITDR processes, the benefit side of 
the equation can also be illuminated.  
                                                        
842 See below, Chapter 7, Section 4.  
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5.2 OECD MAP statistics 
Starting in 2006, the OECD began to compile and disseminate MAP statistics 
for its member countries and several partner jurisdictions. The statistics cover 
the following indicators: opening and closing inventory of MAP cases; the 
number of cases initiated during the year; the number of cases completed 
during the year; the number of cases withdrawn or closed during the year 
without full resolution of double taxation; and the average time for cases 
completed, closed, or withdrawn during the year. Among these indicators, the 
average time taken for cases completed, closed, or withdrawn is the most 
pertinent proxy for measuring the transaction costs of the MAP, as in general, 
the longer the proceedings, the more expensive a dispute-resolution process 
will be.843 
In 2016, this statistical system was superseded by a new system, which will 
be elaborated in Section 4.5 of Chapter 5. The following analysis will be 
largely based on the old statistics. 
5.2.1 Lengthy MAPs 
The most common criticism of the MAP concerns the protraction of the 
process. Table 4 collects the data on the average time for the completion of 
MAP cases in a number of OECD countries that have recorded a notable 
protraction in their MAP operation for certain years. For these 10 countries, 
139 cases had endured for more than 24 months. Of these cases, 37 had 
lasted for more than five years, 35 for more than six years, and 19 cases 
more than seven years. Numerous cases present extreme delays. For 
instance, in 2009 or prior, Belgium had completed eight cases with 
non-OECD economies, taking on average 116 months per case. During the 
same period, Norway closed a case that had lasted for 126 months, and 
                                                        
843 ICC, ‘Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration’ (n 813) 6. 
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Luxembourg closed a case that had lasted for 196 months. 
 
Table 4: OECD countries that record extraordinarily long average time for MAP 
cases completed, closed, or withdrawn for certain years  
Country Year 
Completed cases 
Closed or withdrawn 
with double taxation 
Average time (month) 
for cases completed, 








2009 or prior 7 7 0 1 82 116 
2010 35 3 0 0 56 55 
Portugal 
2009 or prior 1       94   
2011 4       46   
Norway 2009 or prior 2   1 1 82 126 
UK 
2009 or prior 6   0 2 95.3 102 
2010 3   1 1 57.8 59 
2011 5       45.2   
Canada 
2009 or prior 3   0   76.78   
2010 9   2   58.89   
2011 13   1   46.26   
Greece 
2010     1   60   
2011     1   48   
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Luxemburg 
2009 or prior    1   196   
2010 2       56   
2011 1       45   
Mexico 
2009 or prior     1   77   
2012     1   43   
Netherlands 
2009 or prior 1       70   
2010 3       56   
2011 2       52   
Sweden 
2009 or prior 2       75   
2010 1       59   
2011 7       50   
2012 6     1 34 35 
Total   113 10 10 6     
Derived from the OECD MAP Statistics (2006-2015), 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2006-2015.htm (accessed 9 July 2019) 
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5.2.2 “Success stories” 
Despite such extremely slow MAPs, the statistics also tell quite a few success 
stories, which have largely been neglected by commentators.844 Table 5 
collects the most expeditious MAPs. In 2015, Canada completed 14 MAP 
cases with an average time per case of only 4.85 months. In the same year, 
Belgium resolved 185 cases, with each case taking an average of four 
months each, and Luxembourg resolved 149 cases at an average of two 
months each. This is quite a favourable result measured against the two-year 
time frame recommended in the MEMAP, and much more so in comparison 
with the data in Table 4.845  
Note that several countries, such as Belgium, Luxembourg, and Sweden, 
appear in both Table 4 (lengthy MAPs) and Table 5 (expeditious MAPs). In 
her analysis about MAP statistics, Brown also observes that “some countries 
show some dramatic swings”, and wonders whether “there were changes in 
personnel or other external factors that would explain these different 
results”.846 As will be shown in the next chapter, at least the changes in 
Belgium and Luxembourg’s statistics can largely be attributed to the 





                                                        
844 For in-depth analysis of OECD MAP statistics, see also Brown (n 11) 90–97. 
845 OECD, ‘MEMAP’ (n 1) 31 (Section 3.9). 
846 Brown (n 11) 96–97. 
847 See below, Chapter 5, Section 3.2.2. The Belgian MAP performance may have also been influenced 
by the US-Belgium tax treaty signed in 2006. The treaty ties a benefit – i.e. the elimination of 
withholding tax on dividends paid from a subsidiary to a parent entity – to the effective implementation 
of the MAP mechanism. See the US-Belgium Tax Treaty (2006), Art. 10 (3), (4), (12).    
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Table 5: OECD countries that record short average time for cases completed 
for certain years 
 
Derived from the OECD MAP Statistics (2006-2015), 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2006-2015.htm (accessed 9 July 2019) 
Country Year 
Completed cases Average time for cases completed 
OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD 
Australia 2014 4 2 6.9 9.5 
Belgium  2015 185 0 4 0 
Canada 2015 14  4.85  
Luxembourg 
2014 36  5  
2015 149  2  
Denmark  2015 11  3  
Netherlands 
2014 22 0 10 0 
2015 18 0 4 0 
Sweden 
2014 18 0 10  
2015 36 2 1 1 
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5.2.3 Overall performance 
Tables 4 and 5 represent two extremes of MAP practices. Therefore, it is 
desirable to also examine the overall statistics for all OECD countries. As is 
shown in Figure 2, the average time for MAP cases in all the OECD countries 
from 2006 to 2015 was about two years. More specifically, the average time 
reached an historical low of around 19 months for the year 2007. It then rose 
through to 2010, when it reached 27 months. Since then, it has moved 
steadily downward, reaching 20 months in 2015.  
 
Figure 2: Average time in OECD countries for completion of MAP cases, 
2006-2015 
 
Source: Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, 




However, these numbers should be read with caution.848 First, numerous 
countries failed to report their statistics for certain years. 849  Second, 
according to the OECD statistics report framework, the indicator of average 
time only covers completed (which also includes closed and withdrawn) MAP 
cases, while the still pending cases are not included. In this sense, a country 
that has had most of its MAP cases stalemated by the time the statistics are 
gathered may report a nil average time for their MAPs. Third, the use of 
averages obscures the fluctuations in the data. For example, extremely 
stalemated MAPs may be cloaked under the two-year average time. 
5.2.4 Evolution of MAP caseloads 
Indicators of MAP caseloads, including the opening inventory of MAP cases, 
the number of new MAP cases, and the ending inventory, though less 
pertinent than the average time for the completion of MAP cases in 
measuring the transaction costs of the MAP, nevertheless provide insights on 
the efficacy and sustainability of the mechanism. Figure 3 demonstrates the 
changing trend of two variables: the number of new cases initiated in any 
given year (the lower line) and the number of inventory cases at the end of 
that same year (the upper line). Both variables saw substantial growth from 
2006 to 2015.  
The increase in new MAP cases is more difficult to interpret. On the one hand, 
this trend may signify the growing tension between taxpayers and tax 
administrations in competing for trans-border tax bases. On the other hand, 
this could also indicate the increasing popularity of the MAP mechanism 
among taxpayers, perhaps owing to the states’ continuing effort to enhance 
the accessibility and effectiveness of the mechanism. Nonetheless, the 
                                                        
848 Brown (n 11) 91. 
849 For instance, see statistics of Austria, Chile, and Finland. ‘Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics 
(2006-2015)’ (n 3). 
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widening “scissors gap” between the two lines in the figure delivers a more 
definite message: the current MAP mechanism is increasingly under strain. 
The mathematic relationship between the two lines is simple: the inventory of 
MAP cases by the end of any given year equals the inventory at the end of 
the preceding year plus the number of newly initiated cases for this year 
minus the number of completed cases for the given year. Therefore, the 
widening “scissors gap” between the two lines indicates that the number of 
completed MAP cases for OECD countries in any given year could not catch 
up with the number of new cases that year. This suggests an increasing 
stress on the MAP mechanism among OECD countries, and increasing risks 
that more cases will languish. This trend could be exacerbated, at least in the 
near future, due to the BEPS project.850   
Figure 3: The trend of MAP cases for OECD members 
 
Source: Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, 
                                                        
850 See above, Chapter1, Section 1.7.1. 
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https://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/map-statistics-2006-2015.htm (accessed 9 July 2019) 
 
5.2.5 Comments on the statistics 
The extremely lengthy MAPs in Table 4 seem to support a pessimistic view 
about the mechanism for its lack of efficiency and finality. Nonetheless, the 
success stories told by the same statistics indicate that perhaps length and 
inefficiency are not intrinsic to the MAP. As Brown comments, “When the MAP 
works, it works well”.851 The statistics on the overall average time further 
indicate the general effectiveness of the MAP. That being said, the data on 
MAP caseloads suggests that the mechanism is increasingly under strain.  
5.3 Action 14 peer-review reports 
As will be introduced later, BEPS Action 14 provides a peer-review process 
that evaluates participating countries against the minimum standard of the 
MAP established in the Action.852 The process is conducted in two stages. 
Stage 1 assesses countries’ compliance with the standard; Stage 2 monitors 
the follow-up of any recommendations put forth in each country’s Stage 1 
peer review.853 At the time this thesis was completed (15 November 2019), 
Stage 1 assessment had largely been finished, with 45 country reports being 
produced; Stage 2 is still ongoing.854 This section focuses on the Stage 1 
reports.  
5.3.1 Outline of Stage 1 reports 
The period being reviewed started from 1 January 2016, when the members’ 
commitment to the minimum standard began. Nevertheless, most countries 
                                                        
851 Brown (n 11) 97. 
852 See below, Chapter 5, Section 4.  
853 ‘Action 14 - OECD BEPS’ 14 <https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action14/> accessed 18 
August 2019. 
854 ‘Action 14 - OECD BEPS’ (n 853). 
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also offered to provide information on a few years’ “look-back period” before 1 
January 2016.855 Accordingly, Stage 1 reports provide valuable information 
for the evaluation of countries’ MAP practices before the BEPS Project. The 
drafting of the reports was mainly based on the following information sources: 
(1) Inputs provided by the assessed jurisdiction through the questionnaire;  
(2) Inputs from the peer questionnaires; 
(3) Responses from the assessed jurisdiction to peer and taxpayer inputs; 
(4) Information in the assessed jurisdiction’s MAP profile, which is 
published on public platforms; and  
(5) Statistics reported by the assessed jurisdiction pursuant to the agreed 
reporting framework.856  
This information can be categorized into two main types. The first concerns 
the legal and administrative framework for the MAP regime of the assessed 
jurisdictions, and the second concerns the actual application of this 
framework.857 As this thesis mainly concerns the transaction costs of the 
ITDR process in operation, the second type of information will be the main 
focus of this section. Accordingly, the peer inputs, which shed much light on 
the ITDR operation, will be the focus of the following analysis.     
The Stage 1 report is structured into four main parts. Part A covers preventing 
disputes; Part B covers availability of and access to the MAP; Part C covers 
the resolution of MAP cases; and Part D covers the implementation of MAP 
agreements. This section will focus on the last three parts of the report. The 
three tables in the Appendices of this thesis summarise the 45 Stage 1 
reports.  
                                                        
855 For instance, see Report on Belgium, 12.   
856 OECD, ‘BEPS Action 14 on More Effective Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Peer Review 
Documents’ (OECD) 23. 
857 ibid. 
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5.3.2 Access to the MAP 
As shown in Table 7 (in the Appendices), most countries that were surveyed 
ensured that taxpayers were granted easy access to the MAP. Specifically, 24 
countries accepted all MAP requests during the assessed period.858 Several 
other countries only denied access to the MAP in a very small number of 
cases and on reasonable grounds.859 For example, Finland reported that as 
from 1 January 2016, its competent authority had considered in only one case 
that the objection raised by the taxpayer in the MAP request was not 
justifiable. Finland had discussed the decision with its treaty partner. 860 
Another example is Belgium, which denied access in three cases on the 
grounds that insufficient information was provided. In these cases, the 
taxpayers were given several opportunities to provide the required 
information, and access was denied only after they were seen to be unwilling 
to provide it.861   
Several countries seem to have a relatively strict standard in determining the 
admissibility of MAP requests.862 For example, France denied access in 18 
cases on the grounds of unjustifiable objection, and 16 cases for insufficient 
information. Nevertheless, the peers and taxpayers did not raise any issue 
with those decisions. 863  In the latter 16 cases, the French competent 
authority sent letters to the taxpayers concerned asking them to complete 
their requests.864 
That being said, several members’ practice in MAP access did attract 
                                                        
858 Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South 
Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK.    
859 Austria, Belgium, Finland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
the US.   
860 Report on Finland, 26-27 (para.38). 
861 Report on Belgium, 28 (para.53). 
862 France, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland.  
863 Report on France, 23 (para.25), 27 (para.48). 
864 ibid. 
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substantial criticisms from peers and/or taxpayers. In Australia, Germany, and 
Italy, taxpayers were allegedly compelled by the relevant tax administrations, 
usually audit departments, to waive their access to the MAP in advance, in 
exchange for a relatively favourable audit settlement.865 In Denmark, the 
competent authority denied access to the MAP in four cases for insufficient 
information during the assessed period.866 Three of the cases were then 
appealed by the taxpayers concerned to the Danish Western High Court, and 
the court ruled for the complainants.867  
5.3.3 Resolution of MAP cases 
Resolution of MAP cases mainly concerns countries’ endeavour in seeking to 
resolve MAP cases within a 24-month time frame, and their working 
relationships with their peers. In this regard, as shown in Table 9 (in the 
Appendices), the 45 assessed jurisdictions can be categorised into four 
groups. Specifically, 33 members received overall positive comments from 
peers.868 Among these, 12 received some extraordinary compliments from 
peers. 869  Six members received some mixed feedback. 870  Two were 
negatively commented.871 The remaining four countries received too few 
inputs to draw any conclusive conclusion about their performance. 872  It 
should be noted that this categorisation is mainly based on the peers’ 
statements, thus unavoidably susceptible to subjectivity.  
Those positive peer comments, particularly the compliments peers paid to the 
                                                        
865 Report on Australia, 35 (paras 69, 70); Germany, 34-35 (para.65); Italy, 32 (paras 58, 59).  
866 Report on Denmark, 35-36 (paras72, 73). 
867 ibid. 
868 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Isreal, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the USA. 
869 Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. 
870 France, Hungary, India, Korea, Mexico, Poland. 
871 Greece, Italy. 
872 Argentina, Colombia, Liechtenstein, Malta. 
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12 jurisdictions, were generally centred on the following aspects: 
(1) Responsiveness and diligence. The competent authorities were 
responsive and cooperative, and had consistently met promised due 
dates, or at least had the intent to resolve MAP cases in a timely and 
effective manner.873 
(2) Constructive approach. The competent authorities took a realistic, 
constructive, pragmatic and solution-oriented approach in MAP 
negotiations. 874  In the Report on the US, some peers particularly 
appreciated that although the official MAP guidance in the US has strict 
requirements for the content of a MAP, “its competent authority is flexible 
and cooperative once cases are in the MAP and negotiations have 
started”.875  
(3) Adequate resources. The competent authorities deployed adequate 
resources on the MAP.876 The personnel dealing with MAPs in those 
competent authorities were well-trained and professional.877   
In contrast, the negative comments, including not only those on the generally 
“poor” jurisdictions, but also on those “good” countries but with respect to 
certain aspects of their MAP practice, were centred upon several major 
aspects. First, 20 jurisdictions were reported that their competent authorities 
had not always met the expected timeframe for certain intermediate steps of 
MAP processes, such as presenting a position paper to the other competent 
authority or responding to the position paper from the other side.878 The 
                                                        
873 For instance, see Reports on the US, 49 (para.120); Netherlands, 48 (para.103); Austria, 45 (paras 
112, 113); Sweden, 46-47 (paras 115,116). 
874 For instance, see Reports on the US, 51 (para.125); the UK., 47-48 (para.108).  
875 Report on the US, 51 (para.125). 
876 For instance, see Reports on the US, 51 (para.127); the UK., 47-48 (para.108); Canada, 46 
(para.107). 
877 For instance, see Reports on the UK., 48 (para.109); Canada, 46 (para.108); Sweden, 47 
(para.116). 
878 Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain.  
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problem was more severe for those countries that received general negative 
or mixed comments from peers/taxpayers. For instance, several peers 
reported that with one jurisdiction, meeting intermediate target time frames 
within 24 months was “very difficult”.879 Peers further noted that for several 
jurisdictions, there was a discrepancy in the competent authorities’ 
responsiveness between those cases where initial adjustments were made 
by those jurisdictions and those where such adjustments were made by their 
treaty partners.880 For these jurisdictions, their competent authorities’ lack of 
responsiveness was particularly notable in the cases where the adjustments 
were made by them.     
Second, 11 jurisdictions were reported by peers that their competent 
authorities tended to take a rigid stance in negotiations, at least for certain 
cases.881 For example, several competent authorities were observed to be 
less willing to make concessions,882 “lacks willingness to find an agreement 
when the initial positions of the competent authorities differ”,883 or “less 
flexibility in resolving cases, especially when high amounts are at stake”.884 
For several jurisdictions, the rigidity reflected the competent authorities’ lack 
of independence from the audit departments. For instance, peers observed 
that for one competent authority, all adjustments made by the tax 
administration were strongly defended.885 Sometimes the rigid stance taken 
by a competent authority was associated with domestic legal hindrances. 
Specifically, several competent authorities were not willing to discuss certain 
cases either because a judicial procedure was pending on the case886 or 
                                                        
879 Report on Italy, 48-49 (para.119). 
880 Canada, France, Italy. 
881 Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, India Italy, Korea, Poland, Spain, and 
Sweden. 
882 Report on Canada, 43 (para.93). 
883 Report on Czech Republic, 47 (para.128). 
884 Report on Spain, 58 (para.147). 
885 ibid. 
886 Report on Italy, 48 (para.117). 
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because a case was filed after the expiration of a domestic time limit.887  
Third, in four reports, peers or the assessed jurisdictions mentioned that the 
difficulty in achieving an agreement could be attributed to the complexity of 
the case.888 For example, in responding to certain criticisms from a particular 
peer, Korea explained that some of the delays that this peer encountered in 
the resolution of MAP cases were not due to an inefficient allocation of 
resources or the other reasons cited by the peer, but merely to the complexity 
and the importance of the case under review.889  
Lastly, eight jurisdictions left an impression on peers that their competent 
authorities were not equipped with adequate resources.890 As is shown in 
Figure 4, this group of countries overlapped substantially with the group that 
received generally negative or mixed feedback from peers. Coupled with this 
observation is that none of those 12 “very good” countries was within this 
group. Another intriguing aspect is that among these eight jurisdictions, peers 
observed that the competent authorities of four had undergone some staff 








                                                        
887 Report on Hungary, 54 (para.137). 
888 Finland, Germany, Japan, Korea, and the Netherlands.  
889 Report on Korea, 57-58 (para.150). 
890 Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Korea, Norway, Poland. 
891 Finland, France, Germany, Korea.  
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Figure 4: Overlap between the group being negatively commented and the 
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Aside from these positive and negative comments, peers and taxpayers also 
provided rich inputs on the use of modern means of communication in the 
MAP process.892  
5.3.4 Implementation of MAP agreements 
In general, peers and taxpayers did not indicate any substantial issue with the 
assessed competent authorities regarding their timely implementation of MAP 
agreements. Only three jurisdictions have been reported that a small number 
of cases took a relatively long time for implementation.893 This achievement 
is somewhat surprising because at the same time, as shown in Table 9, the 
                                                        
892 See below, Appendices, Table 11. 




         
                 















majority of the assessed jurisdictions did not have in place any administrative 
framework or timeframe for the monitoring of the implementation process.  
5.3.5 Comments 
The Stage 1 reports open a “peephole” on the black-box of MAP practice. 
Traditionally, academic evaluation on the practice was largely based on 
anecdotes, hypotheses or personal experiences, owing to the lack of 
transparency in this area. It is true that the MAP statistics for OECD members 
examined above provide some objective information in this respect. 
Nevertheless, statistics usually cannot reveal causation. Nor can they isolate 
the performance of individual competent authorities owing to the joint nature 
of the MAP process, as explained above (Section 4.2.1). As a result, “no one 
seems quite sure why some [MAP] cases fall into a ditch while others do 
not”.894 Two major insights can be drawn from the reports. 
5.3.5.1 Transaction costs of the MAP 
The Stage 1 reports, particularly the parts covering peer (taxpayer) inputs, 
illuminate the reasons underlying the delay or failure of MAP processes. To a 
significant extent, these inputs substantiate the assertion made in this chapter 
that the agency problem, the bargaining problem, and the administrative 
burden constitute the major sources of the transaction costs an ITDR process 
may entail. 
(1) Agency costs. The obstruction of access to the MAP, and the late or 
lack of response on the part of the assessed competent authorities largely 
reflect the agency problem in the ITDR process: tax administrations care 
more about revenue collection than about dispute resolution and the 
elimination of double taxation. The delay or lack of responsiveness may 
                                                        
894 Park (n 154) 809. 
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also result from general bureaucracy, which is another type of agency 
problem common to most public agencies. While peers didn’t refer to 
bureaucracy openly, they did, in their compliments to those “very good” tax 
authorities, attribute the timeliness of MAP processes to the cooperative 
and diligent attitude of those authorities.895    
It is worth noting that complaints from peers and taxpayers primarily 
concerned the intermediate stages of the MAP process, and, to a much 
lesser extent, the accessibility of the procedure. By contrast, the 
implementation stage raised very few concerns. This fact supports the 
hypothesis in Section 4.2.1 of this chapter, as well as the proposition that 
lower measurability of agents’ behaviour, particularly with respect to the 
process of joint production, implies higher risks of opportunism.896 
(2) Bargaining costs. Even for those jurisdictions that received 
extraordinarily positive peer comments, MAP cases were not always 
resolved in a timely manner. This reflects the bargaining difficulties in the 
MAP process. According to the peer (taxpayer) inputs, both positive and 
negative, the magnitude of bargaining costs is closely connected to the 
size of distributive conflict, the complexity of the disputes, and the parties’ 
willingness to cooperate and ability to find innovative solutions. 
Occasionally, the bargaining and agency costs are intermingled. For 
example, the competent authorities’ adherence to the position of their 
audit departments may reflect both their natural tendency to compete for a 
greater share of the cake in the dispute resolution process, which is a 
bargaining problem, and their making revenue collection a priority, which 
can be subsumed under the agency problem. 
(3) Administrative costs. The issues of resource constraint and staff 
                                                        
895 For instance, see Report on Sweden, 46-47 (para.115). 
896 See above, Chapter2, Section 2.2.3.  
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change, and the intensive attention paid by peers to the use of ICT, all 
reflect the administrative aspect of the MAP process. Moreover, the 
dispute-settlement process can be seriously disrupted by staff changes or 
departures within competent authorities; this is more prominent in ITDR 
than in dispute-settlement systems in other regimes. This has two 
implications. First, numerous competent authorities are under-resourced 
in light of the heavy caseload of MAP cases. Second, as discussed above 
(Section 4.4.2.2), human-asset specificity plays a significant role in the 
ITDR process. 
5.3.5.2 Effectiveness of the MAP 
Despite the negative comments about countries’ MAP practice, the central 
message delivered by the Stage 1 reports is positive: the MAP process is not 
fundamentally broken; it is still an effective means of resolving tax disputes. 
Specifically, most of the assessed jurisdictions have maintained congenial 
working relationships with their treaty partners in seeking timely resolution of 
tax disputes. Furthermore, there is no hint at all in peer (taxpayer) inputs that 
the ITDR process has ever been disrupted by political enmity, as was 
asserted by Burnett.897 In the Report on Japan, one peer’s comment on the 
Japanese competent authority exemplifies the solid political ground of the 
ITDR system and the underlying mutual dependency (i.e. high level of asset 
specificity) characterising international tax relationships: 
One peer qualified its relationship with Japan’s competent authority as robust, 
productive and cooperative, reflecting their countries’ deep, longstanding 
commercial and cultural ties.898 
This peer seemed to emphasise its particular relationship with Japan, 
                                                        
897 Burnett (n 77) 180; see also above, Chapter 1, Section 2.2.1. 
898 Report on Japan, 64 (para.167). 
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perhaps in the light of some historical tradition between the two countries. 
However, the compliments paid to the Japanese competent authority by many 
other peers and the prevailing positive comments about a majority of the 
jurisdictions indicate that the commercial ties between the countries and 
investors, and among the countries themselves, are rather pervasive.   
Even for those countries that have recorded relatively poor MAP performance, 
it becomes clear now that the problem mainly concerns resource constraints 
or administrative bureaucracy rather than political capriciousness. For 
example, the report on Italy, a country that has been vehemently criticised by 
peers for its significant lack of responsiveness in MAP processes, states:   
In response, in order to support the process of resolving MAP cases in a 
timely manner, Italy performed an internal reorganization as already noted in 
the Introduction, inter alia aiming at providing adequate resources to the MAP 
function.… According to Italy, this represents a clear signal of its strong effort 
to improve its dispute resolution mechanism.899 
Comparatively, the report on India established a clearer correlation between 
resource constraint and the delays in the country’s MAP processes. Peers 
providing input in the report could be divided into two groups. The first group 
has a large number of MAPs with India, while the second group does not.900 
In general, the second group provided rather constructive input on their 
experiences with India concerning the resolution of MAP cases.901 It is mainly 
the first group that raised some criticisms of India’s MAP practice. 902 
However, even this first group effusively appreciated India’s endeavour and 
good faith in MAP negotiation.903 Arguably, it is mainly the lack of resources, 
such as staff shortage, that accounts for its delays in MAP processes, 
                                                        
899 Report on Italy, 53 (para.135). 
900 Report on India, 62 (para.170) 
901 ibid 62 (para.171) 
902 ibid 62-65 (paras 171-176) 
903 Ibid 62-63 (para.172) 
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particularly when a large number of MAPs is concerned.904            
Furthermore, somewhat surprisingly, most of those countries that have 
received negative or mixed comments about the timely resolution of MAP 
processes, have good records on the accessibility of the MAP and excellent 
records on the timely implementation of MAP agreements. The latter further 
vindicates the BOS nature of international tax regime: once the distributive 
conflict has been resolved through an agreement, states would have no 
incentive to defect from the agreement.905  
The stable political environment surrounding the international tax regime 
affects ITDR in two ways. First, it further demonstrates the instrumental value 
of a MAP-based ITDR system in facilitating the entire regime, thereby 
vindicating the benefit analysis of the ITDR system. Second, it implies that the 
agency and bargaining problems in the MAP process are generally 
controllable, and thereby bolster the MAP-based ITDR system from a cost 
perspective.  
That being said, political goodwill alone does not guarantee the effectiveness 
of the MAP, and those negative peer inputs strongly suggest that the 
mechanism needs to be strengthened.  
5.4 Data about tax arbitration: Electrolux case 
5.4.1 Overview 
Data about international tax arbitration is quite scant. First, the mechanism is 
significantly underused. Very few cases have been reportedly channelled 
through tax arbitration in the context of the OECD Model Convention.906 In 
the context of EU Arbitration Convention, it is said that by the end of 2012, 
                                                        
904 Ibid 66 (para.179) 
905 See above, Chapter2, Section 2.3.1. 
906 Burnett (n 77) 181–182; Terr and others (n 25) 485–486. 
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while there were 848 tax disputes still pending in the MAP, only a handful 
cases were settled through arbitration.907 Many scholars, with whom this 
author concurs, believe that the underuse of the mechanism simply indicates 
that the current ad hoc method of tax arbitration is so unattractive that 
taxpayers do not rely on it.908 Second, even for those actual cases of tax 
arbitration, there is a paucity of case information due to confidentiality 
requirements. Notwithstanding these, one tax arbitration case, which involves 
Electrolux affiliates (Electrolux case), did enter the public domain when the 
French tax administration shared its experience on this case at a meeting 
held by the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF).909  
The MAP for the case was initiated between French and Italian competent 
authorities in 1997, and ended up with several issues unresolved.910 In 2000, 
the French competent authority approached its Italian counterpart to start the 
arbitration phase.911 The authorities then took a year and a half to set up the 
Advisory Commission.912 The first meeting of the Commission took place in 
November 2002.913 The Commission delivered its opinion on 19 May 2003, 
within six months from the date of its first meeting.914 
5.4.2 Key aspects of the case 
(1) Establishment of the Advisory Commission. The delay in establishing 
the Advisory Commission mainly resulted from the parties’ difficulty in 
                                                        
907 Kollmann and others (n 178) 1191. 
908 ibid. 
909 JTPF, ‘Draft Summary Record of The Third Meeting of The EU JTPF’ (EU Commission 2003) 
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para.11 
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finding a Chair for the Commission. First, the list of independent persons 
maintained by the EU Commission was at that time incomplete and out of 
date.915 Second, some independent persons of standing had declined the 
request to be the Chair because of the time needed for studying the 
documents of the case and for the meetings of the Advisory Commission. 
916  
(2) Establishment of the secretariat. After the Advisory Commission was 
established, the competent authorities decided to set up a secretariat to 
be responsible to the Advisory Commission.917 The role of a secretariat is 
not mentioned in the EU Arbitration Convention. Perhaps the Advisory 
Commission and the parties all thought it helpful to have a secretariat 
facilitating the arbitral procedure. However, this secretariat role was 
performed by a member of the tax administration which had made the 
transfer-pricing adjustment. 918   
(3) Evidentiary issues. The case raised several evidentiary issues. First, 
both competent authorities agreed that all their correspondence 
concerning the case should be made available to the Advisory 
Commission. 919  The quantity and quality of documents depended 
critically on how well the competent authorities had communicated with 
each other during the MAP negotiation.920 Second, the Chair of the 
Advisory Commission requested the position of the enterprise on the 
proposed transfer-pricing adjustment, i.e. whether it agreed or disagree 
with the adjustment and for what reason. 921  Third, the Advisory 
Commission had inquired whether the competent authorities had initiated 
                                                        
915 JTPF (n 909) para.15. 
916 ibid. 
917 ibid para.16. 
918 ibid. 
919 ibid para.17. 
920 ibid 17. 
921 ibid para.18. 
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MAPs on the case with competent authorities of other Contracting States 
– the case seemed to involve multiple jurisdictions – and if so whether an 
agreement had been reached.922 This raised the question of whether the 
Advisory Commission should have access to the correspondence with a 
third competent authority.923   
(4) Taxpayer participation. The taxpayer was informed of the arbitration 
procedure and was invited to be present during the procedure. 924 
However, the taxpayer declined the invitation.925 This is another intriguing 
fact about the Electrolux case, considering that a major advantage of tax 
arbitration is the improved status of taxpayers in arbitral procedures 
compared to the MAP. 926  Perhaps the taxpayer noticed that its 
confrontation with the competent authorities in an arbitral proceeding 
might cause disruption to its long-term relationship with one or both tax 
authorities.  
(5) Logistical issues. The two competent authorities decided that the 
Contracting State that had made the transfer-pricing adjustment would 
arrange for the panel meetings.927 They also agreed that the arbitral 
proceedings should be conducted in the official language of that adjusting 
state with consecutive translation into the other state’s official language.928 
All costs associated with the Advisory Commission, including the fees and 
expenses of the independent persons of standing, travel and translation 
expenses etc., should be shared equally by both countries.929 
5.4.3 Comments 
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In general, the Electrolux case reveals an unsatisfactory aspect of the arbitral 
procedure: it took almost three years to complete. To a large extent, the 
protraction of the process reflects the high administrative costs of the 
procedure. As Burnett observes, “issues of costs, logistics and travel seemed 
to have dominated the procedure [of the Electrolux case]”. 930  This 
observation corresponds to the proposition that tax arbitration implies higher 
administrative costs than the MAP. In particular, the fact that several potential 
arbitrators were deterred by the volume of document reading and the 
frequency and length of meetings vindicates the above notion of human-asset 
specificity and its implication for the choice of ITDR modes (Section 4.4.2.2): 
given the complexity of tax disputes, it is advantageous to have tax authorities 
resolving such disputes in the first instance.      
One commentator suggests that the lengthy establishment of the Advisory 
Commission may also result from an agency problem: competent authorities 
had exploited the gaps in the EU Arbitration Convention, which fails to 
prescribe the time frame for the establishment of an Advisory Commission.931 
This inference, though not adequately substantiated by the case itself, 
supports the above proposition (Section 4.2.2) that arbitral procedure, 
particularly with respect to the stages before the establishment of a panel, will 
still be vulnerable to the agency problem. In addition, the debate about 
whether the Advisory Commission should have access to correspondence 
with a third competent authority intimates that there may also be a bargaining 
problem during the arbitral proceedings.  
Despite all the above nuisances of the proceedings, the fact that the case 
was concluded within six months after the Advisory Commission took over still 
indicates the effectiveness of tax arbitration in providing finality for the ITDR 
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process.  
5.5 Summary of the data analysis 
It should be admitted that the above data analysis is inconclusive. Aside from 
the fact that the Electrolux case is the only publicised case of tax arbitration 
practice, the MAP statistics are largely confined to the OECD members. 
Comparatively, the peer-review process covers a wider group of members; 
yet peer/taxpayer comments could be “tainted” with personal bias or 
emotional appealing. Nevertheless, the above data still provides valuable 
information about ITDR practice and substantiates the theoretical evaluation 
in this chapter. Specifically, the MAP statistics indicate the general 
effectiveness of the MAP, albeit with deviations among individual cases. 
While numerous stalemated cases suggest the shortcomings of the MAP, 
those “fast runners” indicate that the mechanism is not inherently 
time-consuming. The examination of Stage 1 reports largely underpins the 
statistical analysis. Specifically, the peer inputs demonstrate that the three 
sources of transaction costs – the agency problem, the bargaining impasse, 
and the administrative burden – contribute to the protraction of MAP 
processes. That being said, the magnitude of agency and bargaining costs 
should not be overestimated given the general goodwill at the political level. 
The Electrolux case exemplifies the transaction costs of tax arbitration. On 
the one hand, the mechanism implies higher administrative costs than does a 
typical MAP process; on the other hand, it is more effective in providing 
finality for ITDR.      
6. Conclusion of the chapter 
This chapter conducted a benefit-cost analysis on the ITDR system. The 
benefit analysis indicates that a flexible and collaborative ITDR system is 
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instrumental for the maintenance of a congenial international tax (and 
investment) relationship, which is crucial to protect specialised assets in 
international investments. Such a flexible system also avoids nuisances with 
respect to legal application in the field of international taxation. Obviously, 
among various ITDR mechanisms, the MAP represents the most flexible and 
collaborative method. From the cost perspective, the MAP also represents 
the most cost-efficient option among ITDR mechanisms. In particular, the 
procedure implies the lowest administrative costs owing to its procedural 
flexibility and high level of human-asset specificity. It is true that agency and 
bargaining problems frequently cause delays to MAP processes. 
Nevertheless, the particular nature of the international tax regime, as 
explained in the benefit analysis, indicates that the risks of political 
capriciousness or bargaining hassle are relatively low and controllable in 
most MAP cases, although a certain level of bureaucracy, strategic conduct, 
and bona fide disagreements may still plague the processes. The benefit-cost 
analysis in this chapter corresponds to Altman’s explanation of the 
antilegalistic shift by the League of Nations regarding the ITDR mode. 
According to him, two major factors accounted for the shift: (a) the special 
character of international tax rules and the resulting difficulties in treaty 
application; and (b) the high procedural costs of legalistic dispute-resolution 
methods.932 
On balance, this chapter established that a MAP-based system of ITDR can 
generate the highest net benefit for the global welfare. This explains, at least 
partially, the reality that by far most tax disputes have been finalised through 
the MAP. On the other hand, given that ITDR processes are still susceptible 
to agency and bargaining risks, the MAP needs to be strengthened from both 
within and without. In particular, for those stalemated MAPs, the use of 
                                                        
932 See above, Chapter 1, Section 1.2. 
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third-party procedures, including arbitration and mediation, can help to break 
the impasses and move the processes forward. Accordingly, tax arbitration 
and mediation still play an important part in this MAP-based ITDR system, 
albeit in a supplementary manner.  
The analysis in this chapter also showed that the benefit and cost analyses 
are not entirely segregated. First, the characteristics of the international tax 
regime not only determine the choice of ITDR mode, which is the core theme 
of the benefit analysis, but also influence the cost dynamics of a given ITDR 
mode, which belongs to the cost analysis. Moreover, the notion of asset 
specificity affects both benefit and cost analyses. From the benefit 
perspective, asset specificity constitutes one of the key regime characteristics 
that, in turn, determine the mode of dispute-settlement system. This is also 
how the concept is typically used in TCE. In the cost analysis, the notion is 
more associated with the management question of how to make full use of 
specialised assets. 933  Specifically, given the human-asset specificity in 
tax-administration processes, it is desirable for competent authorities to 
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Chapter 4. Testing the Theory: Comparing ITDR with 
Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement 
1. Overview 
The preceding chapter established, through a benefit-cost analysis, that a 
MAP-based dispute-settlement system represents the most efficient mode of 
contractual governance for the international tax regime. To further test the 
validity of this proposition and the underlying arguments, it is beneficial to 
compare ITDR with trade and investment dispute resolution. Intuitively, the 
three regimes – international tax, trade and investment – have much in 
common. In particular, they all serve the role of liberalising the international 
economy, and by using very similar methods. Accordingly, one would expect 
that the arguments for a flexible and collaborative dispute-settlement system 
that were put forth in the last chapter should also apply to the trade and 
investment regimes. Nonetheless, the truth is that the latter two regimes have 
developed a legalistic method of dispute resolution that differs markedly from 
the current ITDR system. As discussed previously, writers of ITDR tend to 
take those legalistic dispute-settlement systems, particularly those under the 
WTO and ICSID, as role models for ITDR.934 Numerous commentators even 
suggest bringing tax disputes under the jurisdictions of the WTO or 
investment-arbitration fora.935  
Section 2 contains an outline of the dispute-settlement systems under trade 
and investment regimes, demonstrating the legalistic character of these 
systems as opposed to ITDR. Section 3 reveals the fundamental differences 
between the tax regime on the one hand and trade and investment regimes 
                                                        
934 See above, Chapter 1, Section 2.6. 
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on the other hand. The section also demonstrates how these differences 
affect the dispute-settlement method under those regimes. In the preceding 
chapter, the benefit-cost analysis of the ITDR system centres on several key 
dimensions of the international tax regime and the ITDR process. The 
analysis in section 3 will also proceed alongside those dimensions. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Outline of trade/investment dispute-settlement systems        
2.1 Trade dispute settlement 
The WTO is the only transnational organisation dealing with the rules of trade 
between nations.936 The goal of the WTO is to ensure smooth, predictable, 
and free flow of trade.937 The WTO was preceded by the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which started in 1947.938 In the GATT context, 
there were eight rounds of trade talks aiming at trade liberalisation.939 The 
Uruguay Round, which was the final GATT Round, established the WTO as a 
substitute for the GATT, a move that marked the biggest reform of the 
international trade regime since the end of World War Ⅱ.940 
The WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of global trade is its 
dispute-settlement mechanism, which is also regarded as a central pillar of 
the multilateral trading system.941 The old GATT also had a procedure for 
settling disputes, but this was perceived as being too soft.942 The GATT 
dispute-settlement procedure had no fixed timetable; the initiation of the 
                                                        
936 ‘WTO | About the Organization’ <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm> accessed 13 
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procedure and the rulings were easy to block; and many cases stalemated for 
a long time inconclusively.943 In this context, the Uruguay Round introduced 
for the WTO a more structured and disciplined mechanism for dispute 
settlement, with a more detailed procedure and timetable. 944  It also 
established the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to administer these 
procedures.945  
According to the Dispute settlement Understanding (DSU) under the WTO, a 
typical process of trade dispute settlement includes several phases: 
consultation, panel investigation and report, appellate review, decision 
adoption and implementation.946 
(1) Consultations. When a dispute arises between WTO Member States, 
either party may request a consultation, which is essentially a negotiation 
between the two parties with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory 
solution.947    
(2) Panel proceedings. The complaining party may request the 
establishment of a panel if: (a) the responding party does not respond 
within 10 days after the request of consultations; (b) the responding party 
does not enter into consultations within 30 days of such request; and (c) 
the consultations fail to yield a settlement within 60 days after the request 
is made.948 The request for arbitration should be made to the DSB, which 
can refuse the request only by consensus.949 Since the parties to a 
dispute also participate in decisions taken by the DSB with respect to that 
dispute, there is effectively a “right to a panel” for a complaining party.950 A 
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panel typically consists of three people, but may also be composed of five, 
if the parties so agree.951 Panellists are proposed by the Secretariat, and 
the parties may only object them for compelling reasons.952 In the event 
of disagreement over the composition of a panel, the Director-General of 
the WTO is authorised to decide the issue upon the request of either 
party.953 The panel is required to make an objective assessment of the 
facts and law.954 In normal circumstances, a panel is required to deliver a 
final report on the dispute within six months after the panel’s composition 
and terms of reference have been agreed upon, and three months in 
cases of urgency. 955  Once issued, a panel report is considered for 
adoption by the DSB.956 The report should be adopted within 60 days of 
its issuance, unless the DSB agrees otherwise or one of the parties 
notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal.957 Note that a panel procedure 
does not close the consultation between the parties, which can settle the 
case through mutual consent at any point in the dispute-settlement 
process.958 
(3) Appellate review. If one or both parties appeal a panel report, a 
three-person appellate panel will be established.959 The appeal is limited 
to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations 
developed by the panel.960 The appellate panel is normally required to 
deliver its report within 60 days from the date of appeal. 961  Such 
appellate-body report is to be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally 
accepted by the disputing parties unless the DSB decides by consensus 
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not to adopt it within 30 days after its issuance.962 
The entire process, from the establishment of a panel to the adoption of 
the panel report or appellate body report by the DSB, is to take place 
within nine months if there is no appeal, and 12 months if there is an 
appeal.963 
(4) Implementation of rulings and recommendations. Where a panel or an 
appellate body finds that a measure is inconsistent with a covered 
agreement, it shall recommend that the member concerned bring the 
measure into conformity with that agreement.964 It may also suggest ways 
for the member to implement the recommendation.965 The DSU further 
specifies detailed procedures and timetables for monitoring the 
implementation of the recommendations and rulings.966  
2.2 Investment dispute settlement  
Trans-border investment is a critical component of the world’s economy, and 
it has become common practice for countries to enter into international 
investment agreements. 967  As of April 2019, there were 2,932 bilateral 
investment treaties and 387 treaties with investment provisions.968 These 
investment agreements have two fundamental innovations as opposed to 
previous international agreements.969  First, they accord investors with a 
series of substantive rights such as fair and equitable treatment, full 
protection and security, protection against uncompensated expropriation or 
                                                        
962 ibid Article 17 (14). 
963 ibid Article 20; Guzman and Simmons (n 307) 207. 
964 WTO DSU Article 19 (1). 
965 ibid. 
966 ibid Article 21, 22. 
967 Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 231; see also Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2004) 73 
Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1527,1528. 
968 ‘International Investment Agreements Navigator’ <https://investmentpolicyhubold.unctad.org/IIA> 
accessed 18 April 2019. 
969 Franck (n 967) 1529. 
 188 
nationalisation, and national treatment.970 Second, they grant investors direct 
access to arbitration with the host states for the violation of their treaty rights 
by the host states.971 Under traditional international law, individuals normally 
had no direct cause of action against a sovereign country for the violation of 
their rights.972 
According to the dispute-settlement clause of a particular investment 
agreement, arbitration between a host state and a foreign investor may take 
place in the framework of a variety of institutions or rules.973 Practically, the 
majority of cases were brought under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, also 
known as the ICSID Convention.974 The Convention, which entered into force 
on 14 October 1966, had been ratified by 154 countries as of April 2019.975 It 
created the ICSID, which has now become the major forum for the settlement 
of investment disputes.976 The Convention also provides that ICSID awards 
are recognised as final in all Contracting States of the Convention and not 
subject to review except under the narrow conditions provided by the 
Convention itself.977 A typical ICSID procedure can be outlined as follows:  
(1) Initiation of the procedure. The procedure begins with a request for 
arbitration directed to the Secretary-General of the ICSID. 978  The 
Secretary-General will register the request unless he or she finds that the 
dispute is manifestly outside the ICSID’s jurisdiction.979 
(2) Establishment of a tribunal. Most tribunals consist of three arbitrators, 
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with the co-arbitrators appointed by each party and the president of the 
tribunal agreed on by both parties.980 If the tribunal is not constituted 
within 90 days after the registration of the request, either party may 
request the Chairman of the Administrative Council to make any 
outstanding appointments.981 
(3) Tribunal proceedings. The remainder of the procedure is quite similar 
to a typical commercial arbitration, which includes procedural meetings; 
memorials and replies; interim relief; evidence presentation; hearings; 
deliberation by the tribunal, etc.982 After the deliberation, the tribunal 
decides questions by a majority of the votes of all its members and then 
delivers an award.983 
(4) Arbitral award. ICSID awards are subject to annulment, in which an ad 
hoc committee may annul the award upon either party’s request.984 
Annulment is different from an appeal. The former is only concerned with 
the legitimacy of the procedure and not with the substantive correctness of 
the decision, whereas the latter is concerned with both.985 There are five 
grounds for annulment: (a) the tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) 
the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) there was corruption on 
the part of a member of the tribunal; (d) there was a serious departure 
from a fundamental rule of procedure; and (e) the award did not state the 
reasons on which it is based.986  
The ICSID Convention also contains the mechanism of conciliation, whereby 
parties can seek a non-binding opinion from a conciliation commission.987 
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The composition, qualification, and appointment of a conciliation commission 
are similar to those of arbitral tribunals.988 The commission is required to 
clarify the issues in dispute between the parties and to endeavour to bring 
about agreement upon mutually acceptable terms.989 The ICSID Convention 
treats conciliation and arbitration as equivalent alternatives; yet in reality, 
conciliation is rarely used.990 As of December 31, 2018, ICSID had registered 
706 cases, of which only 11 were conciliation cases.991   
For investment arbitration outside the purview of the ICSID Convention, the 
enforcement of arbitral awards may be subject to review by domestic courts, 
as is the case with most international commercial arbitration. In this regard, 
the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
also known as the New York Convention, requires courts of Contracting 
States to enforce arbitration awards, albeit subject to a limited number of 
grounds for non-enforcement.992 
2.3 The differences between the ITDR system and 
trade/investment dispute settlement systems 
From the above outline, several key differences between the ITDR system 
and trade/investment dispute settlement systems can be drawn as follows. 
2.3.1 Use of binding and non-binding methods of dispute settlement 
The three dispute-settlement systems all encourage parties to use amicable 
methods of dispute resolution, such as negotiation, consultation, and 
conciliation. Nevertheless, the real practice of trade and investment dispute 
settlement has significantly gravitated toward binding methods such as the 
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panel procedure under the WTO and the arbitration mechanism under most 
investment agreements. By contrast, there is a very low adoption of an 
arbitration clause in tax treaties. Even for those tax treaties that have 
incorporated arbitration clauses, such clauses have been significantly 
underused.993 As a result, most tax disputes have been channelled through 
the MAP.  
2.3.2 Structure of the dispute-resolution procedure  
Like tax arbitration, the DSU under the WTO and the arbitration provision of a 
few investment agreements also place non-binding solutions such as 
consultation and conciliation as a procedural prerequisite for the phase of 
arbitration or adjudication. Nonetheless, whereas tax arbitration is widely 
perceived as an integral part of the MAP, the panel procedure under 
investment and trade dispute settlement acquires much more independence 
and significance. First, whereas tax arbitration only deals with issues that fail 
to be resolved in the MAP phase, panels of trade and investment dispute 
settlement typically have a full jurisdiction over the entire cases. Second, the 
time frame for the non-binding procedure under the DSU (WTO) and several 
investment agreements is typically six months, 994  which is significantly 
shorter than that of the MAP. The longer timetable of the MAP signifies treaty 
drafters’ intention to settle most tax disputes by mutual agreement, and to use 
tax arbitration merely as the last resort or as a stimulus to the timely 
resolution of MAP cases.   
2.3.3 Methods of adjudication 
Both panel procedures under the DSU and arbitration under investment 
agreements adopt a conventional approach to adjudication, in which a 
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third-party neutral makes an independent assessment of the facts and law, 
and issues an award with full reasoning. Indeed, in the context of the ICSID 
Convention, the lack of reasoning in an arbitral award constitutes a ground for 
the annulment of the award. 995  In contrast, the OECD and UN Model 
Convention provide two options: final-offer arbitration and the conventional 
approach. Under final-offer arbitration, the panel is only allowed to choose 
between the two solutions proposed by the parties. The arbitral decision only 
states the outcome of that choice, usually a number, without specifying the 
rationale underlying the decision.996 The adoption of final-offer arbitration in 
the ITDR process indicates that the major purpose of tax arbitration is to 
break the impasse of the MAP negotiation and move the procedure forward.  
2.3.4 Review of panel decisions 
The final decisions of the DSB and investment arbitration are subject to some 
review mechanisms, either in the form of appeal review or an annulment 
procedure. Such a review mechanism is missing in tax arbitration. This also 
reflects the efficiency orientation of the ITDR system. Indeed, the existence of 
a final-offer approach in tax arbitration determines that numerous grounds for 
annulling a panel decision in the context of ICSID Convention, such as the 
lack of reasoning and the violation of due process, cannot apply to tax 
arbitration.  
2.3.5 Enforcement of panel decisions 
Both trade and investment regimes give “teeth” to their dispute-settlement 
systems by having in place enforcement mechanisms. The rules on the 
implementation of panel decisions can be found in Articles 21 and 22 of the 
DSU, Articles 53-55 of the ICSID Convention, and the New York Convention. 
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In contrast, tax arbitration does not have similar enforcing rules. The lack of 
an enforcing mechanism in tax arbitration should not be construed as a 
careless omission. Rather, it reflects the very intention of treaty drafters that 
tax arbitration is instituted as an integral part of the MAP, rather than an 
independent alternative of dispute settlement. In the EU arbitration 
convention and the arbitration provision under the UN Model Convention, 
competent authorities may even deviate by mutual agreement from an arbitral 
decision. Again, this indicates that the major purpose of tax arbitration is to 
facilitate the MAP dialogue between competent authorities.    
3. Comparison between the tax regime and trade/investment 
regimes  
On the surface, the tax regime resembles its trade and investment 
equivalents. Given these apparent similarities, there have been suggestions 
that the trade and investment dispute-settlement modes can be followed by 
the tax regime.997 The affinity between tax treaties and trade agreements has 
already been discussed by Green and several other scholars.998 In short, the 
two regimes not only have the same goal of facilitating the international flow 
of trade and investments, they also employ similar methods to achieve that 
goal.999 For example, the GATT historically prohibited the use of income-tax 
preferences as a means of subsidising exports.1000 Based on this prohibition, 
the GATT panel once struck down the income-tax rules of several 
countries.1001 Compared with the trade regime, the investment regime is 
even more closely related to its tax equivalent. As discussed previously, the 
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international tax regime forms an integral part of investment contracts.1002 
Governments frequently use taxation as a means of regulating foreign 
investments, sometimes in a manner detrimental to foreign investors’ 
interests.1003 Certain tax measures may either render a foreign investment 
uncompetitive vis-à-vis domestic investors, or undermine the economic 
function of the investment.1004 As a result, international taxation is not solely 
governed by tax treaties, but also, in one way or another, regulated by 
investment treaties.1005  Indeed, it is not unusual to see investors bring 
tax-related disputes to investment-arbitration fora.1006  
Be that as it may, from a transaction-cost perspective, there are fundamental 
differences between the tax regime and its trade and investment equivalents.     
3.1 Benefit aspects  
3.1.1 Asset specificity and ongoing relationships 
It has already been established that for regimes that feature ongoing 
relationships among parties, a flexible and collaborative dispute-settlement 
system is more instrumental in facilitating the regimes.1007 The stable and 
congenial quality of the international tax relationship was demonstrated in the 
last chapter.1008 This section will argue that, compared with the tax regime, its 
international trade/investment equivalents are more reminiscent of a 
Hobbesian world.    
3.1.1.1 International trade relationships 
In the literature of international political economics, international cooperation 
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on trade policies is most commonly modelled as a PD game. 1009  This 
indicates that the trade regime is “nastier” than its tax equivalent. Table 6 
depicts the strategic interaction between two countries regarding their trade 
policies.1010  As the PD game dictates, both countries have a dominant 
strategy of trade-protection policies, and the Nash Equilibrium is the profile of 
protection/protection, or a trade war.1011 
 
Table 6: Game of international trade policies 
 Country B 
 
Country A 
 Free trade Protection 
Free trade -1, -1 -3, 0 
Protection 0, -3 -2, -2  
Derived from Paul R. Krugman, International Economics: Theory and Policy 228-229 (Fourth 
edition, Addison-Wesley 1997). 
 
Fortunately, according to Green, international trade is not a single-play game, 
but rather a game of indefinitely repeated play.1012 In such an iterated game, 
countries can adopt retaliatory strategies, of which the best known is 
“tit-for-tat”, to elicit and maintain cooperation.1013 In this “tit-for-tat” strategy, a 
player cooperates on the first move and then mimics what the other player did 
in the previous move.1014 If one player knows that the other player has 
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adopted this strategy, it will rationally adopt the strategy that can maximise its 
long-term interests, i.e. to liberalise its trade policies.1015 However, the use of 
retaliatory strategies in trade policies may run into difficulties in practice.1016 
Among others, given the ambiguity of international trade rules, particularly the 
fact that trade policies are frequently entangled with environmental or health 
regulations, one country may not be able to discern the other’s move 
accurately as cooperation, defection, or retaliation.1017 Green proposes an 
example where Country A takes an action that it believes to be in compliance 
with relevant trade agreements.1018 Country B, however, interprets A’s action 
as a breach of an agreement, and therefore retaliates.1019 A, believing that it 
has done nothing wrong, views B’s action as a proactive violation of a treaty 
obligation and retaliates in turn.1020 The process goes on until cooperation 
breaks down.1021 In this context, a legalistic dispute-settlement mechanism 
will be helpful in managing retaliatory strategies.1022 Such a mechanism can 
interpret actions as being in compliance or noncompliance with a particular 
treaty obligation, and to sanction retaliations in cases of noncompliance.1023 It 
can also legitimise the use of retaliatory strategies; otherwise a government 
using unilateral retaliation would act as both prosecutor and judge 
simultaneously. 1024  To summarise, a legalistic dispute-settlement system 
helps prevent the escalation of trade battles.  
One might still be left with a question of what makes the international trade 
regime so nasty compared to its tax equivalent. In other words, while the 
literature of international political economics widely model trade regimes as a 
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PD game and tax regimes as a BOS game, there has yet to be a general 
theory that can explain this difference in modelling. According to TCE, asset 
specificity constitutes the pivotal contractual characteristic, which in turn 
determines the governance structure of a contract.1025  The last chapter 
further established the correlation between high asset specificity in 
international investment relationships on the one hand, and the BOS nature 
of the tax regime on the other hand.1026 It is therefore desirable to examine 
the dynamics of asset specificity in the trade regime. In this author’s view, the 
degree of asset specificity, particularly the dependence of a state upon 
foreign traders, is substantially lower in the trade regime than in its tax 
equivalent. Specifically, a foreign trader merely “preys” on the market of an 
importing country instead of investing in that country. Accordingly, that 
importing country has a lower stake in maintaining a long-term relationship 
with foreign traders.1027 Note that the distinction between a foreign trader and 
a domestic enterprise hinges upon the location of the enterprise, rather than 
the nationality of the individual owners. For trade purposes, any investment 
located in a country will be regarded by that country as a domestic enterprise, 
even if the investment is owned by foreigners, as with FDI. Conversely, 
outbound investments from a country, although owned by its nationals, are 
deemed as foreign enterprises from that country’s viewpoint. For instance, in 
the current US-China trade conflict, the US president, Mr. Donald Trump, 
urged that Apple, a company founded and owned by US investors but 
locating most of its manufacturing function in China, should return its 
production lines to the US “if it wants to avoid tariffs set to be placed on 
imports from China”.1028 By the same token, in 1970s, there was a rapid 
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increase of Japanese investors relocating their factories to the US and EU 
markets as a response to trade barriers the two regions had imposed.1029 It 
could be seen that national governments generally prioritise domestically 
located investments over foreign traders. In this sense, the PD nature of the 
trade regime and the BOS nature of the tax regime both reflect the 
dependence of countries on the investments within their territories. Countries 
use both trade and tax policies to boost their domestic investments. Trade 
policies are more extroverted, mainly targeting foreign traders, whereas tax 
policies are introverted, mostly imposed on domestic enterprises. This 
explains the distinction between the characteristics of the two regimes: one is 
more aggressive and vulnerable while the other is more stable and benign. 
The literature of international political economics tends to connect the PD 
nature of the trade regime to the factor of domestic political pressure. It is 
argued that trade protectionism arises out of the fact that national 
governments often succumb to the lobbying efforts of domestic interest 
groups, usually import-competing producers.1030 In this author’s view, such 
domestic political factors can be well contained in the theory of asset 
specificity. The lobbying power of the import-competing producers reflects the 
very fact that national governments prioritise domestic investments over 
foreign traders. It may also be useful to consider the above case of Japanese 
investors relocating their factories to the US and the EU. The factories’ 
escaping from tariffs cannot be explained by lobbying pressure on the 
invested countries, as presumably, it is difficult for foreign investors to 
exercise direct political influence on a host state. 
3.1.1.2 Relationships governed by international investment laws 
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On the surface, the tax and the investment regimes are two sides of one coin. 
As discussed previously, the ongoing nature of international tax relationships 
results from the very fact that international investments imply a high level of 
mutual dependency (or asset specificity) between investors and the invested 
states.1031 Therefore, under normal circumstances, international investment 
relationships should also be stable and amicable, at least in general. 
Nonetheless, international investment law was originated not to address 
normal circumstances, but primarily as a response to political or social 
upheavals that may imperil foreign investments.1032 Such upheavals were 
typically associated with civil unrest or ideological revolution, or both.1033 It 
follows that the mutual dependency between the investors and the host states, 
particularly the states’ dependence on foreign investments within their 
territories, could be overridden by political volatility or ideological change. 
Consequently, confiscation of foreign investments or even large-scale 
nationalisation became a real risk.1034 Therefore, international investment law, 
at least in its origin, was focused on the nastiest aspect of international 
investment relationship. This explains why the title of this section particularly 
emphasises the “relationships governed by international investment law” 
instead of generally referring to “international investment relationships”.    
In such nasty cases, foreign investors could hardly rely on the goodwill of the 
relevant states to resolve investment disputes. More often than not, the 
confrontation between a home state and a host state with respect to an 
investment dispute ended up with so-called gunboat diplomacy instead of a 
mutual agreement. For example, in 1833, US military forces were deployed in 
Buenos Aires to protect US investments during an insurrection in 
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Argentina.1035 In 1838, France landed troops at Vera Cruz, a city in Mexico, 
to recover the debts owed to its nationals by the Mexican government.1036 By 
the turn of the 20th century, joint military interventions by combined Western 
powers to protect their foreign investments became increasingly common.1037 
On the other hand, international society gradually accepted the idea of 
employing individual-state arbitration as a more peaceful alternative to the 
diplomatic or military resolution of investment disputes. Such arbitration is 
perceived as a means to depoliticise investment conflicts.1038 For example, 
owing to the proliferation of investment arbitration in the past few decades, 
“the foreign ministries of capital-exporting countries very largely have gone 
out of the claims-settlement business, and the foreign ministries of capital 
importing countries have turned the claims of foreign investors over to their 
lawyers”.1039 In this sense, while an antilegalistic dispute-settlement system 
suits regimes that feature ongoing contractual relationships between parties, 
for those regimes that are extremely vulnerable to political vagaries and 
capriciousness, a legalistic method has the merit of preventing the escalation 
of political enmity between countries. As discussed above (Section 3.1.1.1), 
the legalistic method is also helpful in preventing the escalation of trade 
disputes. Both cases support the proposition that legalistic methods of 
dispute settlement are more instrumental in regimes that are surrounded by 
political capriciousness and volatility. 
The difference between international tax relationships and the relationships 
governed by international investment law is reflected in the treatment of tax 
matters by many investment agreements.1040 Specifically, while tax matters 
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are generally excluded from investment agreements, this exception does not 
apply to expropriation.1041 Accordingly, a tax dispute is normally subject to an 
antilegalistic method of dispute resolution, unless it involves confiscation of 
an investment that risks terminating the ongoing investment relationship. The 
distinction between expropriatory and non-expropriatory tax measures and 
their implications are also reflected in the case law of investment arbitration. 
In Yukos Universal Ltd (Isle of Man) v Russian Federation (Yukos), the 
dispute appears to be a transfer-pricing issue: the Russian government had 
undertaken an investigation of Yukos’ alleged tax avoidance, and was later 
challenged by the company’s foreign shareholders.1042 Nonetheless, the real 
issue between the investors and the state does not concern the proper 
calculation of Yukos’ profits that should accrue to Russia. Rather, it was about 
the arbitrary and harsh manner in which the Russian Government carried out 
its tax-auditing measures.1043 The Tribunal holds that “the primary objective 
of the Russian Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt 
Yukos and appropriate its valuable assets”.1044 Otherwise, “Yukos, its officers 
and employees, and its properties and facilities, would not have been treated, 
and mistreated, as in fact they were”.1045 The tribunal upheld the claimants’ 
position. In contrast, the tribunal in EnCana Corp v Republic of Ecuador 
(EnCana) dismissed the investor’s claim.1046  The case arose out of an 
Ecuadorian reform to its tax regime.1047  Prior to the reform, foreign oil 
companies operating in Ecuador, including the claimant, were entitled to 
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refunds for VAT paid on inputs, like other exporting companies in the 
country.1048 The reform denied those foreign oil companies such refunding 
rights. 1049  The claimant alleged that the reform amounted to an 
expropriation.1050 Yet the court held that although taxation often leads to the 
loss of profit or other income, only those tax measures that are “extraordinary, 
punitive in amount or arbitrary in their incidence” could be considered as 
expropriation. 1051  The change in the Ecuadorian VAT laws was not 
expropriatory because it had not “brought the companies to a standstill”, and 
the claimant subsidiaries “were nonetheless able to continue to function 
profitably and to engage in the normal range of activities”.1052 It could be 
seen that investment arbitrators are confident in claiming jurisdictions over 
tax-related cases only where ongoing relationships between the parties have 
been fundamentally disrupted by a state’s action. This is in line with the 
proposition made previously: litigation is far more likely to occur when there is 
no ongoing relationship between the parties or where such a relationship has 
definitively terminated.1053  
A potential challenge to the above reasoning is related to a recent 
development in the investment regime: modern international investment 
agreements not only concern expropriation, but also impose upon host states 
a higher level of obligations such as fair and equitable treatment of investors. 
Many investment agreements also contain a so-called “umbrella clause”, 
whereby contractual obligations agreed in investment contracts between host 
states and foreign investors can be elevated into treaty obligations.1054 
Essentially, these new developments extend the scope of investment 
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protection and the attendant investment arbitration to those disputes that are 
relatively less fatal to investor-state relationships. In this sense, it seems that 
a legalistic method of dispute settlement also applies to cases where an 
ongoing relationship still survives. The response to this challenge is twofold. 
First, the investment dispute-settlement system embraced an arbitration 
mechanism at its early phase of development, when confiscation of foreign 
investments was a major concern for the then circle of international 
investment law. Once a particular institutional arrangement has been 
established, its evolution may be subject to path dependence. Second, the 
past few years do have witnessed a significant backlash against investment 
arbitration as well as investment law for their regidity and harshness. Several 
members of the ICSID such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, etc. even 
withdrew or threatened to withdraw from the regime, manifesting how 
legalistic methods of dispute settlement may frustrate investment 
relationships.1055 Among those criticisms of investment arbitration, a major 
complaint is that the mechanism unduly restricts the freedom of states to 
promote and implement investment policies that are bona fide and less 
destructive.1056 Meanwhile, calls are increasingly being made for the use of 
more flexible and collaborative methods in resolving investment disputes. As 
one commentator writes, now is the right time to explore some low-cost, 
informal, expeditious, party-friendly, private, and non-disruptive ways, in 
which “foreign investors and ‘host’ states can resolve differences while 
continuing their relationships with minimal disruption”.1057       
3.1.2 Treaty application 
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natives/> accessed 27 June 2018. 
1056 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 594) 11. 
1057 Leon E Trakman, ‘The ICSID under Siege’ (2013) 45 Cornell Int’l LJ 603, 657. 
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As discussed previously, a particular issue of legalistic dispute settlement in 
the ITDR context is the difficulty of treaty application.1058 To recapitulate, 
most tax treaties are bilateral; they overlay on domestic tax laws, functioning 
as a law of limitation. This bilateral and non-substantive nature of tax treaties 
causes considerable difficulties in treaty interpretation, and thereby limits the 
prospect of developing a coherent body of jurisprudence on international tax 
law through legalistic adjudication.1059 In contrast, both trade and investment 
regimes have respectively developed substantive international rules that are 
largely independent from, and mostly superior to, national laws.  
Under the trade regime, the most overarching institutional arrangement is the 
WTO law, principally the WTO Agreement.1060 It consists of a short basic 
agreement and numerous other agreements included in the annexes to the 
basic agreement. 1061  Most substantive WTO laws can be found in the 
agreements contained in Annex 1. 1062  In short, four basic groups of 
substantive rules can be distinguished: (a) rules of non-discrimination; (b) 
rules on market access; (c) rules on unfair trade; and (d) rules on the balance 
between trade liberalisation and public interests. 1063  With regard to the 
relationship between national law and WTO law, Article XVI of the WTO 
agreement states: “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in 
the annexed Agreements.”1064  
Similar to the trade regime, international investment law has also evolved a 
common set of substantive rules on the treatment of foreign investments. 
Such rules can be traced back to state practice in the late 18th and 19th 
                                                        
1058 See above, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2. 
1059 ibid. 
1060 Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Third edition., University Press 2013) 35, 40.  
1061 ibid 40–41.  
1062 ibid 41.  
1063 ibid 35.  
1064 Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement; see also ibid 63.  
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centuries, when major Western powers held the position that their nationals 
should not be subjected to a standard of treatment in a host state that fell 
below a certain international minimum, even if that minimum standard is 
preferable to the treatment accorded by the host states to their own 
nationals.1065 This idea of a minimum standard was later developed into 
customary international law, and more recently embodied in the network of 
investment treaties. 1066  To be sure, the interplay between the relevant 
domestic rules of a host state and the applicable rules of international 
investment law is more complicated than the case of trade-dispute resolution. 
Specifically, whereas it is generally safe for WTO panels to place their legal 
analysis solely on the international plane, tribunals of investment arbitration 
must always be aware of the relevance of municipal law to the case at 
hand. 1067  In most cases the applicable substantive law in investment 
arbitration combines international law and the law of the host state.1068 
Nonetheless, in the event of any conflict between domestic law and 
international investment law, the latter prevails.1069 
3.1.3 Power structure between disputing parties  
As discussed previously, another hurdle to the implementation of a legalistic 
method of ITDR is the concern about double non-taxation.1070 Specifically, 
while the contractual incompleteness of the international tax regime may be 
exploited by both taxpayers and tax authorities, the taxpayers typically gain 
an advantage in the base appropriation as they know their own tax 
arrangements and business details better than tax administrations. 1071 
                                                        
1065 Johnson Jr and Gimblett (n 1032) 650–651. 
1066 ibid; Dolzer and Schreuer (n 594) 3–8. 
1067 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 594) 288–293; Jan Asmus Bischoff, ‘Conflict of Laws and International 
Investment Arbitration’ 7 European International Arbitration Review 143. 
1068 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 594) 293. 
1069 J Christopher Thomas and Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, ‘Applicable Law under International Investment 
Treaties’ (2014) 26 SAcLJ 975, 985–986; Dolzer and Schreuer (n 594) 293. 
1070 See above, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2.3.  
1071 See above, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2.3.  
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Consequently, states may fear that a legalistic method of ITDR may become 
a sword, rather than a mere shield, for the taxpayers: they may take 
advantage of the wording of tax treaties and “poach” the fiscal base of the 
states. 
In contrast, individuals are somewhat more “innocent” and vulnerable in trade 
and investment regimes, where the first move of contractual appropriation 
usually lies with the states. As discussed above, trade barriers are more often 
launched by countries to favour their domestic enterprises, particularly 
import-competing producers, rather than as a countermeasure against 
misconduct of foreign traders. It is true that trade barriers are frequently 
imposed in the name of important societal interests such as environmental 
protection or public security. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for countries to 
use such public interests merely as a shelter to hide their arbitrary or 
discriminatory trade restrictions.1072  
Turning to investment regimes, the “first move” privilege in base appropriation 
lies even more clearly with the state. Dolzer and Schreuer discuss the risk 
allocation between investors and states as follows: 
Once these negotiations are concluded and the investor’s resources are sunk 
into the project, the dynamics of influence and power tend to shift in favour of 
the host state. The central political risk which henceforth arises for the foreign 
investor lies in a change of position of the host government that would alter 
the balance of burdens, risks, and benefits.1073 
Therefore, legalistic methods of dispute settlement in trade and investment 
regimes provide business communities a shield against political 
capriciousness.  
                                                        
1072 Appellate Body Report, US—shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 Occtober 1998), para. 186; Appellate 
Body Report, US—Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996), p.28-30; see also Bossche (n 1060) 
580–582.  
1073 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 594) 22. 
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3.2 Cost aspects            
3.2.1 Strategic actions and bargaining impasses 
As demonstrated previously, the key characteristics of a certain regime not 
only determine the choice of dispute-settlement mode for the regime in 
general sense, but also affect the specific cost dynamics of a chosen 
mode.1074 Specifically, the BOS nature of the tax regime indicates that the 
ITDR process is relatively less vulnerable to the agency problem, which 
usually takes the form of procedural abuse or other opportunistic actions by 
competent authorities.1075 It is true that bona fide disagreements on a case 
may still cause a bargaining problem between the parties. Nevertheless, a 
flexible and problem-solving attitude from the parties will be of substantial 
help in overcoming bargaining impasses.  
In contrast, given the nature of trade and investment regimes, as discussed 
above, processes of trade/investment dispute settlement are more vulnerable 
to strategic considerations and bargaining impasses. The creation of 
investment arbitration stemmed from the very fact that the use of diplomatic 
channels in resolving investment disputes in early times usually culminated in 
hostile confrontation or even gunboat diplomacy. Under modern investment 
regimes, while the ICSID convention and a few BITs provide consultation and 
conciliation as alternative paths to investment arbitration in dispute resolution, 
these antilegalistic mechanisms are rarely used. Considering that 
antilegalistic methods are less expensive – in terms of administrative costs – 
than legalistic methods, the underuse of consultation and conciliation 
presumably reflects users’ concerns about the risk of procedural abuse and 
bargaining impasses in the process.   
                                                        
1074 See above, Chapter 3, Section 6.  
1075 See above, Chapter 3, Section 4.5. 
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In the WTO context, while consultation is a compulsory requirement for all 
WTO cases, around 60% of the disputes were ultimately channelled through 
the panel procedure.1076 An experienced practitioner in WTO law observes 
that the consultation process is subject to strategic actions.1077 Members in 
consultations usually do not admit error or guilt, and they often withhold some 
key information during the negotiation until the panel procedure begins.1078 
Other writers have researched the bargaining problems in the WTO 
consultation process.1079 
Given the political volatility surrounding the trade/investment dispute 
settlement systems, a legalistic method is more desirable in breaking 
procedural impasses and enhancing the robustness of the system.  
3.2.2 Technicality of issue areas and human-asset specificity 
Compared with the consultation process in trade/investment dispute 
settlement, the MAP implies not only fewer risks of strategic sabotage and 
bargaining impasses, but also lower administrative costs. As covered 
previously, tax administrations and the competent authorities thereunder have 
gained specialised knowledge and experience on ITDR matters, which are 
highly technical and complicated. Consequently, there is a quasi-rent to have 
competent authorities resolving tax disputes initially instead of having a third 
party involved from the outset.1080  
By contrast, both the technicality and complexity of disputed issues and the 
specialised human assets of the competent authorities are far less prominent 
                                                        
1076 ‘WTO | Dispute Settlement - Understanding WTO Dispute Settlement Statistics’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm> accessed 29 January 2019. 
1077 Gary N Horlick, ‘The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution: A Private Practitioner’s View’, 
Int’l L. (HeinOnline 1998) 690. 
1078 ibid. 
1079 Guzman and Simmons (n 307); Dukgeun Ahn, Jihong Lee and Jee-Hyeong Park, ‘Understanding 
Non-Litigated Disputes in the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2013) 47 Journal of World Trade 985; 
Marc L Busch and Eric Reinhardt, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in 
GATT/WTO Disputes’ (2000) 24 Fordham Int’l LJ 158. 
1080 See above, Chapter 3, Section 4.4.2. 
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in the context of trade/investment dispute settlement. In terms of technicality 
and complexity, tax disputes are “one of the most specialized and technically 
demanding fields in American jurisprudence”.1081 One commentator further 
notes that “the financial and economic matters that dominate the Internal 
Revenue Code are as incomprehensible as the scientific aspects inherent in 
many environmental, food and drug, or energy law issues.”1082 With respect 
to the element of specialised human assets, the role of tax administrations in 
base allocation at the micro level can hardly find a counterpart in trade and 
investment regimes. In particular, regulations of international investments is 
ordinarily in the hands of the host states, and the home states’ involvement in 
such regulation is quite limited. It follows that the specialised language that 
develops between competent authorities in tax regimes does not exist 
between authorities in investment or trade regimes. It is true that states 
frequently hide their investment/trade restrictive measures under the veneer 
of taxation, environmental protection, or other technical issues. 1083 
Nevertheless, investment/trade authorities do not necessarily possess the 
expertise in such technical issues, since they do not routinely handle 
regulations concerning environment, taxation, food, health, etc. Therefore, the 
economic value of having those authorities to handle trade/investment 
disputes in the first place is discounted as opposed to the case of ITDR.    
3.2.3 Frequency of disputes 
The frequency of disputes has two major implications. First, a high frequency 
of disputes leads to heavy caseloads, which, in turn, spurs the need for more 
expeditious and cost-efficient methods of dispute resolution. For example, 
one of the major driving forces of the ADR movement in the US was the 
                                                        
1081 ‘Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee’ (1990) 70 
<https://www.fjc.gov/content/report-federal-courts-study-committee-0>. 
1082 Kristin E Hickman, ‘The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference’ (2005) 
90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537, 1599. 
1083 Walde and Kolo (n 580) 424–425; Bossche (n 1060) 850–851. 
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heavy caseloads jamming the court system. 1084  Second, recurrent 
experience of dispute settlement by competent authorities generates 
specialised human assets, which is an important procedural capital for 
dispute resolution.      
The frequency of tax disputes is strikingly higher than that for trade and 
investment. For illustration, since 1995, around 570 disputes have been 
brought to the WTO. 1085  From 1972 to 2018, around 700 cases were 
registered under the ICSID. 1086  By contrast, in 2015 alone, the OECD 
members reported 2,509 new MAP cases. 1087  In that year, the WTO 
registered 13 new cases1088 and ICSID 521089. Note that the WTO consists of 
164 members (as of 29 July 2016),1090 and the ICSID 154 members,1091 
whereas the OECD MAP statistics only cover 35 jurisdictions. The case 
inventory of OECD countries is even more striking, standing at 6,176.1092 
Among those countries, Switzerland reported an inventory of 328 MAP cases 
at the end of 2015; Italy reported 319; France, 566; Belgium, 632; the US, 998; 
and Germany, 1,147.1093 It is difficult to imagine how such a caseload can be 
handled were every tax dispute resolved in a formalised, case-by-case 
manner as with arbitration. 
4. Conclusion of the chapter 
This chapter compared ITDR with trade/investment dispute settlement, not 
                                                        
1084 Jethro K Lieberman and James F Henry, ‘Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement’ (1986) 53 The University of Chicago law review 424, 432. 
1085 ‘WTO | Dispute Settlement - Dispute Settlement Activity — Some Figures’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm> accessed 3 October 2019. 
1086 ICSID (n 991) 7. 
1087 ‘Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics (2006-2015)’ (n 3). 
1088 ‘WTO | Dispute Settlement - Dispute Settlement Activity — Some Figures’ (n 1085). 
1089 ICSID (n 991) 7. 
1090 ‘WTO | About the Organization’ (n 936). 
1091 ‘Database of ICSID Member States’ 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> accessed 3 October 
2019. 
1092 ‘Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics (2006-2015)’ (n 3). 
1093 ibid. 
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based on pure legal terms as is the case in the orthodox literature, but on the 
institutional characteristics of the regimes and the disputes that are compared. 
The comparison proceeded along the line of the benefit-cost framework 
developed in the preceding chapter. From the benefit perspective, the chapter 
demonstrated that in trade and investment regimes, both the ongoing 
character of investor (trader)-state relationships and the incompleteness of 
the regimes are less prominent. It follows that a flexible and collaborative 
dispute-settlement system becomes less instrumental to such regimes. On 
contrary, the Hobbesian nature of trade/investment regimes warrants a 
legalistic method of dispute settlement so as to depoliticise the disputes 
arising from those regimes. Moreover, given the substantive nature of trade 
and investment law, the two regimes particularly lend themselves to the 
legalistic method.  
From the cost perspective, the chapter demonstrated that negotiation yields 
the greatest cost-efficiency in tax regimes, in contrast to the trade/investment 
regimes. The preceding chapter attributed the cost-efficiency of the MAP 
mechanism to several factors, including the political stability of the tax regime, 
the procedural flexibility, and the high level of human-asset specificity in ITDR 
processes.1094 This chapter demonstrated that trade/investment regimes are 
less stable than the tax regime, and that trade/investment dispute-settlement 
processes imply a lower level of human-asset specificity than does the ITDR 
process. The chapter found no significant difference in procedural flexibility 
between the MAP on the one hand and the consultation procedure under 
trade/investment dispute settlement on the other hand. Nevertheless, the 
high frequency of tax disputes indicates that the benefit of procedural 
flexibility is more valuable for the tax regime than for the trade/investment 
regimes.   
                                                        
1094  See above, Chapter 3, Section 4.  
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Therefore, the comparative study in this chapter strengthens the benefit-cost 
analysis in the last chapter. Specifically, while the preceding chapter derived 
the MAP-based dispute-settlement system as the optimal governance 
structure in light of the key characteristics of the tax regime and tax disputes, 
this chapter further demonstrates the pertinence of those key characteristics 
in determining the choice of dispute-settlement mode not only for the tax 
regime, but also for the trade/investment regimes.  
 
 213 
Chapter 5. Economising the MAP Process 
1. Overview 
This chapter seeks to explore measures to economise the MAP process 
based on the theoretical framework developed in the preceding chapters. 
While the orthodox literature has left an impression that deficiencies of the 
MAP can only be cured by the adoption of an arbitration mechanism, this 
chapter will demonstrate that the MAP can also be strengthened from within. 
Section 2 explores possible ways to economise the agency costs, bargaining 
costs, and administrative costs of the MAP process, respectively. Section 3 
focuses on two holistic issues about the MAP that encompass more than one 
type of transaction costs. Section 4 contains an assessment of BEPS Action 
14, which primarily concerns the strengthening of the MAP mechanism. 
Several of the proposed measures have already been raised in the MEMAP 
and were recently confirmed in Action 14. Nevertheless, this chapter provides 
a theoretical underpinning for those proposals.     
2. Measures of economising the transaction costs of the MAP 
process   
2.1 Economising agency costs 
2.1.1 Mitigating interest divergence 
The agency problem in the MAP process mainly results from the fact that the 
departmental interests of tax administrations, to which the competent 
authority function is customarily affiliated, are unaligned with taxpayers’ 
interests in preventing double taxation. Altman recommends substituting the 
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department of justice for the tax department in performing the 
competent-authority function. 1095 The argument is that the department of 
justice is not in charge of revenue collection, thus is more impartial than tax 
administrations in handling tax disputes.1096 In the US, Department of Justice 
does occasionally represent the government in some domestic tax-litigation 
procedures. 1097  Nonetheless, in this author’s opinion, Altman’s 
recommendation has three substantial drawbacks. First, the proposed 
institutional change would be too drastic to solicit any political consensus in 
the foreseeable future. In particular, tax administrations that are currently in 
charge of MAP affairs would have a vested interest in perpetuating the status 
quo. Second, as discussed previously, there are efficiency advantages for tax 
administrations to handle tax disputes in the first place. 1098  Third, tax 
administrations also play an important role in enacting tax policies and 
negotiating tax treaties.1099 Their experience in handling tax disputes would 
be of great value in performing the policy-making duties.      
Therefore, a limited independence of the competent authority is 
recommended. Specifically, while the competent-authority function may still 
be delegated to tax administrations, the specific department undertaking such 
function should be independent from the audit function of the tax 
administrations.1100 A related issue is the performance assessment of a 
competent authority and its staff members. 1101  To ensure competent 
authorities’ autonomy, their performance in relation to MAP programs should 
not be measured by the amount of sustained audit adjustment or tax revenue, 
but by the extent to which the treaty goal of eliminating double taxation is 
                                                        
1095 Altman (n 29) 210. 
1096 ibid. 
1097 ibid. 
1098 See above, Chapter 3, Section 4.4.2. 
1099 ‘Update of the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and 
Developing Countries’ (UN 2018) 3 
<https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/publications/manual-bilateral-tax-treaties-update-2019.html>. 
1100 OECD, ‘MEMAP’ (n 1) 41 (Section 5.2). 
1101 ibid 41-42 (Section 5.3). 
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achieved.1102 In this regard, proper performance indicators may include the 
time taken to resolve a case, case outcomes, the peers and taxpayers’ 
feedback, etc.1103 
2.1.2 Monitoring the MAP process 
To constrain the risk of opportunism in an agency relationship, it is usually in 
the principal’s interest to monitor the agent’s conduct. Several ways of 
monitoring the MAP process can be envisaged.  
(1) Scrutiny by taxpayers. The most straightforward way of monitoring a 
MAP process is to increase the involvement of the taxpayer concerned in 
the process. The issue of taxpayer participation will be analysed 
separately below (Section 3.1), as it affects not only agency costs, but also 
bargaining and administrative costs of the MAP process.  
(2) Scrutiny by states. Given the BOS nature of the international tax 
regime, states also have an interest in monitoring their competent 
authorities in relation to the MAP process. In particular, domestic courts 
can play an important role in monitoring the process. Currently, the issue 
of judicial review of the MAP by domestic courts is mainly associated with 
the accessibility of the procedure. If a competent authority denies a 
taxpayer’s request for MAP assistance, is the taxpayer entitled to judicial 
remedy? While the question involves the legal status of tax treaties in 
domestic law, a question beyond the scope of this thesis,1104 suffice it to 
point out that national states increasingly accept the idea of bringing the 
issue of MAP access under judicial scrutiny.1105 As mentioned previously, 
the Danish Western High Court once overruled the Danish 
                                                        
1102 ibid. 
1103 ibid. 
1104 See Farah (n 174) 12–23; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, ‘Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of 
Individuals’ (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082; cited by Paul C Rooney and Nelson Suit, ‘Competent 
Authority’ (1996) 49 The Tax Lawyer 675, 690. 
1105 Carolis (n 9) 395. 
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competent-authority’s denial of access to the MAP in three cases.1106 In 
2015, the Italian Court of Cassation decided in two related cases that it 
has jurisdiction over disputes on MAP access.1107 These two cases will be 
elaborated further subsequently (Section 2.1.4).  
That the judicial review of the MAP is mostly related to the access stage of 
the procedure raises a further question of whether such judicial scrutiny 
can be extended to cover the entire MAP process. This involves the 
structuring of the MAP, which will be analysed subsequently (Section 
2.1.4).      
(3) Scrutiny by international organisations. A fundamental deficiency of 
states’ scrutiny of the MAP process is that each state can only monitor its 
own competent authority, while the MAP process is by nature a joint 
endeavour between the competent authorities of treaty partners. 
Therefore, it becomes desirable for states to delegate part of their 
monitoring authorities to an international organisation. The role of 
international institutions in ITDR will be discussed in conjunction with the 
evaluation of BEPS Action 14 (Section 4).    
(4) Checks and balances between competent authorities. As discussed 
previously, both competent authorities in a MAP process may engage in 
opportunistic actions. However, it is not necessarily the case that they 
shirk simultaneously and symmetrically. More often than not, the 
defending competent authority has a greater incentive to block an ITDR 
process. In this situation, the party with good faith may exert some 
monitoring pressure upon the other side. This mechanism of checks and 
                                                        
1106 See above, Chapter 3, Section 5.3.2. 
1107 Cassazione Civile, SS.UU, ordinanze 19/06/2015 n. 12759 and 12760; see also Daniele de Carolis, 
‘Jurisdiction of the Italian Tax Judge on Administrative Acts Denying Access to the Arbitration 
Convention on Transfer Pricing: Towards a Dispute Resolution Procedure Ever More Independent of 
State Control’ (2016) 44 Intertax 180, 180. However, the Peer Review Report on Italy does not mention 
this case.   
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balances is particularly useful regarding the accessibility of the MAP. If the 
first competent authority denies access, a mechanism is needed whereby 
the taxpayer concerned can rely on the second competent authority to 
consult the first on the veto, or the taxpayer can directly resubmit the MAP 
request to that second competent authority.     
2.1.3 Mitigating information asymmetry 
Another major contributor to the agency problem is information 
asymmetry,1108 of which there are two types. The first is related to the 
information about the task assigned to the agent. If the agent is the only party 
who knows the requirements of the task, they would possess too much 
freedom to decide how the task should be performed, and are thus more 
likely to perpetrate opportunistic behaviours. As discussed previously, while it 
is legitimate to accord competent authorities with some discretion in deciding 
the admissibility of MAP requests, too much leeway in this regard may lead to 
arbitrary limitation of access to the MAP. 1109  One way to mitigate this 
asymmetry of task information is for national governments to publish specified 
MAP guidelines, including detailed criteria for the admissibility of MAP 
requests, on public platforms. The second type of information asymmetry is 
related to the information on the agent’s performance. Individual taxpayers 
may have difficulty measuring competent authorities’ performance on MAP 
processes. To address this issue, some reporting and data-collecting 
mechanisms are needed to verify competent authorities’ performance.       
2.1.4 Structuring the MAP process 
As discussed previously, a particular difficulty of measuring and monitoring 
competent authorities’ MAP performance is related to the joint nature of a 
                                                        
1108 See above, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.  
1109 See above, Chapter 3, Section 4.2.1. 
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typical MAP process.1110 The peer-review reports also reveal that significant 
delays mostly occur during the intermediate stages of the MAP process.1111 
Therefore, it is desirable to have a structured MAP, so that not only the entire 
MAP process, but also its key intermediate stages, will be regulated by a 
predetermined timetable. While the notion of a structured MAP has received 
very scant attention from academics, 1112  its value has already been 
recognised in the policy circle. For instance, the MEMAP recommends an 
ideal timeline for a typical MAP process.1113 A more concise and clarified 
timetable can be seen in Canada’s MAP Program Report published by the 
Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA, the Canadian competent authority).  
 
Table 7: Structured timeframe for a MAP 
Stage Action Target Time Frame 
Initiation of MAP 
request by taxpayer 
and preparation of 
position paper for 
foreign tax 
administration 
Acknowledgement to taxpayer 
and request for additional 
information if submission is 
incomplete 
Within 30 days after 
receipt of a complete 
MAP request from 
taxpayer 
Letter to foreign tax 
administration advising of the 
request and that CRA will send 
details of its position once the 
adjustments have been 
reviewed 
Within 30 days after 
receipt of a complete 
MAP request from 
taxpayer 
                                                        
1110 ibid. 
1111 See above, Chapter 3, Section 5.3.5.1. 
1112 Cai and Zhang (n 12). 
1113 OECD, ‘MEMAP’ (n 1) Annex 1, 45. 
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Review of information received 
from field, and preparation and 
submission of position paper to 
other competent authority 
Within 6 months after 
receipt of a complete 
MAP request from 
taxpayer 
Evaluation by other 
competent authority 
Other competent authority’s 
response to CRA position 
paper 
Within 6 months from 
submission of a position 
paper 
Negotiations with other 
competent authority 
and conclusion of a 
mutual agreement 
Face-to-face meeting  and/or 
exchange of correspondence 
or phone conversations, as 
required , to reach a mutual 
agreement 
Within 24 months after 
receipt of a complete 
MAP request from 
taxpayer 
CRA, MAP Program Report 2012-2013, 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/migration/cra-arc/tx/nnrsdnts/cmp/mp_rprt_
2012-2013-eng.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018) 
 
As Table 7 shows, the CRA timeframe identifies three intermediate milestones 
between the starting and ending dates of a typical MAP process: the date of 
deciding the admissibility of a MAP request, the date of presenting a position 
paper, and the date of presenting a responding paper by the other competent 
authority. In this way, the MAP process is divided into four stages: initiation of 
a MAP, preparation of a position paper, evaluation of the position (by the other 
competent authority), and negotiation. The target timeframes for the stages 
are one month, five months, six months, and 12 months, respectively. 
Table 8 records the actual time spent on average on each of the above stages 
in comparison with the target timeline. Of the four stages, while the 
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negotiation stage still remains a joint endeavour, the other three are solely 
conducted by one of the competent authorities. It follows that any undue 
delay occurred in these three stages can easily be traced to an individual 
competent authority. Accordingly, a structured MAP process enhances the 
measurability of the process.  
  










3.47 4.27 6.32 8.58 
Foreign- 
initiated 
3.59 8.30 2.20 16.81 
Target 1.00 5.00 6.00 12.00 
CRA, MAP Program Report 2012-2013, 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/cra-arc/migration/cra-arc/tx/nnrsdnts/cmp/mp_rprt_
2012-2013-eng.pdf (accessed 1 February 2018) 
 
The idea of structuring the MAP process provides some economic insights to 
the judicial review of the procedure. This can be illustrated using the two 
Italian cases mentioned above.1114 The cases were brought by two Italian 
companies, both of which belonged to the same international group. The 
Italian tax administration made a transfer-pricing adjustment against the 
                                                        
1114 Cassazione Civile, SS.UU, ordinanze 19/06/2015 n. 12759 and 12760; see also Carolis (n 1107) 
180.  
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group. In relation to the adjustment, the two companies submitted two 
requests to the Ministry of Finance (the competent authority in Italy) for MAP 
assistance under the EU Arbitration Convention. These requests were denied 
by the Ministry, and the two companies challenged the Ministry’s decision 
through separate proceedings before the Tax Commission (the court of first 
instance for tax matters). Appearing before the court in both proceedings, the 
Ministry objected to the court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that its decision on 
the admissibility of a MAP request was considered a phase of a MAP under 
the EU Arbitration Convention, and therefore was an international process 
subject to the rules of international treaties. The Ministry further contended 
that domestic jurisdiction over the MAP could amount to an undue 
interference with state sovereignty and an infringement of the principle of 
state immunity. The Court rejected the Ministry’s argument by making a 
distinction between, on the one hand, the assessment of the admissibility of a 
MAP request by the Italian competent authority and, on the other hand, the 
subsequent mutual-agreement procedure. The Court reasoned that while the 
phase of mutual negotiation under the MAP involved a confrontation between 
competent authorities, involving the state’s prominent interests and therefore 
subject to international law, the assessment of the admissibility of a MAP 
request was merely a preliminary phase of the MAP that fell completely within 
national law. 1115   
While the Court took a brave step to assert jurisdiction over disputes on the 
accessibility of the MAP, there is still substantial room for the Court to improve 
its reasoning.1116 First, while the Court based its decision on the distinction 
between an international procedure and the preliminary stage of the 
procedure, it did not spell out the grounds or the criteria for such 
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distinction. 1117  As an illustration, one way for an obstinate competent 
authority to circumvent the court’s ruling is to first admit a MAP request but 
then refuse to take any further action. Should this “post-admission inaction” 
be identified as having entered the international arena, or is it still within “the 
preliminary phase” of an international procedure?1118 Second, the court didn’t 
convincingly explain why an international procedure can preclude domestic 
review. The Court referred to the concept of state interest, reasoning that the 
confrontation between competent authorities may involve states’ prominent 
interests and thereby preclude domestic judicial intervention. However, 
disputes with international implications have been routinely decided by 
domestic courts, although they may by all means involve vital national 
interests. 1119  Furthermore, if the court is right in asserting that states’ 
prominent interests are at stake in the confrontation between competent 
authorities, they should also be at stake during the entire MAP process, 
including the so-called preliminary phase of the MAP.1120 
In this author’s view, a practical reason for many domestic courts to refrain 
from intervening in MAP cases is because of the joint character of MAP 
negotiations. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a domestic court to measure 
the performance of its fellow competent authority in a MAP.1121 However, the 
idea of structuring the MAP makes it clear that at least the stage of initiating a 
MAP is solely the responsibility of the first competent authority, and is thus 
measurable from the standpoint of the fellow court of that authority.1122 
Going further, not just the denial of MAP access, but also the inaction or 
undue delay during the presentation of a position (or responding) paper can 
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also be assessed by respective domestic courts. 1123  Therefore, the 
above-mentioned tactic of “admitting (a MAP request) without proceeding” by 
the first competent authority can become a cause of action for the taxpayer 
concerned. By the same token, the implementation of MAP agreements is 
also amenable to judicial review, as the obligations of each competent 
authority regarding the elimination of double taxation has been delineated in 
the agreement. Article 25 (2) of the OECD Model also confirms that MAP 
agreements should be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the 
domestic law of the Contracting States. The OECD Sample Procedure further 
notes that failure by tax authorities to implement MAP agreements constitutes 
a ground for the taxpayers concerned to seek relief through domestic legal 
remedies.1124  It should be noted that the judicial remedy regarding the 
implementation of a MAP agreement may involve judicial scrutiny of the 
agreement itself, particularly when an agreement incorporates a decision of 
tax arbitration. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.1125    
2.2 Economising bargaining costs 
2.2.1 Side payments and issue linkage 
As explained previously, the bargaining problem mainly stems from 
distributive conflict between the parties.1126 In particular, resolution of a single 
MAP case usually assumes an “all-or-nothing” character. One way of 
mitigating this distributive conflict is to use the method of issue linkage, 
whereby the parties engage in simultaneous discussion of two or more issues 
for joint settlement.1127 At the policy level, the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiation is a good example of showing how issue linkage facilitates trade 
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negotiations.1128 In this round of negotiation, while developing countries such 
as Brazil and India were reluctant to discuss service-sector liberalisation and 
intellectual property rights as part of the Uruguay Round, they eventually 
agreed to participate because they expected their agricultural and textile 
products to be accepted by European states. An inverted trade-off incentive 
also existed for European states. 1129  In a similar vein, two competent 
authorities may elect to resolve a number of MAP cases together so as to 
create a scenario of “case-linkage”. This method is related to the topic of 
package deal, which will be further elaborated below (Section 3.2). 
Competent authorities can also establish a linkage between the MAP and the 
APA in relation to a particular taxpayer. For example, two authorities may 
decide, with the consent of the taxpayer concerned, not only to settle a 
transfer-pricing dispute of the past auditing years, but also to agree on 
transfer-pricing terms for the taxpayer in respect of future years. In this way, 
the two authorities transformed the dispute resolution process from a 
zero-sum game to a problem-solving scenario. In a few peer-review reports, 
peers particularly recommended the use of a mechanism that MAP 
agreements can be applied to future years where the facts and circumstances 
of the case have remained the same.1130  
Related to issue linkage is another method called side payment, whereby one 
party who stands in an advantageous position in a transaction elects to offer 
the other party a payment that per se is not part of that transaction.1131 Both 
side payment and issue linkage create a possibility that a party 
disadvantaged in a transaction may receive some compensation from outside 
that particular transaction. One commentator articulates the closeness 
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between the two methods: “For international negotiation, side payments could 
be facilitated by linking one type of agreement with another”.1132 Nonetheless, 
side payment is broader than issue linkage in the sense that the former also 
includes direct monetary payment made by one party to the other. For any 
single MAP case, it will be difficult to imagine that one competent authority 
directly pay its treaty partner to accept an adverse agreement. However, as 
will be shown below (Section 3.2.3.2), side payments do occur in package 
deals.    
2.2.2 Suspension of disputed revenue-collection  
As explained previously, vested interests form a hurdle to successful 
negotiation between parties. 1133  In particular, the defending competent 
authority may have a vested interest in retaining its original audit adjustment. 
This vested interest will be further compounded by the fact that instigation of 
a MAP does not usually suspend the collection of disputed tax revenue. 
Indeed, it is not unusual for countries to require a taxpayer to pay the tax 
assessment as a condition of obtaining access to a MAP.1134 Among other 
problems, such a requirement may cause delays in dispute resolution, 
because a country facing the prospect of refunding taxes already collected 
becomes less willing to enter into good-faith MAP discussions. 1135  The 
MEMAP therefore recommends that national governments should provide a 
procedure for the suspension or deferral of a revenue-collection that is the 
subject of a MAP request.1136 
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2.3 Economising administrative costs 
Despite the advantages of the MAP vis-à-vis tax mediation and arbitration in 
terms of administrative costs, there is still much room to economise such 
costs. The peer-review reports also confirm that administrative issues, such 
as exchange of documents and organisation of face-to-face meetings, cause 
significant delay to the MAP process.1137 While the optimisation of every 
specific administrative task is too operational to be covered in this thesis, 
systematic economising of the administrative costs of MAP processes can be 
facilitated by package negotiation, institutionalisation, and the use of ICT 
tools.1138    
3. Holistic issues about the MAP 
3.1 Taxpayer participation 
3.1.1 Current situation 
MAP discussions between competent authorities are a 
government-to-government process in which there is generally no direct 
involvement from the taxpayers.1139 Once a MAP request has been officially 
accepted by a competent authority, the taxpayer concerned usually will not be 
actively involved in the remainder of the process, unless invited by either 
competent authority to present its position or to provide extra information.1140 
3.1.2 Literature review  
The proposal of increased taxpayer participation has both proponents and 
opponents, and arguments of both sides carry weight. 1141  Some of the 
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debates are placed at the human-rights plane, which is beyond the scope of 
the law-and-economic approach characterising this thesis.1142 Most of the 
arguments are focused on practical considerations, and are thus amenable to 
a transaction-cost analysis.  
(1) Agency-cost perspective. A common consensus is that greater 
taxpayer participation enhances transparency of a MAP procedure.1143 
According to agency theory, increased transparency of the MAP would in 
turn reduce the scope of bureaucracy, misconduct, or corruption on the 
part of competent authorities. Therefore, increased taxpayer participation 
imposes greater monitoring pressure upon competent authorities in 
handling MAP cases.  
(2) Administrative-cost perspective. Apparently, greater taxpayer 
participation increases administrative burden for competent authorities in 
MAP processes. For example, it becomes more difficult to organise 
face-to-face meetings that fit the schedule of all three parties as opposed 
to a bilateral negotiation. Nonetheless, this administrative aspect seems to 
be overlooked by the literature. Perhaps the majority believe that such 
logistical expense is trivial. By contrast, some emphasise the merit of 
taxpayer participation in reducing information costs. As Terr et al. point out, 
increased taxpayer participation would better ensure that facts and 
economic analyses are available to government negotiators, “who are 
often juggling multiple factually complex cases with very limited staffing 
and other resources”. 1144  This point is substantiated in one of the 
peer-review reports, in which a peer concerned that the assessed 
competent authority might be fed insufficient or inaccurate information by 
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the audit department in respect of certain disputes.1145  
(3) Bargaining-cost perspective. The debates over taxpayer participation 
are mostly centred on the bargaining aspect of the MAP process. There 
are two major rationales for excluding taxpayers from the process. First, 
taxpayer participation may introduce additional advocacy to the procedure. 
In particular, there are concerns that a taxpayer may align itself with one 
competent authority and “gang up” on the other.1146 In contrast, the 
counterargument contends that given the non-binding nature of the MAP, 
a competent authority could simply withdraw or disagree if it felt that it had 
been “bullied” by the other two parties.1147 More importantly, considering 
that a taxpayer usually has the greatest stake in resolving a tax dispute 
and maintaining good relationships with the relevant tax authorities, it 
would have a strong interest in encouraging a settlement between the 
competent authorities.1148 Accordingly, the taxpayer may facilitate MAP 
negotiations by providing the competent authorities with its intimate 
understanding of the business arrangements in question. 1149  In this 
author’s view, the taxpayer may, to some extent, be analogous to a 
mediator in that both can provide focal points for a MAP negotiation.1150 
The second ground for supporting the status quo is the concern that 
increased tax participation would inhibit competent authorities’ ability to 
refer to other relevant disputes between them.1151 This argument, which 
concerns the package deal that will be discussed below (Section 3.2), has 
not met forceful challenges.  
(4) Overall transaction-cost perspective. Several other arguments for 
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increased taxpayer participation refer to the overall transaction costs of 
ITDR rather than any particular type of the costs. First, it is argued that if a 
taxpayer is fully involved in a MAP process, it would more likely accept the 
agreement reached by the competent authorities.1152  If the taxpayer 
otherwise refuses a MAP agreement for the lack of transparency and 
fairness, and therefore litigates the case before a domestic court, the 
ensuing litigation costs could be significant. Second, some argue that 
through participation, a taxpayer can better understand the considerations 
underlying a MAP agreement and incorporate these considerations into its 
transfer-pricing policies to prevent future disputes. 1153  This latter 
argument, however, raises some doubts. Specifically, the nature of the 
MAP dictates that competent authorities are permitted, or even 
encouraged, to take a flexible and pragmatic approach in the MAP 
process rather than solely resorting to legalistic reasoning. Such 
pragmatic considerations can hardly provide consistent guidelines for 
taxpayers in designing their transfer-pricing policies. Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence even indicates that sometimes a barrier to the resolution of a 
MAP case is the reluctance on the part of either competent authority to 
create a precedent for future disputes.1154 
3.1.3 Recommended minimum standard of taxpayer participation 
As Terr et al. point out, the debates over the topic of taxpayer participation 
somewhat reflect the failure among scholars to delineate the concept of 
“participation”.1155 A taxpayer’s role in a MAP could take a variety of forms 
across a broad spectrum, with the status quo representing one end. At the 
other, and most participatory, end of the spectrum, the taxpayer directly 
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engages in the face-to-face meetings between the competent authorities.1156 
Most of the concerns about taxpayer participation are more or less associated 
with full taxpayer participation. In contrast, this author proposes an 
intermediate level of taxpayer participation on the basis of the structured MAP 
as discussed above (Section 2.1.4). Specifically, taxpayers can participate at 
each milestone of a MAP process, albeit in a limited manner.  
(1) Acceptance (or rejection) of the MAP request. Decisions on the 
admissibility of MAP requests, once made by a competent authority, 
should be communicated to the taxpayer concerned without delay. If the 
MAP request is denied, the taxpayer should be entitled to appeal the 
decision before the same competent authority, and where the appeal fails, 
to seek remedies from the domestic judicial system. The appeal 
mechanism and judicial review would also apply if the decision on 
admissibility of MAP requests is unduly delayed.  
(2) Presentation of a position paper (or a responding paper). Before a 
competent authority presents its position paper to the other authority, the 
position should be communicated to the taxpayer, which is entitled to 
present its opinion on the position. Again, undue delay to the 
communication of the position would be subject to internal appeal or 
judicial review. However, the taxpayer should not be permitted to appeal or 
litigate the content of the position paper, since the latter has no final legal 
effect. The same rule is applicable to the milestone of presenting a 
responding paper.  
(3) Mutual negotiation. Usually taxpayers are excluded from this bilateral 
process. Nonetheless, if one or both competent authorities anticipate that 
the resolution of the case cannot be achieved within the predetermined 
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timeframe, they should communicate their views and disagreements on 
the case to the taxpayer separately. The taxpayer is entitled to present its 
position on these views. By the end of the negotiation, the competent 
authorities should notify the outcome of negotiation to the taxpayer without 
delay. Where the authorities fail to reach an agreement, they should 
inform the taxpayer indicating the reasons for this failure.  
In this intermediate participation mode, the competent authorities are under 
greater monitoring pressure than with the status quo (effect on agency costs), 
because there are more occasions for taxpayer intervention in the MAP 
process. The taxpayer also gains multiple opportunities to present its 
understandings on the case to the competent authorities, and even engage in 
discussions – albeit separately – with those authorities during the process. 
Such taxpayer inputs not only reduce the information costs for the competent 
authorities (effect on administrative costs), but also help those authorities to 
develop a more realistic view on the case (effect on bargaining costs). 
Greater taxpayer participation also enhances the legitimacy of the process, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of the taxpayers rejecting a MAP agreement 
(effect on overall transaction costs). Meanwhile, the model avoids direct 
confrontation between the taxpayer and the competent authorities. In this way, 
the concerns about taxpayer advocacy and the impediment to the overall 
balance of a package of cases can be mitigated (effect on bargaining costs). 
The logistical burden associated with the tripartite, face-to-face meetings can 
also be avoided (effect on administrative costs).  
It should be kept in mind that the above model is proposed as a bottom line of 
taxpayer participation. Thus competent authorities can by all means agree on 
more-ambitious approaches, such as the following three measures 
recommended by the MEMAP: 
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(1) Taxpayer presentation to both competent authorities. For those 
fact-intensive, unusual, or complex cases, it could be helpful to have the 
taxpayer make a presentation to both competent authorities at the same 
time, usually prior to the commencement of discussions.1157 The taxpayer 
could include in the presentation its proposals for resolution. However, the 
risk for such exercise is that one competent authority may unduly rely 
upon this position as “the taxpayer’s position” and therefore be unwilling to 
explore other options in good faith.1158 
(2) Frequent communication with the taxpayer. It is recommended that tax 
administrations conduct timely and frequent communication with the 
taxpayer regarding the status or issues of a case in the course of the 
MAP. 1159  Those administrations are also encouraged to consider 
obtaining input from the taxpayer on factual and legal issues that may 
arise during the process.1160 
(3) Debriefing the taxpayer. Competent authorities are encouraged to 
debrief the taxpayer after each substantial MAP discussion (usually via 
telephone).1161 
This author further takes the view that if the competent authorities and the 
taxpayer concerned have maintained a mutual trust, and the authorities feel 
no need to link the dispute to other cases in a package manner, an exercise 
of full taxpayer participation upon the consent of the competent authorities 
could produce a net benefit.  
3.2 Package deal 
As discussed previously, the orthodox literature perceives the practice of 
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package deal as a pitfall of the MAP.1162 The major concern is that individual 
cases might not be judged on their own merits, but rather determined as part 
of a larger trade-off between jurisdictions. 1163  This author has argued 
elsewhere that while blunt “horse-trading” by all means constitutes gross 
misconduct, one should not throw the baby out with the bathwater.1164 To say 
the least, there have been few, if any, reported cases or anecdotes about any 
taxpayer being “sacrificed” in such deals. On the contrary, relevant practices 
all point to the “sunny side” of package negotiation.  
3.2.1 US Framework Agreement with India and other treaty partners 
From January 2015 to January 2016, the Indian and the US competent 
authorities resolved more than 100 MAP cases.1165 These cases related to 
assessment years 1999-2000 to 2011-2012, involving around US$ 737 
million.1166 They primarily involved the IT industry.1167 Compared with the 
two-year benchmark timeframe for the MAP process, and those stalemated 
MAPs reported by a number of OECD countries, resolving 100 MAPs over 
one year is a remarkable achievement.  
This achievement could largely be attributed to the Framework Agreement 
concluded by the two competent authorities.1168 This Framework Agreement, 
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which followed meetings between the competent authorities in India on 
January 15 and 16, 2015, set out general terms and conditions for the 
resolution of some 200 tax disputes between the two countries.1169 Obviously, 
the Indian and the US competent authorities resolved the MAPs in a package 
manner, with the Framework Agreement functioning essentially as a kind of 
package deal.1170 The deal marked a breakthrough in a long-pending conflict 
over the taxation of IT between the two countries.1171 Indeed, the IRS had 
previously declared that until there was a framework to settle a significant 
number of the outstanding MAPs, the IRS would not allow for bilateral APA 
cases with India.1172  
In addition to its agreement with India, the US has also concluded several 
general agreements or memoranda of understanding with other treaty 
partners to address recurring issues arising from MAP cases. 1173  For 
instance, the US-Belgium Competent Authority Agreement –Profit Attribution 
(June 17, 2013) involves the interpretation of Article 7 of the US-Belgium tax 
treaty.1174 The US-Austria Tax Treatment of Certain Scholarships (March 1, 
2005) concerns the interpretation of Articles 20, 21, and 23 of the US-Austria 
tax treaty.1175  
3.2.2 Amicable agreements between Luxembourg and its neighbouring 
countries 
Most of the MAP cases in Luxembourg concern disputes over the taxation of 
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cross-border employees. As of August 2018, Luxembourg had more than 
190,000 cross-border commuters, most of whom lived in Belgium, France, or 
Germany. 1176 Previously, foreigners employed by a Luxembourg company 
were taxable in Luxembourg for the days physically present in the country 
and taxable in their own residence countries for any other days being outside 
Luxembourg.1177 However, it was common for those daily commuters to stay 
one or more days outside Luxembourg for business trips, trainings, holidays, 
or sick leaves. Consequently, the rule caused much uncertainty as to those 
commuters’ tax status.1178 Indeed, the number and harshness of tax audits 
over cross-border employees by their respective residence countries were 
making frequent headlines in local presses. 1179  In this connection, 
Luxembourg reached several mutual agreements regarding this issue with its 
neighbouring countries. In the first, which was concluded with Germany in 
May 2011, Germany agreed to a 19-day period of grace, during which it gave 
up tax rights over its resident commuters provided that their working days 
spent outside Luxembourg were below 19 days.1180 On 16 March 2015, 
Luxembourg reached a mutual agreement with Belgium that a 24-day 
tolerance would be granted to Belgian workers employed in Luxembourg.1181 
While it remains unknown how many MAP cases were covered by these 
agreements, the OECD MAP statistics provide some clue about the efficacy 
of the Luxembourg-Belgium mutual agreement. Specifically, the MAP 
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statistics reported by the two countries suggest that the 2015 amicable 
agreement between them had a dramatic impact on their MAP performance in 
the same year.1182 
3.2.3 Comments on the above cases 
While these cases are still insufficient to draw the conclusion that package 
deals are good deals, they at least suggest the desirability of reassessing the 
pros and cons of the package deals.  
3.2.3.1 Administrative costs 
An obvious strength of a package deal is its generation of scale economies, 
and hence its economising of administrative costs of MAP processes. By 
bringing a number of cases simultaneously to a negotiation, competent 
authorities at least dilute the logistical expenses of the ITDR processes, such 
as travels and accommodations, over multitudes of MAP cases. In the Peer 
Review Report on Spain, one peer particularly proposed that the two 
jurisdictions should try to bring as many cases as possible to future meetings 
considering the significant burden that face-to-face meetings entail. 1183 
Another jurisdiction reported that the usual budget limit for traveling imposed 
on its competent authority was a maximum of two people traveling abroad to 
attend the same event.1184 In addition to the logistical expenses, for those 
MAPs with similar factual patterns or legal issues, package negotiation also 
helps to save the “cognitive” costs in relation to case analysis, because there 
are fewer needs for the competent authorities to mentally “reinvent the wheel” 
case by case. The US-Indian Framework Agreement mainly covers 
transfer-pricing disputes in sectors of IT or IT-related services. The cases 
under the amicable agreements between Luxembourg and its neighbouring 
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countries are more concentrated in that they all concern the tax status of daily 
commuters working in Luxembourg. In the Peer Review Report on Japan, 
one peer revealed that most of the cases that it discussed with Japan’s 
competent authority concerned transfer-pricing issues with common fact 
patterns.1185 
The method of package negotiation and the attendant economies of scale are 
of particular value in light of the high frequency of tax disputes, as discussed 
previously. 1186  First, national governments and international communities 
have been struggling to find ways to cope with the proliferation of 
cross-border tax disputes. Package negotiation provides a cost-efficient 
option without involving extra governmental investment. Second, the more 
MAP cases a pair of competent authorities has, the greater the potential of 
scale economies, and the more attractive the method will become.    
3.2.3.2 Bargaining costs 
Another advantage of the package deal is its effect on the bargaining costs of 
MAP processes. First, by creating a scenario of case linkage, which is similar 
to issue linkage, package deals have the effect of turning a MAP bargaining 
into a problem-solving discussion, thereby increasing the space for mutual 
compromise and innovative solutions by competent authorities. Questions 
may arise as to the legitimacy of horse trading. In this author’s view, at least 
for transfer-pricing disputes, which constitute the vast majority of MAP cases, 
a pragmatic and flexible approach by competent authorities can be justified. 
This is because, as discussed previously, the arm’s-length price is essentially 
a legal fiction and may span a wide range.1187  Even the US domestic 
jurisprudence on this issue is replete with “approximations, compromises and 
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rules of thumb”.1188 Therefore, this author sees no problem for a pair of 
competent authorities to make some marginal adjustment on the transfer 
price of a particular MAP in light of the overall balance of all MAPs between 
the pair. A similar view has been expressed in a study on the WTO 
consultation process. The article establishes that trade disputes that have 
continuous and divisible features, such as tariff rate, are more amenable to 
case linkage and side payment, and thus more likely to be resolved at 
consultation stage, whereas lumpy issues – those that have an all-or-nothing 
quality such as the legitimacy of a restriction policy – are more likely to 
escalate to the panel phase.1189   
The advantage of a pragmatic approach to MAP negotiation is also 
acknowledged in the MEMAP, albeit in a quite prudent manner. On the one 
hand, the MEMAP confirms that MAP discussion should be conducted in a 
principled, fair, and objective manner, “with each case being decided on its 
own merits and not by reference to any balance of results in other cases”.1190 
On the other hand, it also admits that: 
Although a principled approach is paramount, where an agreement is not 
otherwise achievable, both competent authorities should look for appropriate 
opportunities for compromise in order to eliminate double taxation.1191  
Elsewhere, the MEMAP further confirms that practical and pragmatic 
solutions to contentious MAP cases “are regularly the result of compromise 
and concessions made by parties involved”.1192 It is reasonable to infer that 
the MEMAP has left a “back door” for the exercise of package deals, because 
compromise and concessions are mostly reciprocal, with one party 
compromising in some cases in exchange for the other party’s concession in 
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others.  
Second, package negotiation is more conducive to the method of monetary 
side-payment, which directly reduces the distributive conflict between the 
negotiating parties. During the negotiation of the above-mentioned 
Luxembourg-Belgium amicable agreement, Luxembourg agreed to transfer 
€30 million to Belgium as a financial compensation – the compensation 
amount is to be updated every three years – because the regime of the 
23-day period of grace for Belgium residents working in Luxembourg has the 
effect of shifting some tax revenue from Belgium to Luxembourg.1193 It is 
worth noting that the Luxembourg-Belgium agreement involves cases other 
than transfer pricing disputes. This indicates that, through the use of an 
overall side payment, a package deal facilitates negotiation not only for 
continuous and divisible tax disputes, but also for more lumpy issues.  
Third, compared with the case-by-case approach, package negotiation is 
more likely to engage higher echelons of competent-authority officers. This is 
beneficial for overcoming bargaining problems, since lower-echelon officers 
of competent authorities might lack sufficient authority to conclude a deal. 
According to news reports, the negotiation of the India-US deal engaged 
top-level representatives of the two competent authorities: Douglas O’Donnell, 
US competent authority and Deputy Commissioner (International) of the IRS 
Large Business & International Division, and Akhilesh Ranjan, the Indian 
competent authority and Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreement 
Commissioner.1194 The package deal between Germany and Luxembourg 
also benefited from excellent relationship between the ministers of finance Mr. 
Luc Frieden and Mr. Wolfgang Schäuble.1195 
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3.2.3.3 Agency costs 
Unlike administrative and bargaining costs, which may be reduced by the use 
of package deals, agency costs of the MAP could be intensified. 1196 
Specifically, while a package deal creates more scope for compromise 
between competent authorities, it also gives rise to more space for 
manipulation or even corruption, considering that the MAP process is mainly 
dominated by competent authorities. Indeed, the primary concern about this 
method – that certain taxpayers’ interests may be sacrificed as part of a larger 
trade-off between jurisdictions – mainly points to the agency problem of the 
method. In this connection, some element of transparency may help to 
reduce the risk of opportunism on the part of competent authorities, thereby 
increasing taxpayer confidence in the procedure. Specifically, competent 
authorities may implement appropriate mechanisms to increase the level of 
taxpayer participation in the package negotiation. In the India-US deal, 
companies which may be directly affected by the deal were invited by the two 
competent authorities to present their positions and to discuss the proposed 
settlement.1197 In addition to taxpayer participation, publishing the content of 
package deals also enhances the transparency of the deals. Most of the 
above-mentioned framework agreements and memoranda of understanding 
are published.1198 It is true that taxpayer participation and other measures 
aiming at enhancing the transparency of package deals may consume extra 
resources and slow down the processes. Nevertheless, owing to economies 
of scale, these extra costs can be diluted among the cases included in a 
package.1199 
A published package deal may also produce a positive spill-over effect: it not 
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only settles the disputes at hand, but also provides guidance for competent 
authorities and taxpayers in dealing with similar issues to those covered by 
the deal.1200 Indeed, the conclusion of MAP framework agreements is closely 
associated with the interpretative MAP provided in the first sentence of Article 
25 (3) of the OECD Model. Such interpretative MAPs, explains the MEMAP, 
“frequently relate to topics of a general nature which concern, or may concern, 
a category of taxpayers rather than a specific taxpayer’s case”.1201 Through 
the publication of package deals or interpretative MAP agreements, 
transaction costs related to future tax disputes and their resolution can be 
effectively saved. In Luxembourg, after the adoption of the above-mentioned 
deals, the number of tax audits generating double taxation declined markedly 
compared to the years before.1202  
3.2.3.4 Summary 
It could be seen that the method of package negotiation contains two basic 
elements. The first is batch negotiation: two or more competent authorities 
resolve a number of disputes at the same time. The second is some mutual 
compromise made by those authorities in the negotiation. As demonstrated 
above, batch negotiation generates economies of scale, thereby reducing the 
average transaction costs of each MAP case. Things become more 
complicated when the issue of mutual compromise is concerned. This author 
has argued that while blunt horse-trading at the expense of individual 
taxpayers’ interests should be banned, some marginal concession, 
particularly with respect to transfer pricing disputes, is not only desirable, but 
even unavoidable, considering the difficulties in pinning down an arm’s-length 
price in such disputes. While it is true that in light of the agency problem, 
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package deal is vulnerable to horse-trading, a more transparent and 
principled package negotiation can effectively mitigate such concern. In 
particular, the conclusion of framework agreements represents an ideal way 
to strike a balance between the benefit of scale economies and the need to 
protect taxpayers’ interests.    
4. Evaluation of BEPS Action 14  
4.1 Overview 
As discussed previously, the measures developed under BEPS Action 14 aim 
to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the MAP process.1203 In this 
connection, the Action 14 Final Report, which was delivered at the end of 
2015, reflects countries’ commitment to implement a minimum standard on 
dispute resolution, which consists of specific measures that aim to remove 
obstacles to an effective and efficient MAP mechanism. 1204  Some key 
measures of Action 14 were later incorporated into Part Ⅴ of the MLI. 
To ensure that those elements of the minimum standard are effectively 
satisfied, Action 14 contains a peer-review process.1205 The peer-review 
reports (Stage 1) have already been examined previously. 1206  For the 
purpose of the peer-review process, countries further agree to provide timely 
and complete reporting of MAP statistics pursuant to an agreed statistical 
reporting framework.1207  
Action 14 also identifies several best practices that complement the minimum 
standard in removing obstacles that may prevent the timely resolution of MAP 
                                                        
1203 See above, Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1. 
1204 OECD, ‘Action 14 Final Report’ (n 114) 11 (para.3). 
1205 ibid 11 (para.3); 38 (para. 60 (5)). 
1206 See above, Chapter 3, Section 5.3. 
1207 OECD, ‘Action 14 Final Report’ (n 114) 16 (para. 20). 
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cases. 1208  Nevertheless, these best practices will not be monitored or 
evaluated, either due to their subjective or qualitative character, or because 
not all OECD and G20 countries are willing to commit themselves to them at 
this stage.1209  
Accordingly, this section will focus on four key aspects of BEPS Action 14: (a) 
the minimum standard of the MAP; (b) the best practices; (c) the peer-review 
process; and (d) the new statistical reporting framework.  
4.2 Minimum standard  
The elements of the minimum standard are set out in relation to three general 
objectives regarding resolution of tax disputes.1210 Each of these objectives 
and their supporting elements will be viewed through the lens of the TC 
framework developed in preceding chapters.   
Objective 1: Countries should ensure that treaty obligations related to the 
MAP are fully implemented in good faith and that MAP cases are resolved in a 
timely manner.1211 
A number of recommendations have been proposed to ensure the 
achievement of this objective. Specifically, states should:  
(1) Include paragraphs 1 through 3 of Article 25 (i.e. the MAP article) in 
their tax treaties, and ensure access to the MAP and the implementation 
of MAP agreements regarding transfer-pricing cases;  
(2) Provide MAP access in cases involving anti-abuse provisions;  
(3) Commit to resolving MAPs within an average time frame of 24 months, 
and agree to be periodically reviewed in this regard;  
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(4) Become members of the FTA MAP Forum;  
(5) Provide reporting of MAP statistics pursuant to the above-mentioned 
reporting framework;  
(6) Commit to reviews of their compliance with the minimum standard 
through the above-mentioned peer-review process; and 
(7) Provide transparency regarding their position on MAP arbitration. 1212 
Elements under Objective 1 reflect states’ general commitment to the key 
aspects of Action 14. In particular, elements (1), (2) requires states to remove 
legal obstacles to the accessibility of the MAP and the implementation of MAP 
agreements.    
Objective 2: Countries should ensure that administrative processes promote 
the prevention and timely resolution of treaty-related disputes.  
Elements of the minimum standard in relation to this objective are that states 
should:  
(1) Publish MAP guidance and profiles and ensure that they are clear and 
easily accessible;  
(2) Ensure the authority and independence of competent-authority staff in 
resolving MAP cases;  
(3) Avoid using the amount of sustained audit adjustments or maintaining 
tax revenue as the performance indicators for their competent authority 
functions and for their staff members in charge of the MAP process;  
(4) Ensure that adequate resources are provided to the MAP function;  
(5) Clarify in their MAP guidance that audit settlements between tax 
authorities and taxpayers do not preclude access to MAP; and  
                                                        
1212 ibid 13–17. 
 245 
(6) Provide for roll-back APAs.1213 
Elements under Objective 2 concern the actual application of the MAP 
mechanism. Specifically, element (4) reflects a recognition that the MAP 
process implies transaction costs and therefore demands resources. 
Elements (2) and (3) aim to increase the independence of the competent 
authorities, thereby mitigating the agency problems in the MAP process, as 
was proposed above (section 2.1.1). Elements (1) and (5) are focused on the 
publication of MAP guidance and profiles, which are the key information of the 
procedure. In this way, the information asymmetry between tax authorities 
and taxpayers regarding the MAP process – which is a major source of 
agency problem – could be relieved. 
Objective 3: Countries should ensure that taxpayers that meet the 
requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 25 can access the MAP.  
Elements under this objective include:  
(1) That either the Contracting States amend paragraph 1 of Article 25 to 
permit a MAP request to be made to the competent authority of either 
Contracting State, or, where a treaty does not permit a MAP request to be 
made to either Contracting State, the competent authorities from both 
states jointly evaluate whether a taxpayer’s objection is justified in case of 
any controversy about access to the MAP;  
(2) That countries’ MAP guidance should identify the specific information 
and documentation that is demanded from a taxpayer in submitting the 
request for MAP assistance; and  
(3) That any mutual agreement reached through the MAP should be 
implemented regardless of the time limits provided for by domestic law. 
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1214 
While elements (1) and (2) under Objective 1 concern the legal framework for 
the issues of accessing the MAP and implementing MAP agreements, the 
elements under this objective focus on the two issues at an operational level. 
Elements (1) and (2) particularly manifest the logic of TC theory. With respect 
to element (1), by establishing a consultation process that can be invoked if 
the first competent authority denies the access, or more straightforwardly, by 
allowing a MAP request to be made to the competent authority of either 
Contracting State rather than of the residence state, the discretion on the 
admissibility of MAP requests is vested in both competent authorities rather 
than the first authority. The checks-and-balance mechanism between the two 
competent authorities in MAP process has already been covered above 
(Section 2.1.2). Allowing MAP requests to be made to both Contracting States 
is also the major innovation in Part Ⅴ  of the MLI as opposed to the 
traditional MAP provision.1215       
The function of element (2) is analogous to that of elements (1) and (5) under 
Objective 2: to promote the disclosure of information about the MAP process 
so that the information asymmetry between competent authorities on the one 
hand and taxpayers on the other can be remedied. The implementation of this 
element makes it more difficult for countries to limit MAP access on the 
ground of insufficient information if the taxpayer concerned has provided the 
required information.1216   
4.3 Best practices  
Action 14 further identifies 11 best practices regarding the MAP process.1217 
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Most of these measures also correspond to the logic of TC theory.  
Best practices 8 to 11 concern the specific contents of the published MAP 
guidance, with a view to further broadening access to the MAP.1218 For 
example, best practice 9 recommends that countries’ published MAP 
guidance should provide MAP access in the case of bona fide 
taxpayer-initiated foreign adjustment.1219 Essentially, these best practices 
complement the element (1) under Objective 2 in providing sufficient 
information about the MAP process.  
Second, best practice 6 recommends that countries provide for a suspension 
of collections during the period when a MAP case is pending. 1220  As 
explained above (Section 2.2.2), suspension of revenue collection during the 
MAP process helps to mitigate the bargaining problem arising from vested 
interests. 
Third, best practice 5 recommends that countries introduce the joinder 
method into the MAP process. Specifically, in certain cases, a MAP request 
may present recurring issues that will also be relevant to either previous or 
subsequent filed tax years, where the relevant facts and circumstances are 
the same. 1221  In these cases, countries should implement appropriate 
procedures to permit taxpayers also to request MAP assistance with respect 
to such recurring issues for other filed tax years.1222 As the Action 14 Final 
Report recognises, a MAP procedure that allows the joining of cases that 
arise from recurring issues “may help to avoid duplicative MAP requests and 
permit a more efficient use of competent authority resources”.1223 In this 
sense, the joinder method is analogous to the package negotiation and the 
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attendant economies of scale (Section 3.2.3.1) – a single procedural outlay 
on the MAP can be extended to multiple cases, and the average cost of each 
MAP is reduced.  
4.4 Monitoring mechanism 
The Assessment Methodology of Action 14 establishes detailed procedures 
and guidelines for a two-stage peer-review and monitoring process regarding 
the implementation of the minimum standard.1224 The process is coordinated 
by the FTA MAP Forum.1225 In short, the process contains the following 
stages: (a) obtaining inputs for the Stage 1 peer review; (b) drafting the Stage 
1 peer-review report; (c) publishing the Stage1 peer-review report; and (d) 
monitoring measures taken by the assessed jurisdiction to improve the MAP 
regime (i.e. the Stage 2 peer monitoring).1226 
The major function of the peer-review process is to impose peer pressure on 
the assessed members by disseminating information about the members’ 
MAP performance. In this way, the members will incur reputational costs for 
their noncompliance. This is in line with the view of agency theory that it is in 
the interest of the principal to impose a monitoring mechanism upon the 
agent.1227 The peer-based monitoring mechanism, sometimes known as the 
open method of coordination (OMC), has also been used in a variety of 
non-tax domains by the OECD and several other international organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.1228 OMC reflects 
a more structured and robust monitoring mechanism than fora based solely 
on conversation. At the same time, it is more flexible than those hard-law 
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governance modes that are characterised by coercion or sanction 
mechanisms.1229  
A distinctive feature of the peer-review process under Action 14 is the 
imposition of personal accountability on senior officers of competent 
authorities.1230 As mentioned previously, the FTA consists of the most senior 
tax administrators of the member countries.1231 Brown therefore notes that all 
the proposed measures under Action 14 “should be viewed in the light of not 
only the political commitments that are being made, but also the parallel work 
being undertaken within the FTA”.1232 In this author’s view, the fact that the 
peer-review process penetrates the administrative level of the member 
countries is in line with the proposition that has repeatedly been made in this 
thesis: the obstacles to the ITDR process largely exist at the operational, 
rather than the political, level.   
4.5 Statistical report framework 
MAP statistics pursuant to an agreed report framework form the basis of the 
peer-review process. As discussed above (Section 2.1.3), compiling and 
disseminating MAP statistics per se mitigates information asymmetry, thereby 
reducing agency costs. Compared with the old statistical reporting 
framework,1233 the major innovation of the new framework is the insertion into 
the MAP process of “Milestone 1”: the date when one of the competent 
authorities presents in written form its position on the case to the other 
competent authority.1234 By introducing this milestone, the framework divides 
the MAP process into three stages: (a) assessments of the admissibility of a 
MAP request; (b) preparation of the position paper; and (c) mutual 
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negotiation.1235 In this way, the new statistics calculate the average time 
taken both for the entire MAP process and for its intermediate steps. As a 
result, the measurability of the MAP process is enhanced. According to the 
above discussion (Section 2.1.4), it seems the new statistical framework can 
be further improved with the addition of another milestone: the presentation of 
a response to the position paper. At least in one peer-review report, several 
peers mentioned that a timely response to position papers would be 
helpful.1236  
The 2016 and 2017 MAP statistics based on the new report framework have 
already been released. However, since the new statistics started from 
January 2016, the period for assessing post-2015 MAP statistics only 
comprises at most 24 months. Thus it is difficult to assess whether the 
average time for MAPs has been shortened owing to the implementation of 
Action 14. That being said, the new statistics still provide some useful 
information on the transaction costs of the MAP process. For example, in 
2016, jurisdictions resolved 63 transfer-pricing cases and 290 other cases, all 
of which were initiated during the year. Those 63 transfer-pricing cases took 
on average 2.5 months to close, and the 290 other cases took an average of 
only 1.5 months.1237 In 2016 and 2017, 251 new transfer-pricing cases took 
7.8 months on average to close, and the 730 other new cases took 4.7 
months on average.1238 Several jurisdictions seem extremely efficient in 
resolving MAP cases. For example, in 2016, Canada resolved 42 new cases, 
among which transfer pricing cases took 1.10 months and other cases 
6.40months on average.1239 In the same year, Luxembourg resolved around 
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180 cases – all were non-transfer pricing cases – with each case taking 0.83 
months on average.1240 These statistics are in line with the data analysis in 
Chapter 3, demonstrating that the MAP process is not intrinsically 
time-consuming.1241 
4.6 Comments 
Given the propensity toward legalistic approaches in the orthodox literature 
on ITDR, it is not surprising that Action 14 was mainly crafted by policymakers 
and practitioners, with very meagre inputs from scholars. In particular, the 
peer-based mechanisms and the new statistical framework had received very 
scant research attention before the launch of the BEPS Project. Indeed, 
numerous researchers expressed open dismay following the release of 
Action 14. The criticisms mainly concern the fact that the action has failed to 
promote a universal adoption of tax arbitration among countries.1242 Coupled 
with this disappointment is the critique that a majority of the measures 
adopted in the action has already been recommended in the MEMAP as best 
practices since some 10 years ago.1243 Would the recommendations listed as 
best practices in the MEMAP, contend some commentators, carry more 
persuasive weight when presented as elements of a minimum standard under 
Action 14?1244 
Based on the benefit-cost analysis in Chapter 3, this author also agrees that a 
well-designed arbitration clause can strengthen the MAP-based ITDR system. 
The next chapter will explore means of optimising tax arbitration. However, as 
analysed in the preceding chapters, for the ITDR system, a legalistic solution 
should not be taken as a panacea. Consider the two major obstacles to the 
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resolution of MAP cases: the lack of resources and the undue practice of 
audit settlement. Reliance on arbitration may exacerbate these problems. 
First, the high transaction costs of arbitration as opposed to the MAP may 
further stretch the budget constraints facing national governments. Second, 
the prospect of arbitration may spur tax administrations to be more proactive 
in using audit settlements as a way to limit access to the MAP. One might 
argue that the issue of blocking MAP access can be solved by introducing a 
more independent arbitration mechanism, because even if the taxpayer were 
compelled to waive the access to the MAP in return for a more favourable 
audit settlement, it could still pursue arbitration. 1245  The drawbacks of 
independent tax arbitration will be elaborated later.1246 Here it suffices to 
point out that even if taxpayers have the legal right to renege on the 
audit-settlement deal and pursue arbitration to eliminate remaining double 
taxation, they may be unwilling to test this right for fear that their good working 
relationships with the relevant tax authorities could be significantly 
disrupted.1247 By contrast, a strengthened mechanism of policy coordination, 
as manifested in Action 14, seems a better solution to address the practice of 
using audit settlements to limit MAP access.        
As to the “soft” character of many measures endorsed in Action 14, this 
author has already argued above (Section 4.4) that the peer-based 
monitoring mechanism, though not as hard as a legal instrument, produces a 
“law-like” sense of obligation. In particular, the imposition by the FTA MAP 
Forum of direct accountability on competent authorities further strengthens 
the member countries’ commitment to resolving tax disputes effectively, 
efficiently, and in good faith. Therefore, while Action 14 substantially falls back 
on the MEMAP in terms of content, the two initiatives carry different strengths.  
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Chapter 6. Economising Third-Party Procedures of ITDR 
1. Overview 
This chapter seeks to explore ways to economise third-party procedures – 
mainly tax arbitration and mediation – of ITDR. Many general aspects of tax 
arbitration and mediation have already been extensively studied in the 
literature of international commercial dispute settlement, a subject more fully 
developed than ITDR. Accordingly, this chapter focuses only on the “tax facet” 
of these third-party procedures. In particular, the chapter centres on the 
supplementary role of tax arbitration (and mediation), in light of the 
MAP-based ITDR system proposed in Part Ⅰ. As with the MAP, many issues 
in this chapter encompass more than one type of transaction cost.  
Sections 2 to 5 examine four fundamental aspects of tax arbitration. Section 6 
analyses one particular issue of tax mediation. Section 7 provides an 
assessment of the recent reform of tax arbitration embodied in Part Ⅵ of the 
MLI. 
2. Relationship between tax arbitration and the MAP 
2.1 Tax arbitration as an extension of the MAP   
Under the current ITDR system, tax arbitration is instituted as an integral part 
of the MAP, rather than as a self-standing alternative. This built-in feature 
distinguishes tax arbitration from its international commercial equivalent, 
where individuals have direct access to arbitration should a dispute arise. In 
line with the preference for legalistic approaches in the orthodox literature of 
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ITDR, some have argued for stand-alone tax arbitration, to which taxpayers 
can have direct access.1248 However, as argued in Chapter 3, given the 
characteristics of the international tax regime and tax disputes, a MAP-based 
system that is supplemented by third-party procedures represents the optimal 
mode for the international economy. Chapter 5 further established that for 
those countries with a high inventory of tax disputes, the MAP in a package 
manner provides a powerful tool for countries to address their heavy 
caseloads of tax disputes.1249  
2.2 Implications of “building” tax arbitration into the MAP 
2.2.1 The MAP as a prerequisite to arbitration  
The built-in characteristic of tax arbitration means that only if and when the 
competent authorities are unable to resolve the case within the 
predetermined time frame – usually two years – can the arbitration procedure 
be invoked. A particular problem is where the competent authorities even 
disagree on the admissibility of a MAP request in the first place. Under the 
DSU of WTO, the failure of the responding party to reply to the other party’s 
request for consultation within 10 days can directly trigger a panel 
procedure.1250 Nonetheless, under tax arbitration, which is built into the MAP, 
the denial of MAP access by one competent authority does not trigger the 
arbitral procedure over the tax dispute. As discussed previously, in numerous 
countries, a taxpayer that is denied MAP access can seek a remedy before 
the domestic court.1251 At the most, an arbitral panel can be envisaged to 
resolve the dispute over the admissibility of a MAP request, yet with no 
jurisdiction over the substantive issues of the tax dispute.  
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Despite the built-in manner of tax arbitration, the triggering of the arbitration 
procedure does not necessarily need to wait until the entire two years elapse. 
The competent authorities can, upon the consent of the taxpayer concerned, 
agree to initiate tax arbitration before the deadline, if and when, for example, 
they anticipate at an early stage of a MAP that the prospect of achieving an 
agreement is gloomy.1252         
2.2.2 Taxpayer participation in arbitral proceedings 
Given the built-in manner of tax arbitration, the inter-governmental nature of 
the MAP will remain during arbitral proceedings. Accordingly, taxpayers do 
not have any greater right to participate in arbitral proceedings than they have 
in the MAP.1253 Indeed, the cases for increased taxpayer participation may 
even be weaker in tax arbitration than in the MAP. Specifically, while taxpayer 
participation in the MAP has the value of mitigating the agency and 
bargaining problems in the process, this value is discounted in tax arbitration, 
which per se implies a lower level of agency and bargaining costs.1254 
Furthermore, given that tax arbitration is more formalised than the MAP, 
taxpayers’ full participation in arbitral proceedings may lead to a significant 
increase in administrative costs in terms of logistical expenses and the fees 
for legal counsel. Park instances a particular “hassle” that may arise from 
taxpayer participation in tax arbitration: if the two competent authorities and 
the taxpayer concerned each nominates an arbitrator and the three arbitrators 
so appointed further nominate a fourth arbitrator to chair the tribunal; this 
would produce an even-numbered tribunal that would risk an awkward 50/50 
split, with no one to break a possible deadlock.1255 Moreover, the risk that 
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greater taxpayer participation will bring extra advocacy into an international 
tax relationship is more prominent in tax arbitration than in the MAP. This is 
because while in a MAP, a taxpayer is permitted to take a more flexible 
approach in participating in the process so as to mediate the conflict between 
the competent authorities, the taxpayer’s latitude would be more restricted by 
law under tax arbitration. Consequently, it becomes quite difficult, if not 
impossible, for that taxpayer to avoid an impression that it is siding with one of 
the competent authorities. This concern may explain, at least partially, the 
taxpayer’s absence in the arbitral proceedings in the Electrolux case, even 
though the company had been invited by the arbitral panel to attend the 
procedure.1256   
That being said, the information value of taxpayer participation matters for 
both the MAP and tax arbitration. Indeed, given that arbitration is more 
demanding than negotiation on the precision of case information (in terms of 
both facts and legal arguments), taxpayer participation can play a greater role 
in reducing information costs in tax arbitration as opposed to the MAP. For 
instance, the Chairman of the Advisory Commission in the Electrolux case 
had requested the position of the taxpayer on the disputed issues.1257 In this 
connection, a minimum standard of taxpayer participation in arbitral 
proceedings is recommended at least for two stages of the process. The first 
stage is the initiation of an arbitral process, where the taxpayer, in requesting 
the triggering of the arbitral procedure, is entitled to submit its position 
accompanied by supporting documents. The second is the pre-hearing stage, 
where the taxpayer should be informed of the major arguments and evidence 
presented by both competent authorities and is entitled to present its 
arguments either in written form or orally before the panel. In addition, upon 
the consent of both competent authorities, the panel certainly can invite the 
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taxpayer to fully participate in the arbitral proceedings if the former thinks 
desirable and appropriate to do so.                        
2.2.3 Enforcement of arbitral decisions 
Enforcement of arbitral decisions constitutes one of the key pillars supporting 
the legalistic method of resolving international commercial and economic 
disputes.1258 For example, both the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention set forth a legal framework for the worldwide execution of arbitral 
awards rendered under these conventions. 1259  Under the New York 
Convention, if an arbitral award prescribes that the respondent is liable to the 
claimant for monetary damages, should the respondent fail to honour the 
award in time, the claimant may seek recognition and enforcement of the 
award in a jurisdiction where the respondent’s assets are located, provided 
that the jurisdiction is a party to the Convention.1260 Indeed, it has been 
widely recognised that one of the prime reasons parties include an arbitration 
clause in an international contract is the relatively certain enforceability of 
arbitral awards.1261 The DSU of the WTO also has detailed rules on the 
enforcement of panel decisions.1262 In this connection, a number of tax 
scholars have also discussed this issue.1263 For instance, Park recommends 
applying the New York Convention as a legal framework for the enforcement 
of tax-arbitral awards.1264 
Nonetheless, in this author’s view, given the built-in character of tax 
arbitration, the enforceability of tax-arbitral awards is intrinsically different 
from that of their commercial equivalents. Specifically, a tax-arbitral award 
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only forms an interim opinion that needs to be incorporated into the final MAP 
agreement. As Article 25 (5) of the OECD Model states, arbitral decisions 
rendered under this Article must be implemented through mutual 
agreement.1265 In the context of the UN Model Convention and the EU 
Arbitration Convention, the competent authorities can even take a decision 
which deviates from the arbitral decision.1266  The enforceability of MAP 
agreements has already been discussed previously.1267 To recapitulate, tax 
administrations are obliged to implement MAP agreements, and failure to do 
so may trigger domestic procedures of judicial review upon the request of the 
taxpayers concerned.1268 This enforcement framework is in line with the BOS 
character of the international tax regime, which indicates that although the 
resolution of MAP cases implies distributive conflict, once the case has been 
settled, countries will have no incentive to defect from their agreement.1269 
On the contrary, allowing taxpayers to seize the assets of award-debtor 
countries, as in the case of international commercial (and investment) 
arbitration, may risk damaging the ongoing tax relationships.  
2.2.4 Synergy between the MAP and tax arbitration  
The “built-in” approach of tax arbitration indicates that an arbitration 
procedure can take advantage of its preceding MAP phase. In this way, 
transaction costs of tax arbitration can be significantly reduced. The synergy 
between the MAP and tax arbitration will be elaborated below (Sections 4 and 
5). 
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3. Procedural rules of tax arbitration: flexibility vs. robustness  
3.1 Overview 
The balance between procedural flexibility and procedural robustness has 
been extensively discussed in the literature of international commercial 
arbitration.1270 On the one hand, procedural flexibility allows the parties to 
craft a procedure tailored to the particular kind of dispute. On the other hand, 
if either party engages in deliberate obstruction of the process, the advantage 
of procedural robustness becomes obvious. 1271  A party, usually the 
respondent, may feel it is in its interest to delay, obstruct, or otherwise to 
subvert the arbitral process.1272 Occasionally, claimants may also have an 
interest to do so when, for example, they discover that their claims do not 
have the expected value, or the prospect of facing a counter-claim raised by 
the respondents becomes evident.1273 Procedural obstruction may occur at 
almost all stages of an arbitral proceeding including the initiation of arbitration, 
the establishment of a panel, and the post-panel procedure. Accordingly, a 
consensus is that although procedural flexibility is an obvious advantage of 
arbitration vis-à-vis litigation, unlimited flexibility does not always lead to 
maximum procedural efficiency.1274 
The arbitration clause of the OECD Model leaves the arbitration process to be 
applied by competent authorities through mutual agreement.1275 Intuitively, 
procedural flexibility seems desirable for tax arbitration, which is still in its 
embryonic stage compared to commercial arbitration. According to Pit’s study, 
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in most of the 158 tax treaties with an arbitration clause, there are no 
operational rules on how to act during an arbitration procedure.1276 However, 
as discussed previously, the advantage of tax arbitration in constraining 
agency and bargaining costs hinges upon the robustness of the arbitral 
procedure.1277 In particular, given the built-in manner of tax arbitration, the 
initiation of an arbitration phase indicates that leaving the parties to resolve 
the dispute on their own has been unsuccessful. Should the arbitral 
proceedings be governed by procedural flexibility, the same problems 
associated with party autonomy may creep into tax arbitration and increase 
the risk of procedural impasses. It is worth noting that the motivation for 
procedural obstruction is not always clear-cut. Obstructive behaviours may 
result from either the determination of one party to block the procedure, a 
desire to maximise the party’s procedural gain, or a sincere belief that the 
procedure should be conducted in a certain manner. 1278  Accordingly, 
obstructive behaviours in tax arbitration may reflect either agency costs, or 
bargaining costs, or both. Procedural robustness has slightly different 
implications for different stages of tax arbitration.     
3.2 Initiation of the arbitral procedure 
A particular issue at this stage is the choice between voluntary and mandatory 
arbitration. Mandatory arbitration means that an irrevocable agreement to 
arbitrate was concluded between the Contracting States before, rather than 
after, a dispute arose. 1279  The OECD Model Convention contains a 
mandatory arbitration provision, which a taxpayer can invoke upon the 
expiration of the MAP timeframe, without being subject to the approval of 
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either competent authority.1280 In contrast, under voluntary arbitration, the 
initiation of the procedure is subject to the consent of both parties.1281 For 
instance, the 1989 US-Germany Income Tax Treaty provided that tax 
arbitration will only be triggered if both competent authorities agree so.1282 In 
between pure mandatory and voluntary approaches, there lies a third type 
which is patterned after Article 25 B (5) of the UN Model Convention, whereby 
arbitration may be requested by the competent authority of one of the 
Contracting States.1283  
Obviously, voluntary arbitration is more vulnerable to procedural obstruction. 
As Park notes, when a real tax dispute arises, one side usually has second 
thoughts about its commitment to a binding resolution. “Consequently, no [tax] 
arbitration has yet taken place pursuant to such treaty provisions.” 1284 
Arguably, the defending competent authority in an ITDR process would 
usually have more vested interests in sabotaging the arbitral procedure. 
Therefore, as many agree, a mandatory procedure reflects a preferential 
choice for tax arbitration.1285 
3.3 Establishment of the panel 
International commercial arbitration usually provides for either a sole 
arbitrator or a three-member tribunal. A typical arbitral panel under the OECD 
Model Convention has three members, with two co-arbitrators being 
appointed respectively by the two competent authorities, and the third being 
appointed as the chair of the panel by the two co-arbitrators.1286 The process 
of establishing an arbitral panel is vulnerable to agency and bargaining 
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problems given that before the panel is created, the procedure is still largely 
governed by party autonomy.1287 Specifically, either competent authority may 
deliberately delay the appointment of arbitrators (agency problem), or 
challenge the impartiality of the arbitrator proposed by the other side (agency 
or bargaining problem). In the Electrolux case, while the delay in the 
establishment of the Advisory Commission largely reflected the high 
administrative cost of finding the right person to be the Chair of the panel, 
some suggest that certain opportunistic “shirking” may also play a role.1288 
The process of establishing an arbitral panel in ad hoc tax arbitration can be 
strengthened mainly by introducing a specified time frame plus a backstop 
mechanism should that time frame be exceeded. The OECD Sample 
Procedure recommends a time frame for the appointment of panel 
members.1289 If any of the appointments are not made within the required 
time period, the arbitrator(s) not yet appointed shall be appointed by the Head 
of the CTPA.1290 That being said, the Sample Procedure has no binding 
effect.  
3.4 Post-panel proceedings 
After the establishment of the arbitral panel, the full arbitral process typically 
involves the following steps: some kind of organisation meeting to discuss 
how the arbitration will proceed; further written submissions to clarify the 
positions of each party; a pre-hearing disclosure involving exchange of 
documentary evidence and/or witness statements; the hearing procedure 
including oral testimony, submission of documentary evidence, the 
cross-examination of witnesses and legal arguments; post-hearing 
submissions; and a deliberation period for arbitrator(s) before the final award 
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is made.1291  
In general, under the supervision of the panel, the post-panel proceedings 
could be more controllable and predictable than the pre-panel stages. 
Nevertheless, the devil is in the detail. According to TCE theory, legal rules 
are incomplete and thus susceptible to opportunistic exploitation. 1292 
Commentators have enumerated the most common types of obstructive 
behaviours during the post-panel process in international commercial 
arbitration: 
(1) Challenging the member(s) of the arbitral tribunal for insignificant 
reasons; 
(2) Changing lawyers before the expiry of a particular deadline so as to 
ask for an extension;  
(3) Asking for extensions on a regular basis; 
(4) Making file submissions late or presenting documents/witnesses at the 
very last moment; 
(5) Refusing to produce documents; 1293 
…     
Given its embryonic stage of development, tax arbitration may be more 
vulnerable to procedural obstruction, although empirical information on this 
point is scant.  
For ad hoc tax arbitration, the post-panel proceedings can be strengthened in 
two ways. The first is to develop more-detailed arbitral rules that can 
accommodate procedural contingencies as much as possible. Nevertheless, 
                                                        
1291 Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 157; Park (n 154) 821. 
1292 See above, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1. 
1293 Tobias Zuberbühler, ‘How to Overcome “Obstructive” Behaviour in International Arbitration’; Harris 
(n 781); Scott (n 802); Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 148. 
 264 
given the presence of bounded rationality, absolute perfection of procedural 
rules is merely wishful thinking. Therefore, the second solution is also critical: 
to grant the arbitral panel broad discretion in determining procedural issues. 
For example, in any circumstances that are not anticipated by the existing 
rules of tax arbitration, the simplest way to address procedural contingencies 
is “to leave it to the arbitrators to develop these rules on an ad hoc basis”.1294 
In doing so, arbitrators may resort to their own experience or reasoning in 
managing the procedures; they may also refer to commercial arbitration rules, 
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) rules, which provide a full-fledged procedural framework for ad 
hoc commercial arbitration.1295  
3.5 Potential concerns 
One might argue that maintaining party autonomy in tax arbitration preserves 
states’ sovereignty as much as possible. The flaw of the sovereignty 
argument has already been examined;1296 it suffices here to point out that 
there is little merit for countries to embrace tax arbitration on the one hand, 
while on the other hand rejecting specified and predetermined arbitral rules. 
Another potential challenge is that the notion of robust tax arbitration seems 
to contradict the antilegalistic position characterising this thesis. However, 
strengthening arbitral procedure does not alter the supplementary role of tax 
arbitration and the central status of the MAP in the ITDR system. And 
obviously, an arbitration of a supplementary nature should not be equated as 
a procedure fraught with loopholes. Furthermore, party autonomy is still 
preserved to a substantial extent in tax arbitration with robust procedural rules. 
For example, in the case of panel establishment, the appointment of 
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co-arbitrators is still in the hands of the competent authorities in the first place. 
Those authorities can also agree on different rules on the panel 
establishment.1297 Only when they encounter deadlock in the process would 
the default arbitral rules apply.     
4. Decision modes of tax arbitration: conventional vs. 
final-offer approach 
4.1 Overview    
According to the way an arbitral panel reaches its decision, tax arbitration 
could be divided into two types: conventional and final-offer.1298 Conventional 
arbitration, or independent-opinion arbitration, refers to an approach under 
which arbitrators make their own independent decisions based on the facts 
and arguments presented before them by the parties.1299 The arbitrators 
normally need to specify the reasoning behind their decisions. Under the 
final-offer approach, also known as baseball arbitration, each competent 
authority presents the arbitral panel with a proposal for the resolution of the 
dispute and the panel is allowed to choose only between the two 
proposals.1300  Usually, an arbitral decision under the baseball approach 
merely states a number, such as monetary amount or tax rate, without any 
additional information or comments from the panel. 1301  Obviously, the 
final-offer arbitration is far less legalistic than the conventional approach. The 
final-offer approach is the default mode in the Sample Procedure of the UN 
Model.1302 The US treaty practice generally employs the final-offer approach 
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as the exclusive means of arbitration.1303  By contrast, the conventional 
approach is the exclusive mode of arbitration in the EU Arbitration Convention, 
and the preferred mode in the OECD Model Convention (pre-2017 
version).1304  
As its name indicates, conventional arbitration represents the most common 
form of arbitration. The following analysis will be focused on the final-offer 
approach. 
4.2 Advantages and theoretical implications of the final-offer 
approach  
As its name suggests, baseball arbitration was originally developed as a 
means of resolving salary disputes between US Major League Baseball (MLB) 
players and their clubs.1305 Like many other sport leagues in the country, the 
US baseball leagues use a long-established reserve system as part of their 
employment practice.1306 Under the system, a player who signs a contract 
with a baseball team is bound to play for that team for a certain number of 
years (usually six).1307 However, after three years of service to the current 
employer, the player is eligible to invoke salary renegotiation with the 
employer.1308 The use of final-offer arbitration in salary negotiation has an 
important function: to promote good-faith negotiation and pre-hearing 
settlement.1309 Specifically, when an arbitrator is limited to a choice between 
two final offers, each party may realise that if their final offer is too extreme, 
an arbitrator will choose the final offer of the opposing party. 1310 
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Consequently, it is to the strategic advantage of each party to maintain a 
position that is closer to the middle. 1311  This middle-ground approach 
enhances the likelihood of settlement prior to an arbitration hearing.1312 In 
contrast, arbitrators in conventional arbitration are often perceived to have an 
inclination to “split the difference” between each party’s position.1313 It follows 
that the parties may have a greater incentive to take extreme positions so that 
the arbitral “compromise” will be skewed in their favour.1314 Pre-hearing 
settlement avoids arbitral proceedings, which are usually lengthy and 
adversarial.1315 In particular, parties avoid the embarrassing moment when, 
in an arbitration proceeding, a team management questions a player’s value 
to the club.1316 To summarise, final-offer arbitration is instrumental for parties 
to maintain a congenial relationship. This is quite important because under 
the reserve system in baseball, a player would still remain with the team after 
the salary arbitration.1317 Therefore, the adoption of the final-offer approach 
in the MLB salary arbitration constitutes a good example of how relational 
contracts can benefit from a flexible and collaborative governance structure.  
Going further, this relational employment contract between baseball players 
and the MLB is related to the notion of asset specificity.1318 On the surface, 
the reserve system seems to unduly restrict the freedom of baseball athletes, 
and occasionally the reserve practice did result in players bringing lawsuits 
against the system.1319 Nonetheless, the system survived judicial scrutiny, 
and the major argument relied on by the court is related to 
transaction-specific investment. The players, argued the court, must be so 
unique and extraordinary that the breach of contract would result in 
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irreparable harm to the team.1320 Indeed, not only does a team deploy 
specialised investment in their players, the players also invest team-specific 
human assets through special training and adaptive learning. Therefore, 
there is a mutual dependency developed between a team and its players. 
Commentators observe that the use of final-offer arbitration is largely 
confined to sport leagues salary arbitration and public employment interest 
arbitration, both of which involve employment contracts.1321 Literature on 
international dispute settlement, particularly international commercial and 
investment arbitration and the WTO panel procedure, indicates very scant 
use of this approach. In this sense, the use of final-offer approach constitutes 
a distinctive feature of tax arbitration. This indicates some similarity between 
international tax relationships and the MLB employment relationships, both of 
which assume an ongoing and relational character. As established previously, 
the ongoing nature of international tax relationships also arise from the high 
degree of asset specificity embodied in the relationships.1322  
While studies on employment salary arbitration emphasise the merit of the 
final-offer approach in promoting good-faith negotiation and pre-hearing 
settlement, it should be noted that even if the pre-trial negotiation breaks 
down and the prospect of arbitration becomes unavoidable, the parties would 
still benefit from the final-offer approach over the conventional approach. 
Specifically, given that the authority of a panel in final-offer arbitration is 
limited to one of the two resolutions submitted by the parties, the final-offer 
approach not only saves arbitrators the burden of drafting a well-reasoned 
decision, but also entails less-extensive fact finding and legal reasoning than 
conventional arbitration.1323 For example, a face-to-face hearing will typically 
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be unnecessary and the arbitrators will be able to liaise between themselves 
and with the parties by telephone or video conference.1324 The result is 
increased expediency and cost-efficiency for the final-offer approach relative 
to the conventional mode  
Some commentators argue that the final-offer approach entertains 
sovereignty concerns.1325 Since the panel under the final-offer approach has 
to adhere to the view of one of the Contracting States instead of developing 
its own opinion, this approach gives Contracting states more control over the 
dispute resolution process.1326 To some extent, the UN Model’s emphasis on 
the final-offer approach as the generally applicable process reflects the 
sovereignty concerns, as the UN Model is more favourable for developing 
countries, and developing countries are presumably more sensitive to their 
sovereignty interests.1327 Without prejudice to the previous critique of the 
sovereignty notion, this author argues that even if the sovereignty concerns 
are justified, the effect of the final-offer approach on sovereignty interests is 
not straightforward. If a panel in final-offer arbitration selects the proposal of 
one state, it seems as if the sovereignty interest of the other state is 
dismissed entirely. In contrast, given that arbitrators in conventional 
arbitration tend to split the difference between the parties, the perception 
would be that the sovereignty interests of both countries have been 
accommodated. More importantly, as will be argued below (Section 4.3.2), 
the final-offer approach requires parties to possess a certain degree of 
sophistication. Since tax administrations of developing countries are more 
likely to suffer from shortages of expertise and resources, the final-offer 
approach may in fact pose a greater challenge to their sovereignty interests.  
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4.3 Potential concerns about the final-offer approach 
Several concerns about the final-offer approach have been raised in the 
literature on tax arbitration. They are centred upon two major issues: 
unreasoned decisions made by the panels and unreasonable offers submitted 
by the competent authorities.  
4.3.1 Unreasoned decisions 
As discussed above (Section 4.1), a panel of final-offer arbitration usually 
does not state the reasoning for the decision. As a result, such decisions are 
perceived to have little value in guiding the resolution of future cases as well 
as in preventing similar disputes in future.1328 In contrast, reasoned decisions 
under the conventional approach seem more instrumental in the development 
of a coherent body of jurisprudence on international tax law, although such 
case laws may not have any precedential value. A related concern is about 
the legitimacy of final-offer arbitration. It is argued that the explanation of the 
reasons behind a decision may increase acceptance of the result, and an 
opaque decision without reasoning may lead to doubts about the panel’s 
competence and impartiality.1329  
Accordingly, a compromise solution has been proposed in the orthodox 
literature of tax arbitration: recognising the utility of both final-offer and 
conventional arbitration, and using whichever better suits the type of tax 
dispute.1330 This is also the approach adopted by the Sample Procedure in 
the OECD Model (pre-2014 version), which recommends the conventional 
approach as the default mode and the final-offer approach for those disputes 
in which the unresolved issues will be primarily factual and/or numerical.1331 
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Such issues “will often arise in transfer pricing cases, where the unresolved 
issue may be simply the determination of an arm’s length transfer price or 
range of prices”. 1332  
Nonetheless, based on the theoretical reflections in Part Ⅰ, this author 
contends the validity of the above concerns. Specifically, as explained 
previously, the non-substantive nature of tax treaties and the separate-entity 
approach to the taxation of MNEs significantly compromise the value of the 
legalistic method characterising conventional arbitration. 1333  Adjudicators 
may frequently be situated in a difficult situation: if they split the difference of 
the parties’ positions, the arbitral decisions will be perceived to lack any 
elements of the rule of law; if they strictly adhere to legal principles, the 
decisions are quite likely to encounter political backlash from the losing party. 
By the same token, the strength of conventional arbitration in guiding the 
resolution of future disputes and thus fostering greater legal certainty is 
questionable.1334 In contrast, the final-offer approach avoids the cumbersome 
and troublesome task of judging domestic tax laws and/or establishing 
arm’s-length prices. It is true that an opaque decision without reasoning does 
not represent a perfect solution. Nevertheless, since the final-offer approach 
exerts “a centripetal force on the parties to move toward a middle ground”,1335 
the potential harm of this approach is somewhat constrained as opposed to 
the conventional approach, in which parties tend to polarise their position. 
Therefore, final-offer arbitration provides a conducive mechanism for both 
transfer pricing and non-transfer pricing cases. A possible challenge would be 
that this approach was originally developed to solve monetary disputes, while 
non-transfer pricing cases usually involve legal interpretation or 
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classification.1336 For example, the core issue of the Boulez case is about the 
correct categorisation of the activity undertaken by Boulez – whether it is 
provision of service or a license of royalties.1337 The reply to this challenge is 
simple: all such legal issues in tax cases can be ultimately translated into 
monetary disputes. In the end, the taxpayer in the Boulez case cares about 
the exact amount of revenue he should pay, for whatever reason and to 
whichever jurisdiction.       
4.3.2 Unreasonable offers by the competent authorities 
Another concern about final-offer arbitration is that parties may 
misunderstand this “non-mainstream” mechanism.1338 For example, if the 
parties in a final-offer arbitral proceeding are unable to understand that the 
panel is to choose the more reasonable offer, they may see the opponent’s 
more reasonable offer as a concession, and may therefore polarise their 
positions much as they might in the conventional approach.1339 This author 
rather doubts the weight of this concern. Non-mainstream as it may be, 
final-offer arbitration is not so complicated to understand. Some explanation 
and training for competent authorities can easily dispel the mysteries about 
the approach.  
However, the final-offer approach does require sophisticated parties to handle 
the procedure. Specifically, since a panel may only choose one of the final 
offers, the parties’ preparation of such final offers and the supporting 
arguments plays a critical role in determining the outcome of the dispute 
resolution. Basically, parties must walk a tightrope between their interests of 
revenue maximisation, on the one hand, and the reasonableness of their 
offers, on the other. They also need to craft their position paper and the 
                                                        
1336 Petruzzi, Koch and Turcan (n 190) 155. 
1337 Boulez, 83 TC (1984) (n 688) 584. 
1338 Tulis (n 1306) 106; Petruzzi, Koch and Turcan (n 190) 156. 
1339 Tulis (n 1306) 106. 
 273 
supporting documents such that the panel can be convinced as strongly as 
possible. In contrast, under conventional arbitration, arbitrators must lay out 
their own reasoning in the decision.1340 In this way, at least part of the burden 
of legal arguments has been shifted from competent authorities to 
arbitrators.1341 Arguably, one of the reasons that parties in conventional 
arbitration are more inclined to polarise their position is because they are 
aware that under this approach the panel is less dependent on the arguments 
they put forth.1342 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that many competent 
authorities, particularly those from developing countries, may need quite a 
while to get used to and become more confident about final-offer 
arbitration.1343           
4.4 Summary 
From the benefit perspective, final-offer arbitration is congruent with the 
MAP-based ITDR system, which, in turn, facilitates the ongoing international 
tax relationships. On the cost-side of the equation, this approach implies 
lower procedural costs than the conventional model. There are several 
concerns about final-offer arbitration, yet many of them are overstated. This 
author particularly argues that the type of tax dispute does not significantly 
affect the applicability of this approach, which can cover both transfer pricing 
and non-transfer pricing cases. That being said, this author realises that for 
tax administrations with low capacity, final-offer arbitration does imply some 
risks. Therefore, this author generally favours a wider application of this 
approach, but also submits that competent authorities should be allowed to 
choose a different approach. In particular, if the two competent authorities are 
unable to agree on an arbitration mode for a particular case, the conventional 
                                                        
1340 Petruzzi, Koch and Turcan (n 190) 155. 
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1343 Jérôme Monsenego, ‘Designing Arbitration Provisions in Tax Treaties: Reflections Based on the 
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approach should apply.   
It should be noted that despite the merits of final-offer arbitration, this 
approach does have a technical limitation that has been overlooked by most 
commentators: it is only suitable for bilateral disputes, because it necessitates 
a pair of binary offers, so that the panel’s selection of one party’s offer also 
delineates the disputed tax base for both parties. By contrast, in a multilateral 
case, each of the competent authorities can only propose its own share of the 
tax base, and the choice of any single offer cannot settle the share of the 
remaining parties.     
5. Trial method: oral hearings vs. documentary trials 
5.1 Oral hearings as the default mode of arbitral trial 
Typically, a full arbitral proceeding features an oral hearing that includes, inter 
alia, opening statements, oral testimony, and legal arguments. 1344  The 
process certainly incurs substantial transaction costs. As the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) confirms in a Guide, oral hearings are typically 
one of the most expensive and time-consuming phases of the arbitral 
process.1345 The following are the most common costs of oral hearings that 
has been identified by the ICC:1346 
(1) The cost of the extensive preparation that a hearing usually 
necessitates. 
(2) The expenses of physically bringing numerous people (parties, legal 
counsel, witnesses) together and hiring the facilities for the hearing. 
(3) The difficulty of scheduling a commonly convenient time for all relevant 
                                                        
1344 Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 157. 
1345 ICC, ‘Effective Management of Arbitration – A Guide for In-House Counsel and Other Party 
Representatives’ (n 813) 52. 
1346 ibid 52, 57. 
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participants. 
(4) The fees for interpreters in cases where participants use different 
languages. 
The ICC’s list is not conclusive. For example, the issue of multiple languages 
also raises equity problems for oral hearings in international commercial 
arbitration, in which English is the most common language. Specifically, the 
arbitration system will favour those counsellors and arbitrators who are from 
English-speaking jurisdictions. 1347  Moreover, oral hearings may increase 
party confrontation and advocacy so that parties become more dependent on 
the expertise of sophisticated legal counsel. In this way, an arbitral procedure 
can become prohibitively expensive.       
Accordingly, international arbitrations are increasingly relying on standardised 
procedures such as one or more rounds of pre- and post-hearing 
memorials.1348 Even for those arbitrations centred in common law systems, 
which have a stronger tradition of oral advocacy, oral hearings play a more 
limited role than common-law court proceedings. Certain constraints apply to 
arbitral hearings, such as shorter evidentiary examination (and 
cross-examination) and greater reliance on written materials. 1349  One 
practitioner observes that, even for those arbitral proceedings that feature 
oral hearings, “the limited time available for opening submission was best 
spent giving the tribunal a road map as to where important documents can be 
found in the exhibit binders submitted by each side”.1350     
That being said, oral hearings have advantages. Among others, they are 
often considered an effective means to assess evidence.1351 In particular, 
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while legal argument may take both oral and written forms, the questioning of 
witnesses is mostly an oral skill.1352 Indeed, in the context of international 
commercial arbitration, which is under a mounting pressure to reduce the 
length of hearings as much as possible, the primary function of an arbitral 
hearing has become the cross-examination of witnesses.1353  
5.2 Documentary methods in tax arbitration 
Given the cost-benefit analysis of oral hearings, the pros and cons of the 
documentary method in arbitral trials become clear as well: it significantly 
saves transaction costs for parties, albeit at the expense of thorough fact 
finding. However, in the context of tax arbitration, the cost-advantage of the 
documentary method outweighs its evidentiary disadvantage, primarily 
because the built-in manner of tax arbitration reduces the need for a thorough 
fact-finding in the arbitral proceedings. First, pursuant to Article 25 (5) of the 
OECD Model Convention, only disputed issues that are unresolved in the 
preceding MAP phase will be referred to arbitration.1354 This narrows the 
scope of tax disputes that need to be dealt with in an arbitral proceeding.1355 
Second, since the major function of tax arbitration is to facilitate MAP 
negotiations, the deliberation of an arbitral panel should be principally based 
on the facts and evidence that have already been presented by the parties in 
the MAP phase.1356 Indeed, the evidentiary rules of tax arbitration should be 
designed in such a way that competent authorities are generally precluded 
from strategically hiding key evidence in the MAP process and using them to 
their own advantage during arbitration.1357 Third, even in a MAP process, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
Representatives’ (n 813) 51. 
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1354 OECD Model Convention (2014) Article 25 (5). 
1355 Cai (n 327) 452. 
1356 OECD Model Convention (2014) Sample Procedure, 408-409 (para.18); Cai (n 327) 452. 
1357 Cai (n 327) 452; see also Brown (n 11) 108. 
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would be very unusual for competent authorities to deal with evidentiary 
disputes, since the MAP negotiation is usually based on a set of facts that are 
commonly agreed upon by the parties.1358 Consider a case in which a 
taxpayer challenges the procedural legitimacy, and thus the evidentiary value, 
of a tax audit conducted by a tax administration. The appropriate forum for the 
resolution of such dispute should be domestic procedures such as litigation or 
administrative appeal mechanisms in the state of that tax administration. It 
would be quite unrealistic and somewhat odd for the competent authority of 
another Contracting State to judge whether or not the aforementioned tax 
administration has satisfied a due-process requirement in carrying out its tax 
audit.1359    
5.3 US tax treaty practice 
Almost all US tax treaties that contain arbitration provisions adopt the 
documentary method for arbitral proceedings. 1360  For instance, the 
US-Canada Competent Authority Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
provides that all communications, except for logistical matters, between the 
competent authorities and the board of arbitrators must be in writing.1361 
Generally, the board is not allowed to require new evidence from the 
competent authorities beyond the documents produced on the basis of the 
MAP phase that precedes the arbitral procedure.1362   
It is true that most of the US tax treaties adopt final-offer arbitration, which is 
less demanding on fact finding and legal reasoning. Nevertheless, the 
documentary method is not intrinsic to the final-offer approach. Indeed, the 
MLB baseball arbitration, which is the origin of final-offer arbitration, contains 
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a simplified oral hearing procedure, where the parties can make an oral 
presentation to the panel.1363 Rather, in this author’s view, the documentary 
method in the US-Canada MoU, particularly with respect to the limitation on 
the source of evidence, is more connected with the built-in character of tax 
arbitration.      
6. Tax mediation: from ivory tower to the real world 
6.1 Overview 
As discussed previously, despite the benefits of mediation in ITDR, the 
mechanism has never been used.1364 The reason for this underuse has 
already been discussed: while mediation implies higher administrative costs 
than the MAP, it cannot guarantee a final result of dispute settlement.1365 In 
particular, considering that competent authorities under the traditional MAP 
process have no obligation to achieve a final settlement, they have 
insufficient incentives to invest extra resources on mediation with no 
assurance of finality. Based on the TC framework developed in Part Ⅰ of 
this thesis, two ways to increase the use of tax mediation can be envisaged.   
6.2 Mediation in the shadow of arbitration 
As mentioned previously, the incorporation of an arbitration clause into MAP 
provisions has the effect of spurring a higher level of diligence and goodwill 
from the competent authorities in conducting MAP cases. 1366  If the 
competent authorities encounter a bargaining impasse and the prospect of 
arbitration looms large, they would have a greater incentive to seek 
assistance from an impartial and sophisticated mediator.        
                                                        
1363 Petruzzi, Koch and Turcan (n 190) 140. 
1364 See above, Chapter 1, Section 1.8. 
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A typical mode of tax mediation in the shadow of arbitration can be seen in 
the institutional ITDR framework proposed by Owens et al.1367 Under the 
framework, if the competent authorities are unable to achieve an agreement 
within 20 months from the initiation of the MAP, they shall, unless they 
otherwise agree, submit the unresolved issues to a third party for mediation. If 
the mediation is still unable to resolve the case, the remaining issues would 
be submitted to an arbitration procedure.1368  
6.3 Package mediation 
The method of package mediation is associated with the package deal of the 
MAP, as discussed previously. 1369  On various occasions, competent 
authorities undertaking a package negotiation may find it difficult to achieve a 
deal on their own, perhaps because the package covers too many cases or 
issues, thereby complicating the negotiation. In this case, the involvement of 
a mediator can facilitate the negotiation significantly. Competent authorities 
can also submit a batch of cases to mediation in the first place. Similar to 
package negotiation, mediation in a package manner produces economies of 
scale, and thus becomes more affordable than the case-by-case method of 
dispute resolution. 1370  In particular, the extra costs associated with the 
involvement of a third-party mediator can be diluted across multiple cases.1371 
Furthermore, a mediator in package mediation is equipped with more tools to 
create a problem-solving climate or a win-win prospect for the competent 
authorities.1372 As the MEMAP notes, the mediator’s ability to disengage 
parties from the classic zero-sum game and shift the focus to a more collegial 
and collaborative approach to dispute resolution will help the competent 
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authorities reach a satisfactory result.1373  Arguably, this ability could be 
significantly compromised if the mediator’s authority were to be strictly 
confined to a particular dispute at hand. The notion of package mediation 
echoes Dalton’s interview, which suggested that tax mediation is underused 
partly because case-by-case mediation cannot satisfy the broader 
perspective taken by competent authorities in handling MAP cases.1374     
7. Evaluation of Part Ⅵ of the MLI 
7.1 Overview 
Part Ⅵ of the MLI contains the mechanism of tax arbitration. Each state has 
the option to apply this part with respect to their tax treaties, and the new rules 
would act to modify a tax treaty only if both parties so opt.1375 As of October 
2019, 30 jurisdictions have chosen to implement Part Ⅵ  in their tax 
treaties.1376  
7.2 Key aspects of Part Ⅵ  
7.2.1 Initiation of arbitral procedure 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the MLI, while the usual two-year time limit regarding 
the initiation of arbitration still applies in principle, it is subject to several 
exceptions. First, prior to the expiration of that period, the competent 
authorities may agree to a different time period for the case, subject to 
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notifying the taxpayer concerned (henceforth referred to as discretional 
extension).1377 Second, the period can be extended either on the grounds 
that the same issue is pending before a court or administrative tribunal 
(extension for procedural conflict), or that the taxpayer concerned has failed 
to provide in a timely manner any additional information requested by the 
competent authorities (extension for insufficient information).1378 Third, the 
Contracting States may replace the two-year time limit with a three-year 
period, which is in line with Article 25 (5) of the UN Model (legislative 
extension).1379  
7.2.2 Appointment of arbitrators 
The procedure of appointing arbitrators generally follows the pattern in the 
OECD Sample Procedure of the pre-2017 OECD Model, yet with substantial 
improvements. An arbitral panel consists of three individual members with 
expertise and experience in international tax matters.1380 Each competent 
authority should appoint one panel member within 60 days of the date of the 
arbitration request, and the co-arbitrators so appointed should then appoint a 
Chair within 60 days of their appointments.1381 Under the OECD Sample 
Procedure (2014), the time period for the appointment of co-arbitrators is 
three months after the Terms of Reference have been received by the 
taxpayer concerned, or, if the competent authorities fail to communicate the 
Terms of Reference to the taxpayer, four months after the request for 
arbitration.1382 Therefore, the timetable for the appointment of arbitrators 
under the MLI is tighter than that of the OECD Sample Procedure.  
Similar to the rule of the Sample Procedure, if any of the above appointments 
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has not been made within the given period, the outstanding appointment will 
be made by the highest-ranking official of the CTPA under the OECD.1383 
Part Ⅵ  of the MLI further provides rules on the impartiality and 
independence of arbitrators.1384 
7.2.3 Arbitration modes 
As is the case in the UN Sample Procedure, Article 23 of the MLI provides the 
final-offer arbitration as the generally applicable arbitration process, although 
the competent authorities can also opt for the conventional approach. This is 
the most significant deviation from the OECD Sample Procedure that has 
been made in Part Ⅵ of the MLI. Article 23 further provides some basic 
procedural rules for each of the two arbitration modes. 1385  Under the 
final-offer approach, each competent authority submits to the arbitration panel 
a proposed resolution and a supporting position paper.1386 The proposed 
resolution is typically a disposition of specific monetary amounts (e.g. of 
income or expense), or the maximum rate of tax charged.1387 Nevertheless, 
in a case involving threshold questions such as residency status of a taxpayer 
at issue, or the existence of a PE, the proposed solutions can also be the 
determination of such questions.1388 Each competent authority may also 
submit to the panel a reply submission as a rebuttal to the other side’s 
position.1389 The arbitration panel is to select as its decision one of the above 
proposed resolutions.1390 
If the parties opt for the conventional approach, all the information previously 
available to the competent authorities should be provided to the panel without 
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delay.1391 New information is principally not allowed unless otherwise agreed 
by the competent authorities.1392 The panel would decide the case based on 
the tax treaty, domestic law and other sources identified by the competent 
authorities via agreement.1393 The decision is to be supported by reasoning, 
yet does not have any precedential value.1394                 
7.2.4 Implementation of arbitration decisions 
An arbitration decision is to be implemented through mutual agreement by the 
competent authorities. 1395  Such decisions are generally binding, except 
where (a) the taxpayer concerned does not accept the decision; (b) the court 
of either Contracting State rules that the decision is invalid; or (c) the taxpayer 
litigates the issue in question before any court or administrative tribunal.1396 
Article 24 (2) further stipulates that the arbitration decision will not be binding 
if the competent authorities agree on a different resolution of all unresolved 
issues within three months after the issuance of the decision.  
7.2.5 Costs 
The allocation of arbitration costs is to be settled through mutual 
agreement.1397 If no such agreement is achieved, each party should bear its 
own expenses and those of its appointed panel members. Other expenses, 
including the cost of the Chair, will be borne by the parties in equal shares.1398 
7.3 Comments 
For many commentators, the tax arbitration rules under the MLI represent a 
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“half-way house” approach, having left much room for further 
improvement.1399 In particular, the adoption of final-offer arbitration as the 
default mode is regarded as a compromise under the pressure of sovereignty 
concerns.1400  However, this author takes the view that in principle, the new 
rules are in line with the MAP-based ITDR system. Specifically, the extended 
time limits regarding the initiation of an arbitral procedure reflects the 
policymakers’ intention to encourage the resolution of tax disputes within the 
MAP phase before such cases are eligible for arbitration. The use of 
final-offer arbitration as the default mode and competent authorities’ ability to 
agree on a resolution that differs from an arbitral decision highlight the role of 
tax arbitration in supplementing and facilitating MAP negotiation. With respect 
to conventional arbitration, the rules restricting the panels’ authority in 
requesting new information from the competent authorities are in line with the 
above notion of synergizing the MAP and the arbitration phase (Sections 
2.2.4, 5.2).  
Meanwhile, the MLI provides more-detailed rules on the arbitration procedure, 
thereby increasing the procedural robustness of the mechanism.1401 It is true 
that the OECD Sample Procedure (pre-2017 version) also contained 
relatively detailed arbitration rules. However, the Sample Procedure is, after 
all, merely a sample lack of any binding effect. Therefore, through the 
adoption of Part Ⅵ of the MLI, operational rules of tax arbitration have been 
imported into the text of affected tax treaties, most of which were originally 
stipulated in a very general manner without further guidelines on how to 
operate the procedure.1402 
Nonetheless, the new rules under the MLI are far from perfect. First, the rules 
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for post-panel procedures, particularly with respect to conventional arbitration, 
are still very preliminary.1403 This raises a concern that parties may engage in 
procedural obstruction during arbitral proceedings. One solution is, as 
discussed above (Section 3.4), to accord more discretion to the arbitral panel 
in applying a wider range of procedural rules. 
Second, procedural obstruction may also occur at the initiation of tax 
arbitration. In particular, the rule of discretional extension may de facto nullify 
an arbitration clause in its entirety.1404 Therefore, it seems advisable to 
subject this type of extension to the consent of the taxpayer concerned. For 
example, in a MAP case where there is every prospect of achieving an 
agreement yet the expiration of the two-year period is imminent, it is quite 
likely that the taxpayer may agree to an extension of the negotiation. As to the 
extension for insufficient information, Article 19 (10) states that the minimum 
information required is to be settled by the competent authorities through 
mutual agreement. Since this rule will also cause uncertainty for taxpayers, it 
is desirable for the OECD (or other relevant international organisations) to 
promulgate general rules for the information requirement during the MAP 
process. In principle, the required information should have substantial 
relevance to the resolution of a dispute. Moreover, the timing for requesting 
additional information should also be regulated. For example, any such 
requests should be made within a certain period of time from the admission of 
a MAP request to ensure that the taxpayer concerned will have sufficient time 
to reply, and that the competent authorities will not use such a request as a 
tactic to postpone the triggering of tax arbitration.1405  
Third, the fact that an arbitration decision is subject to almost unlimited review 
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by courts may open the door to unlimited disputes over the validity of 
arbitration decisions.1406 First, the use of a final-offer approach and the 
attendant lack of reasoning in arbitral decisions may in itself constitute 
grounds for the domestic court to annul the decisions. Even under the 
conventional approach, it is easy for a domestic court of the jurisdiction that 
has lost in the arbitration to discredit the decision. This is because, as 
explained previously, the domestic court is justified to interpret the tax treaty 
at issue differently from the approach adopted by an international tribunal.1407 
On the other hand, considering the party-arbitrator relationship in the tax 
arbitration process, judicial review does constitute an effective means to 
address opportunism on the part of the arbitrators.1408 Therefore, a balanced 
approach is to allow the judicial review of arbitration decisions, but on a very 
limited basis. Drawing on the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention, four possible grounds for nullifying a tax-arbitration decision can 
be envisaged:1409 
(1) The tribunal was not properly constituted. 
(2) The tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers. For example, an 
arbitrator conducted the procedure under the conventional arbitration 
mode although the parties had chosen the final-offer approach.  
(3) There was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal. 
(4) There was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. 
For example, a party did not receive proper notice or the arbitrators 
prevented a party from being able to present its case.           
In this way, the judicial review of a tax-arbitration decision is limited to the 
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procedural and most fundamental aspects of the process, thereby ensuring 
the finality of an arbitration decision while at the same time reducing the 
agency problem of the arbitration process. 
8. Some reflections on the cost analysis in Chapter 3 
In comparing the transaction costs of the MAP and that of tax arbitration in 
Chapter 3, this author mainly kept in mind a conventional mode of tax 
arbitration with full-fledged procedure.1410 Accordingly, the analysis of this 
chapter may raise a potential concern that the final-offer approach, and the 
documentary method, of tax arbitration proposed above may weaken the 
analysis in Chapter 3. Specifically, one may argue that had these more 
efficient modes of arbitration been taken into account in Chapter 3, the cost 
analysis there may have led to different conclusions that could contradict the 
legalistic position characterising this thesis. The reply to this concern is 
twofold. 
First and foremost, this chapter has demonstrated that the effectiveness of 
both the final-offer approach and the documentary method is conditioned 
upon the synergy between the MAP and arbitration. Therefore, these 
simplified versions of tax arbitration are indeed an integral part, rather than 
the antithesis, of an antilegalistic style of the ITDR system. In contrast, what 
becomes the target of this thesis are those proposals of stand-alone 
arbitration or more legalistic approaches. This explains why the cost analysis 
in Chapter 3 mainly concerns the conventional, full-fledged arbitration 
vis-à-vis the simplified versions. 
Second, even assuming that the final-offer approach, and the documentary 
method, of tax arbitration can be operated on a stand-alone basis, the cost 
analysis in Chapter 3 still largely holds true. This is because compared with 
                                                        
1410 See above, Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
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the MAP, even arbitration in its simpler version is still more formalised, let 
alone the extra costs associated with the establishment of an arbitral panel. 
Moreover, for countries with large inventories of tax disputes, the MAP may 
benefit from the method of package negotiation, particularly the conclusion of 
framework agreements, whereas arbitration, simplified though as it may be, is 
typically conducted on a case-by-case manner.  
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Chapter 7. Institutional ITDR 
1. Introduction 
While Chapters 5 and 6 focus, respectively, on the improvement of the ITDR 
system within the paradigm of traditional MAP and third party procedures, this 
chapter will explore measures that can strengthen the entire ITDR system. To 
be sure, an apparent way to improve the system would be for national 
governments to augment their budgets for ITDR. As Terr et al. comment: 
Most would agree that more resources are needed now – in the form of 
increased numbers and quality of personnel and funding for training, 
operations, management, and the like – just to maintain existing levels of tax 
dispute resolution activity in the international tax area, let alone to undertake 
significant new ones such as…formulating and implementing procedures for 
expanded taxpayer participation in MAP and arbitration cases.1411    
However, for researchers adopting a law-and-economic approach, a budget 
increase should principally be the last option. This is because economics rest 
upon the assumption that resources are scarce and hence access to them is 
competitive, and the role of economists is to study how individuals optimise 
their choices in the face of resource constraints. 1412  Moreover, for 
researchers on tax systems, saving money for taxpayers (in a general sense) 
is always an overarching good. Lastly, for developing countries, particularly 
those of the least developed, budget constraints on national ITDR systems 
reflect the countries’ overall incapacity.   
Instead, this chapter focuses on a key elements that may affect the 
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cost-efficiency of the ITDR system: institutionalisation.  
2. Transaction costs, firm theory, and institutionalisation 
As demonstrated previously, TC theories are closely related to firm theory. 
First, classic TC theory started from Coase’s seminal enquiry: why does a 
firm emerge at all in a specialised exchange economy? Coase argues that 
the firm economises transaction costs by reducing the number of voluntary 
exchanges that are otherwise necessary for collaborative production in the 
market. 1413  Second, in agency theory, the firm provides a mechanism 
whereby a central agent can monitor collaborative production to prevent the 
participants from shirking.1414 Third, from the TCE perspective, the firm’s role 
is to provide a governance structure for contracts with specialised investment 
and recurrent transactions so that opportunistic exploitation and competitive 
bargaining by parties on every occasion of contractual adaptation can be 
managed more effectively and efficiently. 1415  While different theories 
approach the phenomenon of the firm from slightly different perspectives, 
they share a commonality: the nature of the firm is to substitute a hierarchical 
structure for voluntary exchanges. By applying this hierarchical structure, 
which is characterised by the method of management order and 
entrepreneurial decision in allocating economic resources, the transaction 
costs associated with voluntary exchanges, including, inter alia, the costs of 
searching for the right parties, negotiating contracts, and monitoring 
contractual enforcement, can largely be saved.  
In addition to the transaction-cost approach to firm theory, numerous theorists 
emphasise the knowledge aspect, or “core competence”, of the firm.1416 This 
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latter approach regards the firm not as a nexus of contracts, but as a stock of 
knowledge or an accumulation of core competence.1417 A well-known dictum 
under this approach is that “organizations know more than what their 
contracts can say”.1418 It is this knowledge-based advantage that explains 
why some firms trump others in a competitive market.1419 How, then, is this 
advantage generated within a firm? A common explanation is that the firm can 
supply some “higher-order organization principles” such as corporate culture 
or shared values. 1420  That being said, as some point out, the 
knowledge-based approach actually complements, rather than discredits, the 
hierarchy-based theory. The argument is that higher-order organisational 
principles, which help foster the firm’s knowledge stock and core competence, 
emerge exactly because the use of a hierarchical structure controls strategic 
behaviours of, or hostile bargaining among, parties in an organisation.1421 
Once such disruptive inclinations are tamed, a healthy and productive set of 
shared values or corporate culture would naturally grow within the 
organisation.1422 
The firm theory, which emphasises the pivotal role of a hierarchy, can be 
further generalised as an organisational or institutional theory.1423 This is 
because among various institutions, public or private, what matter are 
hierarchies. 1424  “Viewed against this background, state and private 
bureaucracies have a similar nature. They both serve as allocation 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Nicolai J Foss and Peter G Klein, Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment: A New Approach to 
the Firm (Cambridge University Press 2012); Richard R Nelson, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change (Harvard University Press 2009); Edith Tilton Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 
(Second edition., Basil Blackwell 1980). 
1417 Klein (n 1416) 17. 
1418 Nicolai J Foss, ‘Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments’ 
(1996) 7 Organization science 470, 471. 
1419 ibid 470. 
1420 Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, ‘Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the 
Replication of Technology’ (1992) 3 Organization science 383; see also Foss (n 1418) 472. 
1421 Foss (n 1418) 473. 
1422 ibid. 
1423 Musole (n 383) 65. 
1424 ibid. 
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mechanisms that save on transaction costs.”1425 Indeed, this institutional 
theory has exerted a far-reaching influence on IR theory, particularly the 
school of Liberal Institutionalism, which is frequently drawn upon in theoretical 
reflection on the topic of ITDR.1426 Keohane, one of the founders of the 
school, compares international anarchy with the situation of market failure, 
whereby “economic activities uncoordinated by hierarchical authority lead to 
inefficient results”. 1427  To correct these defects, conscious institutional 
innovation is warranted, since international institutions, which are manifested 
in various international organisations, facilitate coordination among states by 
reducing transaction costs, i.e. costs associated with negotiation, monitoring, 
and enforcement of international agreements.1428    
3. Institutional third-party procedures of ITDR 
In the context of dispute settlement, investigation and discussion of 
institutionalisation is mostly related to the dichotomy between ad hoc and 
institutional arbitration. Institutional arbitration mainly refers to arbitral 
proceedings that are administered by an established body or forum. This 
body or forum, also known as an arbitral institution, ordinarily provides 
disputing parties with secretarial support and other facilities such as a central 
place for hosting arbitral proceedings.1429 In contrast, ad hoc arbitrations are 
those where the major aspects of arbitral procedures are determined by 
parties rather than by an arbitral institution.1430 The choice between ad hoc 
and institutional approaches has been extensively discussed in the literature 
                                                        
1425 ibid. 
1426 Hasenclever (n 444) 4 ("Neoliberals have drawn heavily on economic theories of institutions 
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1427 Robert O Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’ in Stephen D Krasner (ed), 
International Regimes (Cornell University Press 1983) 151. Emphasis added by this author.  
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on international commercial (and investment) arbitration and those debates 
provide useful insights to the discussion here.1431 The following investigation 
will centre upon several major aspects of an arbitral procedure.  
3.1 Selection of arbitrators 
Institutional arbitration usually benefits from access to a database of 
arbitrators.1432 Numerous arbitral institutes maintain rosters of highly qualified 
experts from various regions and backgrounds. This allows parties to select 
arbitrators with the necessary skill, experience, and expertise for the disputed 
cases.1433 Several arbitral institutes provide extra mechanisms to ensure 
arbitrators’ impartiality. For example, under the rule of the Arbitration Institute 
of the Stockholm and Chamber of Commerce (SCC), chosen arbitrators must 
submit a written statement confirming their impartiality and independence.1434  
By contrast, parties in an ad hoc arbitration usually have to rely on their own 
resources and experience in appointing arbitrators. 1435  Given the 
underdevelopment of tax-arbitrator communities, parties in ad hoc tax 
arbitration may encounter more difficulties in searching for competent 
arbitrators. In the Electrolux case, such difficulty resulted in a significant delay 
in the establishment of the Advisory Commission.1436 
3.2 Secretarial support 
Tribunal secretaries handle administrative tasks such as communicating 
                                                        
1431 For representative studies, see Margaret L. Moses (n 769) 9–10; Edlira Aliaj, ‘Dispute Resolution 
through Ad Hoc and Institutional Arbitration’ (2016) 2 Academic Journal of Business 241; Arkin (n 1429); 
Sundra Rajoo, ‘Institutional and Ad Hoc Arbitrations: Advantages and Disadvantages’ [2010] The Law 
Review 12; Blanke (n 1270); ‘Institutional vs. “ad Hoc” Arbitration’ 
<https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/projects--construction/international-arbitration/institutional-vs-ad-h
oc-arbitration/> accessed 19 April 2018. 
1432 Blanke (n 1270) 279. 
1433 ‘Institutional vs. “ad Hoc” Arbitration’ (n 1431); Ault and Majdanska (n 193) 270. 
1434 Ault and Majdanska (n 193) 236. 
1435 Blanke (n 1270) 279. 
1436 See above, Chapter 3, Section 5.4.2. 
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procedural issues or coordinating logistical matters. Occasionally, they also 
undertake more-advanced, albeit more-contentious, duties including, inter 
alia, conducting legal research, attending panel deliberations, and drafting 
procedural orders. 1437  The involvement of a secretary enhances the 
efficiency of an arbitration proceeding, allows the panel to focus on 
deliberating the merits of the case, and enables the tribunal to render an 
award more quickly.1438 Most arbitral institutes host a team of sophisticated 
staff that can routinely provide secretarial support for various arbitral 
proceedings. A number of arbitral institutes further codify their practice of 
appointing tribunal secretaries into rules, guidelines, or notes, such as the 
ICC Note on the Appointment, Duties and Remuneration of Administrative 
Secretaries.1439 
The Advisory Commission and the competent authorities in the Electrolux 
case also found it helpful to have secretarial support. However, the fact that 
the secretary was a member of the respondent competent authority raises 
concerns about its impartiality.1440 
3.3 Procedural rules 
In most cases, by submitting their disputes for institutional arbitration, parties 
tacitly agree to accept that institution’s procedural framework.1441 These 
procedural rules are time-tested, and thus quite effective in dealing with most 
situations that may arise in an arbitral proceeding. They ensure that 
arbitrators (and tribunal secretaries) are appointed in a timely way, and that 
arbitral procedures proceed in a reasonable and efficient manner.1442 In 
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1438 ibid. 
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1440 See above, Chapter 3, Section 5.4.2. 
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particular, these procedural rules normally prescribe tight timelines for key 
stages of an arbitral proceeding – such as the appointment of arbitrators, the 
exchange of the parties’ pleadings, the main hearing and the publication of 
the final award – so as to expedite the process.1443  Numerous arbitral 
institutes also provide mechanisms that could guarantee continuation of an 
arbitration proceeding in the event that either party defaults in the course of 
arbitration.1444 For example, Article 26(2) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration 
provides that if any of the parties, although duly summoned, fails to appear 
without a valid excuse, the arbitral tribunal shall have the power to proceed 
with the hearing.1445 
For tax arbitration, specified and time-tested procedural rules provided and 
executed by an arbitral institution are of particular benefit. As discussed 
previously, the advantage of tax arbitration over the MAP in terms of 
procedural finality and efficiency hinges upon the robustness of arbitral 
rules. 1446  Specifically, given the built-in manner of tax arbitration, the 
triggering of an arbitral procedure signifies a relatively low level of good faith 
between the parties.1447 Moreover, the underdevelopment of tax arbitration 
further intensifies the risk of procedural impasses and abuses in the ad hoc 
approach.1448 
3.4 Publication of arbitral awards 
While the last chapter recommended a wider use of the final-offer approach to 
tax arbitration and hence placed a lesser emphasis on the publication of 
arbitral awards, 1449  this author does acknowledge that where the 
                                                        
1443 Blanke (n 1270) 281. 
1444 ibid. 
1445 ICC, ‘ICC Rules of Arbitration’ (ICC 2017) Art. 26 (2). 
1446 See above, Chapter 6, Section 3.1. 
1447 ibid. 
1448 See above, Chapter 6, Section 3.1, 3.4. 
1449 See above, Chapter 6, Section 4.  
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conventional approach applies, such publication could be beneficial. The 
OECD states in its 2007 report that although the final decision of tax 
arbitration would not become a formal precedent, “having the material [of 
arbitral decisions on tax disputes] in the public domain could influence the 
course of other cases so as to avoid subsequent disputes and lead to a more 
uniform approach to the same issue.”1450 In this author’s view, while the 
prospect of a uniform approach to legal application in international tax regime 
is doubtful, published decisions can at least foster a more educated approach. 
In addition, publication of arbitral awards can lend additional transparency to 
the process, and thus mitigate the risk of opportunism on the part of 
arbitrators. 1451  Some scholars voice their concerns about the possible 
damages to business confidentiality with the publication of arbitral awards.1452 
The solution is to take an incremental approach: at the early stage, decisions 
can be published in a redacted form, and full publication will be subject to 
party consent.1453 
Despite the advantages of publishing tax-arbitration decisions, the task is 
more difficult to fulfil in the ad hoc approach than in an institutional setting. 
First, the task of writing and then publishing a well-reasoned and polished 
arbitral award may overload an ad hoc tribunal, which may have already been 
under stress due to the lack of administrative support. Second, based on the 
egoism assumption established in economics, neither parties nor an ad hoc 
tribunal will have sufficient incentives to assume the extra burden to produce 
a social good. In contrast, an arbitral institution not only possesses more 
capacity than an ad hoc tribunal, but also has a greater incentive to publish 
arbitral awards, because in so doing it can enhance its own credibility and 
                                                        
1450 OECD, ‘Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes’ (2007) 24 (para. 39) 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/38055311.pdf>. 
1451 ibid. 
1452 Terr and others (n 25) 438, 491–492. 
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reputation. In fact, numerous well-known arbitral institutes, such as the ICC, 
the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the ICSID, routinely 
publish their arbitral awards.1454     
3.5 Research and development 
In addition to providing administrative services for the arbitral proceedings 
registered with an institution, staff of arbitral institutions may also engage in 
research and development activities with respect to substantive and 
procedural aspects of dispute resolution. They can draw lessons from its 
recurrent arbitration practices and seek to optimise the institution’s procedural 
rules. They can conduct research on their case decisions to achieve more 
consistency and coherence in their approach to case decision.1455 Numerous 
arbitral (or adjudicatory) institutes, such as the WTO, ICSID, and ICC, also 
play an active role in academic research on the relevant issue areas. For 
example, the Secretariat of the ICSID has long compiled and published 
national legislation and international agreements relating to foreign 
investments, and has regularly invited academic contributions on the topic of 
international investment to be published in its own journal. 1456  These 
activities have significantly contributed to the development of international 
investment law.1457  
Given the immaturity of tax arbitration and the proliferation of tax disputes, an 
efficient research and development mechanism, whereby the stock of 
knowledge on ITDR can be rapidly built up, is of significant value.  
                                                        
1454 ibid. 
1455 Cai (n 327) 461. 
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3.6 Procedural costs 
On the surface, opting for institutional arbitration may impose on the parties 
extra expenses related to the use of an arbitral institution that administers the 
case, such as registration and hearing fees.1458 In the context of ITDR, 
institutional arbitration may further necessitate an outlay of setup fees to build 
an arbitral institution that is specialised in tax dispute settlement.   
Nevertheless, the expenses of using an arbitral institution should not be 
exaggerated. First, compared with the party costs such as expenses for 
arbitrators, lawyers, or representatives – which will occur in both ad hoc and 
institutional settings – the expenses associated with the use of an arbitral 
institution are insignificant. For instance, according to a report from the ICC 
Commission on Arbitration, for ICC arbitrations finalised in 2003 and 2004, 
82% of the costs were borne by parties to present their cases, 16% were 
attributed to arbitrators’ fees, and only 2% were administrative expenses of 
the ICC.1459 In 2012, Allen& Overy, a British law firm, studied the expense 
structure of international investment arbitration, finding that the average party 
costs for claimants and respondents respectively averaged US$ 6,019,000 
and US$ 4,855,000, while tribunal costs averagely US$ 933,000.1460 Note 
that the tribunal costs in this study include both arbitrators’ fees and 
institutional charges. The Allen & Overy study further shows that the average 
tribunal costs under the ICSID (US$ 920,000) are even less than those of ad 
hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL (US$ 1,089,000).1461 This discovery is 
somewhat surprising given that proceedings under the ICSID involve an extra 
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outlay of institutional charge. The most sensible explanation for this paradox 
is that the ICSID rules impose some regulations on arbitrators’ remuneration. 
This could be another advantage of institutional arbitration in terms of 
procedural costs.  
With regard to the setup fee of establishing an arbitral institution for tax 
dispute resolution, the rule of scale economies indicates that this setup outlay 
can be easily spread among those tax disputes that recur frequently. More 
importantly, based on the discussion in this section, it should be noted that the 
extra costs associated with the setup and use of an arbitral institution should 
be balanced against the benefits provided by the institution. This corresponds 
to the proposition that the transaction costs of ITDR include not only monetary, 
but also non-monetary expenses.  
3.7 A firm-theory explanation  
The above lessons drawn from international commercial (investment) 
arbitration can also be viewed through the lens of firm theory. An arbitral 
institution, through its people functions such as secretarial support and 
administrative management, performs the role of a central agent in 
dispute-settlement activities and coordinates the conduct of the multiple 
participants – including, inter alia, competent authorities, arbitrators, 
taxpayers, lawyers and experts, translators, and witnesses – in arbitral 
proceedings. Instead of negotiating with each other on every procedural 
aspect, those participants only need to follow the directions of the institution, 
thereby saving a large amount of administrative costs. This central agent also 
helps monitor the participants’ potential opportunism and resolve 
disagreements among them. In this way, arbitral proceedings can be 
managed in a more robust manner. Furthermore, through its focus on 
procedural management, the institution reaps the benefit of scale economies. 
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For example, its costs associated with the maintenance of secretarial 
services, arbitrator databases, courtrooms, and other facilities can be 
significantly diluted among a large number of cases it administers. Lastly, by 
engaging in research and development functions, an arbitral institution 
acquires more expertise on ITDR practice; it can even contribute to the 
development of the discipline of ITDRP as well as international tax law.   
The benefits of institutional arbitration also apply to tax mediation. As 
discussed previously, the dormancy of tax mediation partly results from its 
higher administrative costs as opposed to the MAP.1462  Specifically, the 
involvement of a third-party neutral and the organisation of face-to-face 
meetings may incur substantial expenses, both monetary and non-monetary. 
These costs can be economised effectively in an institutional setting.1463    
4. Institutional MAP: some preliminary thoughts 
Generally speaking, among various ITDR mechanisms, the MAP should be 
the last to be institutionalised, in light of the flexibility of the procedure. That 
being said, certain types of MAP particularly lend themselves to institutional 
facilitation. The first type involves cases with a high level of complexity and 
large funds at stake. Such cases imply a higher risk of impasses, and thus a 
greater possibility of triggering arbitral proceedings. As covered previously, 
the built-in manner of tax arbitration entails a synergy between the MAP and 
tax arbitration that requires a more structured MAP process. 1464  In the 
Electrolux case, the participants realised that the quantity and quality of 
documents available in the arbitral procedure depended critically on how well 
the MAP process was conducted.1465 In this connection, an institutional 
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1464 See above, Chapter 6, Sections 2.2.4, 5.  
1465 See above, Chapter 3, Section 5.4.2.  
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setting would be of substantial value in assisting competent authorities to 
conduct their MAPs in a more structured manner. For example, the 
institution’s administrative function may help record and classify the 
documents generated in a MAP process. In particular, authoritative 
documents can be distinguished from informal correspondence; factual 
statements can be isolated from interim concessions. In this way, it becomes 
easier for the panel of the ensuing arbitral procedure to distinguish settled 
issues from those unsettled, and to identify which documents can be 
accepted as evidence and which cannot.  
The second type of MAP that is amenable to institutionalisation concerns 
multilateral disputes. As the number of party increases, all three types of 
transaction costs will increase.1466 Accordingly, the role of institutionalisation 
in economising these costs is highlighted. For example, a technical issue for 
multilateral MAPs is the free-riding situation, where no individual competent 
authority has the incentive to take an initiative in organising face-to-face 
meetings or serving key documents to all the procedural participants. The 
institutional approach provides an effective means to overcome such 
problems. Moreover, the high transaction costs of a multilateral MAP also 
indicate a greater likelihood for the process to escalate to an arbitral 
procedure. As discussed above, the high synergy between a case’s MAP and 
arbitration phases, which is a critical means to enhance the cost-efficiency of 
the dispute-settlement process, requires a more structured MAP.  
The third type of case involves package negotiation, particularly with respect 
to framework agreements. This type of MAP is more structured and usually 
involves multiple participants, and is thus more amenable to institutional 
facilitation. Indeed, competent authorities have already envisioned the 
prospect of institutional package MAPs. In at least five peer-review reports, 
                                                        
1466 See above, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4; Chapter 3, Section 4.6. 
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peers suggested arranging regular MAP meetings in a centralised place 
(Paris).1467  
Institutional MAPs also provide a setting conducive for promoting tax 
mediation. If a MAP negotiation were to go awry within an institutional setting, 
it would be quite natural for that institution to intervene as a mediator, or at 
least as a provider of good office. 
To some extent, the idea of institutional negotiation has already been, at least 
partially, realised in the trade regime. Under the DSU of the WTO, all the 
requests of consultations must be notified to the DSB in writing.1468 Any third 
country that desires to join the consultation should also notify the DSB of such 
intentions. 1469  Although the DSB does not substantially manage the 
consultation process, and thus fall short of a full institutional consultation, at 
least “a formal request to the DSB for consultations demonstrates that a 
Member is serious about resolving the dispute”.1470 Furthermore, the DSU 
provides that the Director-General of the WTO may offer good offices, 
conciliation, or mediation to assist the Members’ consultation.1471            
5. Institutional coordination on ITDR policies 
The role of international institutions in coordination of national tax policies has 
been extensively investigated both by tax and IR scholars.1472 In particular, it 
is widely recognised that the OECD has played a pivotal role in shaping the 
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international tax regime.1473 Its work on avoiding double taxation through the 
OECD Model Convention has become a fundamental part of the international 
tax architecture for more than 50 years.1474 Its efforts to address double 
non-taxation, mostly reflected in the Harmful Tax Practices Project, ultimately 
resulted in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Tax 
Information, with more than 150 members around the world. 1475  More 
recently, in partnership with the G20, the OECD took the lead in launching the 
most fundamental rewrite of international tax rules in the past century: the 
BEPS Project.1476 This thesis has already demonstrated the OECD’s role in 
coordinating ITDR policies, in conjunction with the discussion of the 
dispute-settlement provision under the OECD Model Convention, the 
MEMAP,1477 and particularly the peer-review process under BEPS Action 
14.1478 
To a lesser extent, the UN also plays an important part in shaping 
international tax policies. Specifically, the UN has in place a Tax Committee 
with an aim of enhancing and promoting international tax cooperation among 
national tax authorities.1479 The UN Model Convention, though it reproduces 
the basic provisions of the OECD Model, reflects a greater accommodation of 
developing countries’ interests. 1480  With respect to ITDR policies, the 
Committee recently formed a subcommittee with a mandate to draft a 
handbook on tax-dispute avoidance and resolution.1481 
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6. Boundary of institutionalisation 
Given the advantages of institutionalisation in international tax coordination, it 
seems quite desirable to promote more-aggressive schemes such as the ITO 
or, at least, the ITC for the purpose of ITDR. While many commentators have 
championed such centralized plans, this author argues that institutional ITDR 
has its limits.1482 
6.1 Theory on the firm’s limits 
After Coase addressed the question of why the firm emerges, he continues to 
inquire: if the firm is advantageous in economising transaction costs 
associated with market exchanges, why is not all production carried out by 
one big firm?1483 The clue to this question still lies in TC theory. As a firm 
grows its size, wrote Coase, there may be decreasing returns to the 
entrepreneur function. 1484  Specifically, the costs of organising additional 
transactions within the firm may rise. It may also be that the entrepreneur fails 
to make the best use of production resources as the number of transactions 
increases.1485 To a certain point, the costs of using the firm as a method of 
organising transactions will be equal to the costs involved in carrying out the 
transactions in the open market, and the expansion of the firm ceases.1486        
Other theorists approach the same question from slightly different 
perspectives. One argument is that as the firm substitutes market exchanges, 
                                                                                                                                                             
s-to-tax-treaty-negotiation-manual-27630> accessed 11 April 2019 See also below, this chapter, 
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1483 Coase (n 377) 394. 
1484 ibid. 
1485 ibid 394–395. 
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there will be an impairment of incentives.1487 For example, once an individual 
seller of an asset in the market is absorbed by a corporation, and hence 
becomes a division manager of the organisation, he can no longer be 
expected to use the assets with the same due care as before the merger.1488 
Another branch of literature has connected the issue of firm size to the notion 
of control loss. Specifically, expansion of an organisation removes the senior 
executive further from the basic data of the operating conditions. 1489 
Information about those conditions must now be transmitted across 
successive hierarchical levels, with attendant information loss at each 
level.1490 In a similar way, the superior’s instructions to subordinates will also 
be increasingly distorted level by level within the hierarchy.1491 As a result, 
there is a control loss within the organisation, and “the larger and more 
authoritarian the organization, the better the chance that its top 
decision-makers will be operating in purely imaginary worlds”.1492      
6.2 Limits on institutional ITDR 
A centralised ITDR institution is analogous to a giant firm, and thus vulnerable 
to the maladaptation problem. First, Coase’s “diminishing returns to the 
entrepreneur function” are quite pertinent to the ITDR context. As discussed 
previously, tax disputes are highly recurrent, and high caseloads may 
decrease the efficiency of a centralised ITDR institution to the point of 
malfunctioning.1493 Indeed, the ADR movement resulted in part from the 
recognition that it is hardly possible for the court system alone to cope with 
massive caseloads, and that a decentralised system that includes courts and 
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various ADR providers may enhance the efficiency of the justice.1494 Second, 
a centralised institution may have difficulty adapting itself to conditions of the 
front line. In the context of ITDR, most tax treaties are entered into bilaterally 
and are superimposed on domestic tax laws. It follows that countries may 
have diversified preferences over the manner of conducting the ITDR process. 
As the MEMAP acknowledges, some competent authorities have developed 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements on both the MAP process and 
substantive treaty issues.1495 Some treaty partners with significant caseloads 
even have in place bilateral training initiatives, where their competent 
authorities have taken precisely the same training courses on ITDR.1496 Third, 
processing ITDR in a centralised place increases logistical costs for parties 
located in a region far from the institution’s location. For illustration, in the 
Peer Review Report on Canada, one peer, probably a European country, 
suggested that all MAP meetings between the two countries be arranged in 
Paris. The proposal was declined by Canada on the grounds that regular 
meetings in Paris would involve high travel costs.1497 This example shows 
that while on the one hand, there is a need for more institutionalised MAP 
negotiations, on the other hand, a centralised ITDR scheme may increase the 
party costs to a prohibitive extent. It is true that both the WTO and the ICSID 
have centralised places for hosting dispute-resolution processes. 
Nevertheless, as discussed previously, tax disputes are far more recurrent 
than its trade/investment equivalents.1498 According to TCE, ceteris paribus, 
high frequency of transactions warrants a more-specialised dispute-resolution 
mode.1499  
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1498 See above, Chapter4, Section 3.2.3. 
1499 See above, Chapter2, Section 3.3.2. 
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6.3 Proposal on a multi-layer scheme of institutional ITDR 
Given the concerns about centralised institutional ITDR, this author 
envisages a multi-layer scheme of institutionalisation, as illustrated in Figure 
5.  
(1) Tier Ⅰ: inter-governmental organisations for ITDR policy coordination. 
At the top layer, various inter-governmental organisations, including the 
UN, OECD, EU, and others, will participate in international or regional 
coordination of ITDR policies. In the international context, this author 
takes the view that since the OECD and the UN have already become the 
central fora for the coordination of global tax polices, the case for the 
establishment of a brand-new ITO is quite “thin”.  
(2) Tier Ⅱ: ITDR institutions for dispute resolution. At the intermediate 
level, various international and regional ITDR institutions can facilitate the 
specific resolution of tax disputes. These institutions can be part of 
inter-governmental organisations. For example, the institutional ITDR 
body proposed by Owens, et al. is affiliated to the UN.1500 They could also 
be non-governmental or even private organisations. In particular, various 
existing arbitral institutions can participate in the ITDR processes. For 
instance, the ICC has a long-established interest in engaging in tax 
arbitration. Regardless of their governance structure, these different types 
of ITDR institutions will have equal legal status, and therefore, national 
governments will be free to choose among them. For illustration, two 
Scandinavia countries may agree to refer their tax disputes to the SCC for 
arbitration so as to save travel costs. In contrast, another pair of countries 
may have more confidence in an ITDR institute under the auspice of the 
UN. 
                                                        
1500 Owens, Gildemeister and Turcan (n 193) 1007. 
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(3) Tier Ⅲ: institutional joint commissions. At the bottom level, countries 
may bilaterally work out a customised way of institutionalising their ITDR 
processes. To some extent, this bilateral approach to institutionalisation 
can find its legal mandate in Article 25(4) of the OECD Model: 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate 
with each other directly, including through a joint commission consisting of 
themselves or their representatives, for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement in the sense of the preceding paragraph.   
Compared with traditional MAPs, the joint commission reflects a more 
structured mechanism of conducting the procedure. Consider a pair of 
countries with high inventory of pending tax disputes; it would be desirable 
for the two competent authorities to establish a permanent joint 
commission. For example, they may appoint – in mutual agreement – 
some secretarial staff to facilitate the joint commission on a daily basis. 
This joint commission would be responsible for the management of not 
only MAPs, but also proceedings of tax arbitration and mediation. It may 
establish partnership with existing arbitration institutions. Take the 
aforementioned two Scandinavia countries for example, the joint 
commission between the two competent authorities may either manage 







Figure 5: Proposal on a multi-layer scheme of institutional ITDR 
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The multi-layer scheme can be summarised in a two-dimensional matrix. The 
first dimension is the order of the issue: whether it is an issue of policy 
coordination or specific resolution of ITDR cases. Policy coordination usually 
warrants the involvement of inter-governmental organisations whereas 
case-level dispute settlement allows for a more-decentralised institutional 
scheme. In this way, heavy caseloads of tax disputes can be dealt with in a 
more efficient manner while at the same time, the minimum standard of the 
ITDR process and a relatively consistent approach to treaty application can 
be better guaranteed. Furthermore, through policy coordination, 
inter-governmental organisations may help to create a political environment 
conducive to the development of case-level institutional ITDR.  
The second dimension is the geographic scope: whether the issue is regional 
or global. For regional ITDR issues, a localised and customised approach is 
more desirable so as to entertain the different conditions of various countries. 
In particular, an institutional joint commission reflects the most specialised 
and customised model of institutional ITDR. That being said, the above matrix 
should not be taken as a limitation on institutional innovations. For illustration, 
while the ICC reflects a non-governmental institution, it has also played an 




Figure 6: Two dimensions of the proposed multi-layer institutional ITDR 
 
                                  
 
                                                   
  
 
                                                          
 
          
 
 
                                  
 
 
7. Reply to potential concerns 
A major concern about the institutional approach is that this approach may 
reinforce the legalistic character of the ITDR system and thus contradict the 
antilegalistic position throughout the preceding chapters. In this author’s view, 
however, there is a fundamental difference between institutionalisation and 
legalisation. Whereas legalistic approach emphasises the role of a third-party 
neutral in conducting an objective assessment of the facts and arguments of 
a dispute based on predetermined rules, institutional approach merely 
focuses on the aspect of procedural management. Obviously, a robust and 
EU, etc. 
 Regional 








streamlined procedure benefits not only arbitration and adjudication, but also 
mediation and consultation. 
One might further contend that institutional approach may indeed increase 
the transaction costs of the ITDR system, both in terms of setup costs and 
running costs of such institutions. However, as already discussed above, 
such increased costs, if any, should be weighed against the benefits of 
institutionalization (Section 2.2.6). For instance, tax arbitration can be 
considerably streamlined through institutional facilitation. Indeed, a 
combination of the final-offer arbitration and some institutional facilitation can 
be a very cost-efficient option for parties having large inventories of 
stalemated MAPs. Moreover, considering the high frequency of tax disputes, 
transaction costs associated with institutionalization can be substantially 
spread among the cases managed by those institutions. Last but not least, 
the decentralised scheme of institutional ITDR proposed above allows the 
existing dispute resolution institutions to participate in ITDR activities, thereby 
minimising the need to build new ITDR institutions from scratch.    
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
1. Overview 
This thesis has developed an interdisciplinary approach to the topic of ITDR, 
drawing on TC theory. Based on this law-and-economic framework, the thesis 
provided a benefit-cost analysis of the major ITDR mechanisms: the MAP, tax 
arbitration, and tax mediation. It then explored various measures to 
economise those mechanisms and the entire ITDR system. To recapitulate, 
the optimal ITDR system that can be derived from the TC framework features 
three fundamental elements.  
(1) Comprehensiveness. The MAP, tax arbitration, and tax mediation all 
have their respective pros and cons. Therefore, a holistic approach that 
can synthesise their strengths is desirable. Chapters 5 and 6 respectively 
explore ways to economise the MAP and the third-party procedures of 
ITDR. Chapter 7 focuses on the improvement of the entire ITDR system.   
(2) MAP-orientation. Despite the comprehensive approach discussed 
above, different ITDR mechanisms should not be given the same weight. 
Based on the benefit-cost analysis in Part Ⅰ of this thesis, the ITDR 
system should be centred on the MAP, with tax arbitration and mediation 
built into the MAP to supplement or facilitate it.  
(3) Institutionalisation. Various institutions can play an overarching role in 
facilitating ITDR processes as well as the international coordination of 
ITDR policies.  
At the first glance, the above three elements do not add much new to the 
existing literature on ITDR. After all, despite the legalistic preference in the 
orthodox literature, many can also settle for the idea of building tax arbitration 
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into the MAP. The dichotomy between ad hoc and institutional approaches to 
tax arbitration has also received increasing attention in the scholarship of this 
area. In the article by Owens et al., the three elements – comprehensiveness, 
MAP-orientation, and institutionalisation – are all present.1501  
However, this thesis differs from the existing literature of ITDR in several 
fundamental ways. First, in the orthodox literature, the built-in manner of tax 
arbitration is accepted mainly as a compromise in the face of sovereignty 
concerns, or as a “half-way house” approach. For the majority of students in 
this area, stand-alone arbitration still represents the ideal mode of ITDR. 
Many take investment arbitration and the panel procedure under the WTO as 
role models for the ITDR system. Accordingly, only scant attention has been 
paid to the traditional MAP. In contrast, this thesis established in its theoretical 
discussion that the MAP-based system is economically sound and thus can 
be justified for its own sake.  
The emphasis on the MAP and the MAP-based ITDR system is also reflected 
in the policy discussions of this thesis. Specifically, Chapter 5 explored ways 
to economise the MAP from within, whereas in the orthodox literature, a 
legalistic approach seems to be the only promising solution to cure the flaws 
of the MAP. Several ideas that were proposed in the chapter, such as the 
structuring of the MAP and the reassessment of package deals, have not 
been touched in the existing literature.1502 In seeking to economise tax 
arbitration, Chapter 6 mainly focuses on its supplementary role. In particular, 
the synergy between tax arbitration and the MAP and the implications of this 
synergy for the arbitration procedure, such as the selection of trial method 
(oral or documentary) and evidentiary rules, has been overlooked by past 
studies, although the issue has already been recognised in legal practice, as 
                                                        
1501 See above, Chapter 1, Section 2.5.3. 
1502 See above, Chapter 5, Section 2.1.4, 3.2. 
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exemplified in a number of the US tax treaties.1503 The proposal on the wider 
use of final-offer arbitration, which is also distinctive relative to the existing 
literature, is again in line with the MAP-based ITDR system.1504 
As to the institutional element, while the existing literature largely confines the 
discussion to the topic of institutional tax arbitration, this thesis further 
envisioned the prospect of institutional mediation, institutional MAPs and 
institutional coordination of ITDR policies. On the other hand, this thesis 
proposed a decentralised scheme of institutional ITDR, which also differs 
from the orthodox literature on the topic.  
Finally, all the three elements were derived from a uniform and 
well-established conceptual framework: TC theory.    
2. Managerial approach: insights from international-law 
theories  
This thesis prominently features a managerial approach. The evaluation of 
various ITDR mechanisms and the proposed measures to strengthen those 
mechanisms are mostly based on benefit-cost considerations rather than on 
pure legal analysis. In particular, the thesis favours a comprehensive dispute 
management system, in which arbitration forms only a small part. This 
managerial approach has its counterpart in public international law: the 
managerial mode of treaty compliance.1505 Traditionally, theories on treaty 
compliance have been dominated by the enforcement mode, in which 
noncompliance has been conceptualised as wilful violation of treaty 
obligations that should be responded to with strict enforcement or coercive 
                                                        
1503 See above, Chapter 6, Section 5. 
1504 See above, Chapter 6, Section 4. 
1505 For representative researches on this topic, see Abram Chayes, The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press 1995); Markus 
Burgstaller, Theories of Compliance with International Law (MNijhoff 2005) 141–152; Chayes, Chayes 
and Mitchell (n 444). 
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sanctions.1506 Accordingly, politicians, academics, journalists, and ordinary 
citizens frequently seek to equip treaties with “teeth” in the form of coercive 
enforcement measures.1507 In contrast, the managerial mode begins with the 
recognition that countries generally enter international agreements with 
goodwill.1508 This is in line with the crux of IR theory that countries enter and 
observe certain regimes because they benefit from doing so.1509 In this 
connection, the principle source of noncompliance is not wilful disobedience, 
but the ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language, the complexity of the 
regime, and the capacity limitations of the noncompliance countries in 
carrying out their treaty undertakings.1510 Accordingly, the emphasis of the 
managerial mode is on addressing the sources of noncompliance and 
managing compliance rather than punishing misconduct. 1511  The key 
measures of promoting compliance under the managerial mode, including, 
inter alia, data collection, peer assessment, and capacity building, can all find 
their counterparts in this thesis.1512 In particular, while dispute-settlement 
systems still play a part in the managerial mode, less emphasis is placed on 
legalistic dispute-resolution methods.1513 As some leading writers on the 
managerial mode observe: 
Despite the fixation of international lawyers on the virtues of binding 
adjudication (preferably in the International Court of Justice, but if not, then by 
a specialized tribunal or arbitral panel), most treaty regimes turn to a variety 
of relatively informal meditative processes if the disputants are unable to 
resolve the issues among themselves.1514 
                                                        
1506 Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (n 444) 39,62. 
1507 Chayes (n 1505) 2. 
1508 ibid 3; Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (n 444) 39. 
1509 See also above, Chapter 1, Section 2.5.4. Chayes (n 1505) 3–4. 
1510 ibid 22. 
1511 Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (n 444) 39. 
1512 Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (n 444). 
1513 ibid 54. 
1514 Chayes (n 1505) 24. 
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Antilegalist though it may be, the managerial approach highlights the role of 
international institutions in promoting treaty compliance. “It is no coincidence 
that the regimes with the most impressive compliance experience – ILO, IMF, 
OECD, GATT – depend upon substantial, well-staffed, and well-functioning 
international organizations.”1515 It has further been recognised that various 
NGOs have also played an increasing part in the management of treaty 
compliance.1516 
The managerial mode is not free from criticism. Above all, it is contended that 
on many occasions, noncompliance does result from wilful violation of treaty 
obligations by unscrupulous countries.1517 Critics particularly refer to the PD 
situation, also known as the collaboration situation, where states have an 
incentive to renege on their commitments, “since they gain more from an 
agreement if they reap all the benefits without putting in their own share”.1518 
In such situations, enforcement mechanisms such as sanctions seem quite 
necessary to ensure compliance. Those critics particularly invoke the WTO as 
an example of the enforcement mode. 1519 
That being said, even those critics of the managerial mode acknowledge that 
this mode does work well in coordination games. In such games, as one 
writer reasons,   
once the parties have agreed on a certain set of behaviors, neither party has 
an incentive to deviate from the agreement, and compliance is the expected 
outcome even in the absence of enforcement. Because there is no incentive 
to cheat, there is no need to focus on enforcement. Resources are better 
                                                        
1515 Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (n 444) 58 
1516 ibid 
1517 Burgstaller (n 1505) 145–146. 
1518 Jonas Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’ (2002) 
56 International organization 609, 612; firther cited by Burgstaller (n 1505) 146. 
1519 Tallberg (n 1518) 612; see also Burgstaller (n 1505) 146. 
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directed at managerial issues.1520 
As has been repeatedly mentioned, the international tax regime presents a 
typical coordination game, thereby providing an excellent case for the 
management mode of treaty compliance.   
3. Reply to potential criticisms 
Given the antilegalistic position and the managerial approach in this thesis, it 
is not difficult to think of potential criticisms of the thesis and where they would 
come from. Specifically, proponents of a legalistic approach to ITDR typically 
highlight two advantages of this approach: preservation of taxpayer rights and 
promotion of legal certainty. These two aspects may also become the major 
grounds on which the legalistic camp can challenge this thesis. 
3.1 Taxpayer rights 
Criticism from the direction of taxpayer rights may argue that a taxpayer 
involved in a tax dispute will be directly affected by the resolution of that 
dispute. Therefore, the taxpayer’s interests and rights should be vindicated in 
the process of dispute resolution. In a broader sense, the taxpayers’ status in 
the ITDR process may involve the right to a fair trial, which is a fundamental 
human right. Such rights may be compromised in an antilegalistic 
approach.1521 This criticism actually applies to the entire law-and-economic 
approach, which is often said to be so overwhelmed by the benefit-cost 
calculation that fundamental values such as justice, right, and fairness, are 
overlooked.  
                                                        
1520 At Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 
1823, 1831; Burgstaller (n 1505) 146.  
1521 Katerina Perrou, ‘Participation of the Taxpayer in MAP and Arbitration: Handicaps and Prospects’ 
in Michael Lang and Jeffrey Owens (eds), International Arbitration in Tax Matters (IBFD 2015) 293–296; 
Baker (n 196) 467–471. 
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Nonetheless, to yield refutable conclusions in social science research, one 
should be careful in resorting to those fundamental values. As Lucas claims, 
“the formal idea of equality or justice as a lodestar of social policy is devoid of 
all meaning; it is possible to advance every kind of postulate in the name of 
justice”.1522 The same caveat also applies to the concept of sovereignty.  
Without prejudice to the above argument, this author further contends that the 
antilegalistic position in this thesis is not necessarily incompatible with the 
rights-based approach. First, the thesis challenges the validity of the 
sovereignty argument, arguing that the notion of sovereignty should be 
subject to the more fundamental value: the welfare of individuals. In the ITDR 
literature, sovereignty constitutes a major impediment to the promotion of 
taxpayer rights. Second, while each of the ITDR players has its own 
benefit-cost payoff structure, with one party’s benefit being the other’s cost, 
this thesis adopts a global perspective, in which the prevention of double 
taxation, the efficient resolution of tax disputes, and the liberalisation of trade 
and investment, are all regarded as enhancing the global welfare. Obviously, 
these social goods are also in line with taxpayers’ interests. Third, compared 
with the status quo, the taxpayer-participation model proposed in this thesis 
significantly improves taxpayers’ standing in the ITDR process. It is true that 
this research did not recommend a full-participation model. This is because in 
general, the law-and-economic approach does not recognise absolute 
taxpayer rights, but emphasises the need to balance various different 
interests in institutional design.  
3.2 Legal certainty 
Criticism based on legal certainty seems more compelling, as this value is not 
purely moral, but can also be incorporated into the law-and-economic 
                                                        
1522 JR Lucas, On Justice (Clarendon Press 1980) 31; Veljanovski (n 329) 60–61.  
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approach. Specifically, a stable tax environment reduces the risk of future tax 
disputes and encourages cross-border investments. For illustration, in an 
economic analysis of property rights, Barzel notes that in countries operating 
under a common-law tradition, such as the US and England, court rulings 
serve as precedents for new rulings. 1523  “Since court rulings become 
precedents for similar cases, litigants are resolving others’ disputes”.1524 The 
role of precedents in solving distributive conflict has also been confirmed in 
the theory of the BOS game.1525 In this connection, a potential challenge is 
that had the benefit-cost analysis of this thesis taken legal certainty into 
account, the conclusion would have been different.     
While this author does acknowledge the value of legal certainty, he doubts the 
validity of the proposition that it can only be achieved through legalistic 
dispute settlement. First, as argued previously, considering the difficulties of 
treaty application, a tax arbitrator/adjudicator may even feel struggled to 
justify a decision to the concerned parties, let alone provide guidance for the 
general public through the decision.1526 Second, legal certainty can also be 
achieved, at least partially, through antilegalistic methods. This author has 
demonstrated that MAP package deals, particularly with respect to framework 
agreements, also provide some legal certainty for wide groups of 
taxpayers.1527 Third, through the development of model conventions (and the 
commentaries thereof), relevant international organisations also engage in 
providing tax certainty at the policy level, and in a conversational manner. As 
Brown notes:  
While the legalistic approach to resolving tax disputes – arbitration – has had 
almost no impact on the development of international tax rules, government – 
                                                        
1523 Barzel (n 564) 98. 
1524 ibid. 
1525 See above, Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1.3.  
1526 See above, Chapter 6, Section 4.3.1. 
1527 See above, Chapter 5, Section 3.2.3.3. 
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through international bodies such as the OECD and the United Nations – 
have been able to agree on substantive rules that address a multitude of 
increasingly sophisticated problems and situations.1528    
Finally, the wide use of the APA, which is unique to international tax practice, 
indicates that in this domain, certainty is more often attained in a flexible, 
consensual, firm- or business-specific manner. In contrast, the idea of general 
legal certainty, or certainty that can be acquired once and for all, might only 
be wishful thinking.   
 
                                                        




Appendices: Summary of Peer-Review Reports 
Table 9: Summary of Stage 1 peer-review reports (Part Ⅰ) 
 
Country Denial of access to MAP 











1 UO1529, not notified1530  
(para 42) 1531 
Lmited experience 
(paras 133, 134) 
No agreements1532 




3 UO, notified; limitation  






  (para. 188) 
Austria 






N   
(para. 137) 





Y   
(para. 134) 
Canada 











Y   
(para. 142) 
Chile 













                                                        
1529 “UO” stands for “unjustifiable objection”; “2 UO” means “in two MAP cases, the assessed competent 
authority considered the objection not justified”.    
1530 “Notified” means for the MAP request considered as not being justified, the assessed competent authority 
has notified its treaty partner of such consideration. 
1531 The paragraph number denoted the exact place of the peer inputs in the Stage 1 reports on respective 
countries. 
1532 “No agreement” means that during the assessed period, the assessed competent authority had not achieved 
any agreement, and thus the actual implementation of MAP agreements cannot be assessed.  
1533 “AS” stands for “audit settlement”; “limitation based on AS” means taxpayers were asked by the audit 
department to forego MAP access as part of an audit settlement. 
1534 “N” stands for “No”. Specifically, “N” in the second column means no actual denial of access to MAP by the 
assessed competent authority during the assessed period. “N” in the fourth column means no issue of actual 
implementation of MAP agreement. “N” in the fifth column means the assessed competent authority has no 
monitoring mechanism in place for the implementation process.   
1535 “Y” stands for “Yes”.   
1536 “II” stands for “insufficient information”, “OG” means “opportunity granted”, and “3 II, OG” means the 
assessed competent authority denied access to the MAP in three cases, yet it had granted the taxpayers concerned 
opportunities to supplement the information required.  
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Derived from Stage 1 peer-review reports, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action14/ (accessed 9 Jul. 2019) 
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Table 10: Summary of Stage 1 peer-review reports (Part Ⅱ) 
 
Country 
Late or lack 
of response 
Rigid negotiation stance 
Delay due to 
complexity of the case 
Resource constraint 
General rigidity 
Rigidity due to domestic 
procedure 
Rigidity due to 
deference to audit 
department 
Argentina Para.134    
  
Australia   Para.141    
Austria       
Belgium Para.114      
Canada Para.93 Para.93     
Chile       
Colombia Para.83      
Croatia       
Czech Republic Paras 115, 128 Para.128     
Denmark Para.146      
Estonia       
Finland Paras 135, 137    Para.135 
Paras 135 (resource 
constraint and staff 
change), 138, 139 
France *Paras 100, 101 1537     
Para.115(resource 
constraint and 
                                                        
1537 “*” denotes that the peers observed significant lack of responsiveness on the part of the assessed competent authority.   
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staff change) 
Germany Paras 139, 140    Paras 147, 150 Para.146 
Paras 139 (staff 
change), 150 
Greece *Paras 132-134      
Hungary *Paras 135,136  Para.137    
Iceland       
India *Paras 170-176 Para.182    Paras 179, 181 
Ireland       
Israel       
Italy *Paras 118-120, 143   Para.117   Para.134 
Japan     Para.172  
Korea *Para.143  Para.149  Para.149 
Paras 125(staff 
change), 147 
Latvia       
Liechtenstein       
Lithuania       
Luxembourg Para.89      
Malta       
Mexico *Paras 139, 141, 153      
The Netherlands     Para. 94  
 329 
New Zealand       
Norway Paras 116, 129     Para.129 
Poland *Paras 115, 126 Para.127    Para.127 
Portugal Para. 137      
Romania       
Singapore       
Slovak 
Republic 
      
Slovenia       
South Africa       
Spain Paras 141, 143,145 Para.147 Paras 142, 147    
Sweden   Para.117    
Switzerland       
Turkey       
UK       
USA       
 
Derived from Stage 1 peer-review reports, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action14/ (accessed 9 Jul. 2019) 
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Table 11: Summary of Stage 1 peer-review reports (Part Ⅲ) 
 
Country Peer inputs on the use of ICT in the MAP process 
Argentina  
Australia 
The use of email increases efficiency (para.152);  
Suggested more use of teleconferencing (para.155).               
Austria 
Digital means of communication increases efficiency (para.112); 
Suggested finding new and secure electronic means to exchange information (para.114) 
Belgium 
Suggested periodic use of conference call; suggested the use of secured email to improve 
turnaround time (para.114);  
Canada Suggested more use of conference call (para.109) 
Chile 
Chile attributed the delay a peer had experienced in a MAP case to the use of mail via 
regular post. It therefore suggested more use of email (para.125). 
Colombia  
Croatia Suggested the use of safe electronic means (para.129) 
Czech Republic  
Denmark Suggested more use of email and conference call (para.143) 
Estonia  
Finland  
France Suggested more use of email (para.100); propose to use video conference (para.116)1538 
Germany 
Suggested more use of conference call (para.148); suggest more use of email; Germany 
raised the issue of information security in digital communication(para.149) 




Recommended more use of regular email and teleconference, which has expedited the 
process (paras 171, 179) 
Ireland Suggested frequent use of email and conference call (para.151) 
Israel  
Italy 
Suggested more use of (video) conference call (para.132); suggest more use of electronic 
means of communication to exchange confidential data (para.134)  
                                                        
1538 As to this point, France replied that it preferred to use audio-conference instead of video conference for 
technical reason (para.116).  
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New Zealand Suggested more use of email (para.139) 
Norway  
Poland Suggested more use of email (para.127) 
Portugal Suggested more use of email (para.153) 
Romania 
Suggested more use of email (para.132); do not regard telephone conferences as efficient, 





Slovenia Email and conference calls increased efficiency (para.151) 
South Africa 
South Africa noted that its peers’ use of mail by post rather than electronic channels 
caused delays (para.126) 
Spain Suggested more use of email (para.149) 





US raised the issue of information security in digital communication (para.123); suggest 
more use of conference calls or videoconferencing (para.127) 
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Derived from Stage 1 peer-review reports, 
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